

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

B.A. Eric Holtschke

**The Democratic Transition of Czechoslovakia,
the German Democratic Republic and their
Successor States, with Particular Focus on the
Geopolitical Framework after 1989**

Master thesis

Prague 2014

Author: B.A. Eric Holtschke

Supervisor: Mgr. Martin Riegl, PhD.

Academic Year: 2013/2014

Bibliographical Note

HOLTSCHEKE, Eric. *The Democratic Transition of Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and their Successor States, with Particular Focus on the Geopolitical Framework after 1989*. 120 pages. Master thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies. Supervisor Mgr. Martin Riegl, PhD.

Abstract

In 1989-1990 the communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe collapsed, opening up the road to democracy, came about by means of mass demonstrations, the first of which took place in Plauen (GDR) on 7 October 1989. Only a few months later, no-one could be sure how the world would develop. The so-called 'voice' was followed by 'exit' in the German Democratic Republic – and the Czechoslovakians were close to the events taking place in the embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Prague. The end of the autocratic system was followed by the process of democratisation, characterised by upheavals and the restructuring of political conditions. Free and independent elections marked the end of democratisation in both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The consolidation period was determined by the dissolution of both of the aforementioned countries. The author's focus was on economic consolidation, as well as on political consolidation with regard to regional integration by means of the countries' membership of international organisations and regional and sub-regional bodies. Finally, a comparison has been made of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and their successor states.

Key words

Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, regionalism, NATO, European Union, international organisations, transition

Range of thesis: 304,941 symbols, 44,327 words, 134 pages

Declaration of Authorship

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 304,941 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 134 manuscript pages.

Prague, 14 May 2014

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "E. Holtschke".

(Eric Holtschke)

<p>Institute of Political Science Master Thesis Proposal</p>
--

**Democratic Transition of Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic
and their Successor States with a Particular Focus on the Geopolitical
Framework since 1989**

by Eric Holtschke

Title/Topic of the Thesis:

Democratic Transition of Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic and their Successor States with a Particular Focus on the Geopolitical Framework since 1989

Thesis Supervisor:

Ph.D. Mgr. Martin Riegl

Date of Submission:

May/June 2014

Date of Defense:

June 2014

Number of Pages:

approximately 60

Structure:

1. Introduction
 - 1.1 Subject of Study
 - 1.2 Problem Statement

- 1.3 State of Research
- 1.4 Structure
- 1.5 Methodology
- 2. Theoretically-based Rapprochement: Definitions
 - 2.1 System
 - 2.2 Transition
- 3. Czechoslovakia and its Successor States in Transition
 - 3.1 Historical Rapprochement
 - 3.2 The Emergence of the Process of Transition
 - 3.3 Czech Republic and Slovakia within the Transition
 - 3.3.1 (Geo-)Political Effects
 - 3.3.2 Transition Today?
- 4. German Democratic Republic and its Successor State in Transition
 - 4.1 Historical Rapprochement
 - 4.2 The Emergence of the Process of Transition
 - 4.3 “Neue Länder” of Federal Republic of Germany in Transition
 - 4.3.1. (Geo-)Political Effects
 - 4.3.2 Transition Today?
- 5. Comparative Studies
 - 5.1 Two different transitions?
 - 5.2 Evaluation
- 6. Conclusion
 - 6.1 Summarisation
 - 6.2 Outlook
- 7. Bibliography

Key Questions/Hypotheses:

- 1. How can the development of the transitional process of Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic and their successor states be outlined?
- 2. What are the similarities between these mentioned states, what are the differences regarding to the level of transition and where do these countries stand today?
- 3. How can the geopolitical impacts of the transition be analyzed and evaluated (regarding to the membership of these mentioned states in international organisations)?

Reasons and Purpose of Thesis:

The author would like to outline the chosen topic due to his former area of interests. During his Bachelor Studies at University of Technology in Chemnitz (Germany) in the field of political science the writer was focussed on transition studies with regarding to countries in Middle and Eastern Europe. His Bachelor thesis, rated with 1.8, was dealing about a very special topic. Titled as “Continuity between Yesterday and Today? Transition of ‘Junge Welt’ from the Central Organ of FDJ [Free German Youth] to a left-wing extremist Daily Paper with Particular Focus on the years 1989/1990”, Eric Holtschke discussed the development and the changing point of a former central organ of the communist youth movement to an ultra left-wing newspaper in reunited Germany.

The purpose of the current Master thesis is lying in the survey of the development and comparison of the processes of transition as well as consolidation in both former communist countries Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic and their three successor states. An enormous lack of scientific investigation can be found referring to the transition of the German Democratic Republic due to the reunification with (West) Germany; nevertheless significant distinctions between the West and the East of Germany in regard to society, economy and politics are still more than visible which shall be in the focus of the thesis. Concerning Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Slovakia, the thesis shall follow a geopolitical framework and its aftermaths with respect to the membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union and Eurozone. Due to the Master Program in Prague the author tries to connect and to combine his country of origin and his current state of living to look behind the history happened in the past and to look for the future which will determine the transitional process tomorrow.

Description of Contents:

The Master thesis shall consists of seven ideally numbers of content. In the beginning the thesis should introduce the main area of interest which is going to be discussed in the further text. The introductory chapter will be especially focussed on the core problem statement and on an evaluation of the current state of research. Furthermore the thesis presents the structure and the methods which will be used during the thesis’ drawing up.

The first content-related aspect will introduce the main terminologies. It seems to be very important for the topic’s understanding to bring the readers of the final assignment closer

to the theory behind the essay. The author of the thesis would like to be concentrated on several definitions with regard to the terms “system” and “transition”.

In the third chapter Czechoslovakia and its successor states Czech Republic and Slovakia will be in the focus of discussion. In this and the following chapter the main content-related work of the thesis will be done. The writer will be particular orientated on a historical rapprochement starting in the mid 1980's before the emergence of the process of transition towards geopolitical effects regarding to territorial changes and membership in different international organizations will be in contemplation. Afterwards a brief evaluation of the today's level of transition will be added. The same structure is going to be used for the German Democratic Republic and later on the new-born federal states of reunited Germany.

In point 5 a comparison of both transitional processes will be given by the author before the thesis will be finished by a final evaluation. The main content is followed by a conclusion. The conclusion shall be used firstly to summarize the main topic and, secondly, to maintain a further outlook regarding to the future of both transitional states. The thesis finally ends by a bibliographical overview.

Description of Methodology:

The final assignment consists of two methods. The main method which will be used within the thesis consists of comparative studies of all three current countries in transition or parts of a country in transition. This method will be supplemented with the measurement of the level of transition given by the organisations “Freedom House” and “Bertelsmann Stiftung”. Both “Freedom House” and “Bertelsmann Stiftung” are focussed on nations in transition and their progresses. Not only the evolution of Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and German Democratic Republic and its successor will be compared; the author is going to be concentrated on the two different assessments of both organisation which will be included in the comparative studies, too. Furthermore, the second method consists of two interviews with contemporary witnesses and their experience within the process of the exchange of the political systems in Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic. It will be done by means of a journalism fact interview underlain by certain formulation of questions.

Selection of Bibliography:

Printed Books:

Alena Novosadová: DDR-Nostalgie in den neuen Bundesländern und die Geschichtspolitik der PDS, Praha 2012.

Barbara Lippert/Peter Becker: Towards EU-Membership. Transformation and Integration in Poland and the Czech Republic, Bonn 1998.

Barbara Thomaß/Ljuba Tzankoff: Medien und Transformation in Osteuropa, 1st edition, Wiesbaden 2001.

Claus Offe: Varieties of Transition. The East European and East German Experience, 1996.

Eckhard Jesse: Zäsuren und Neuanfänge in der deutschen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts im Vergleich, in: Alexander Gallus (Editor): Systemwechsel in der deutschen Geschichte, Köln and others 2006, p. 291-327.

Emil Voráček/Vladimíra Dvořáková: The Legacy of the Past as a Factor of the Transformation Process in Postcommunist Countries of Central Europe. The territory of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, former GDR, Praha 1994.

Gert-Joachim Glaeßner/Michal Reiman: Systemwechsel und Demokratisierung. Rußland und Mittel-Osteuropa nach dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion, Opladen 1997.

Hans Misselwitz/Dieter Segert: Rückkehr nach Europa? Die geistig-politische Dimension des ostmitteleuropäischen Umbruchprozesses seit 1989. Beiträge der Tagung am 8./9. November 1996 in Potsdam, Potsdam 1997.

Helmut Wiesenthal: Die Transformation der DDR. Verfahren und Resultate, Gütersloh 1999.

Jakob Juchler: Osteuropa im Umbruch: Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen 1989-1993. Gesamtüberblick und Fallstudien, Zürich 1994.

Jozef Mládek: Transformation Processes of Regional Systems in Slovak Republic and Czech Republic, Bratislava 1996.

Jürgen Anyel/Jennifer Schevardo and others: Transforming 68-89. Umwege am Ende der Geschichte, Berlin 2008.

Karl Schlögel: Die Mitte liegt ostwärts. Europa im Übergang, Bonn 2002.

Klaus von Beyme: Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

Ladislav Ájek/Carlos de Cueto : Politics and Economics in the Czech Transition, Hradec Králové 2000.

Lubomír Kopeček/Jakub Šedo: Czech and Slovak Political Parties and their Vision of European Integration, 1st edition, Brno 2003, p. 1-10.

Lubomír Kopeček: Comparison of Left Parties in Central Europe. Some Causes of Different Successfulness, in: Lubomír Kopeček (Editor): Trajectories of the Left. Social Democratic and (Ex-)Communist Parties in Contemporary Europe: Between Past and Future, 1st edition, Brno 2005, p. 109-117.

Lubomír Kopeček: Creating a New Democratic System and the Problem of Overcoming the Communist Past. The Czech Case, in: IPSA and IPSA: 21st World Congress of Political Science, 2009.

Lubomír Kopeček: Institutionalization of Slovak Political Parties and Charismatic Leaders, Volume 6, 1st edition, 2004, p. 15-26.

Lubomír Kopeček: Slovakia, in: D. J. Sagar (editor): Political Parties of the World, 7th edition, London 2009, p. 516-522.

Marek Škréta: Der Tschechische Weg. Ein "liberales" Konzept in der postkommunistischen Transformation, Wallisellen 2001.

Marianne Rinza/Wolfgang Merkel: Systemwechsel, 2nd edition, Opladen 1996.

Marie Kolmanova: Die neuen Bundesländer und die Tschechische Republik. Ein wirtschaftspolitischer Vergleich der Transformation 1990-2002.

Michael Zarth: Zwischen Deindustrialisierung und Aufbau neuer Strukturen. Zum wirtschaftlichen Transformationsprozess in den neuen Ländern, Bonn 1994.

Nadace Friedricha Eberta: Evropská revoluce roku 1989 a budoucnost Evropy, Praha 2003.

Ondřej Císař/Lubomír Kopeček: Czech Democracy, Politics and Society from 1989 to Present, in: Tadeusz Buksinski (Editor): Democracy in Western and Post-Communist Countries, Frankfurt am Main 2009, p. 227-262.

Peter R. Weilemann/Magarditsch Hatschikjan: Parteienlandschaften in Osteuropa. Politik, Parteien und Transformation in Ungarn, Polen, der Tschechoslowakei und Bulgarien 1989-1992, Paderborn 1994.

Sharon L. Wolchik: Czechoslovakia in Transition. Politics, Economics and Society, London 1991.

Stanislav Balík/Jan Holzer and others: Czechoslovakia in 1989. A Case of Successful Transition, Volume 5, Göttingen 2008, p. 19-42.

Vít Hloušek/Lubomír Kopeček: Cleavages in Contemporary Czech and Slovak Politics: Between Persistence and Change. Volume 22, 3rd edition, 2008, p. 518-552.

Vratislav Vavlík/Vít Hloušek and others: Czech-German relations within the process of the European Integration, 2012.

World Bank: Czechoslovakia. Transition to a Market Economy, Washington 1991.

Online Sources:

Bertelsmann Stiftung: Transformations Index, viewed on <http://www.bti-project.org/home/index.nc>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Dossier. Lange Wege der Deutschen Einheit, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/lange-wege-der-deutschen-einheit/>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Centar za javne politike i ekonomske analize: Political and Economic Transition of Slovakia, viewed on <http://ceahrvatska.wordpress.com/2011/04/19/political-and-economic-transition-of-slovakia/>, retrieved on 15th of May 2013.

Central European Democracy, viewed on http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/03september/pdf/S_Szomolanyi.pdf, retrieved on 15th of May 2013.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Life in Transition. Slovak Republic, viewed on http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/slovakrepublic_lits2.shtml, retrieved on 15th of May 2013.

European Transition Compendium, viewed on <http://www.eutransition.eu>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Freedom House, viewed on <http://www.freedomhouse.org>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Hans-Jürgen Wagener: Der deutsche Sonderweg der Transformation, viewed on <http://www.iwh-halle.de/d/start/News/workshops/20100311/presentationen/wagener.pdf>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Janík Zdeněk: Twenty Years after the Iron Curtain. The Czech Republic in Transition, viewed on http://www.juniata.edu/services/jcpress/voices/pdf/2010/janik_twenty_years_iron_curtain.pdf, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Jason Harmala, in: Atlantic Council: Slovakia Can Help with Transition to Democracy, viewed on http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/slovakia-can-help-transition-democracy, retrieved on 15th of May 2013.

Lubomír Kopeček/Vít Hloušek and others: Democratic Institution Building Process. The Czech Republic's Transition to Democracy, viewed on <http://www.eduinitiatives.org/publications/democratic-institution-building-process-czech-republic%E2%80%99s-transition-democracy>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic: Transition Promotion Program, viewed on http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/human_rights/transition_promotion_program/index_1.html, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Miroslav Beblavy: Slovakia's Transition to a Market Economy and the World Bank's Engagement, viewed on http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1530284_code367436.pdf?abstractid=1530284&mirid=1, retrieved on 15th of May 2013.

Mitchell Orenstein: Transitional Social Policy in the Czech Republic and Poland, viewed on <http://www.mitchellorenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Transitional-Social-Policy.pdf>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, viewed on <http://www.oecd.org>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Raoul Oreskovic: Economic Transition in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Twenty Years Later, viewed on <http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/28042/EconomicTransition.pdf>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Rolf Reißig: Von der privilegierten und blockierten zur zukunftsorientierten Transformation, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. 30/31 (July 2010), viewed on <http://www.das-parlament.de/2010/30-31/Beilage/004.html>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Soňa Szomolányi: Slovakia. From a Difficult Case of Transition to a Consolidated

Transition Online: Regional Intelligence, viewed on <http://www.tol.org>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.

Václav Klaus: The Economic Transformation of the Czech Republic. Challenges Faced and Lessons Learned, in: Cato Institute Bulletin, No. 6 (February 2006), viewed on <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb6.pdf>, retrieved on 3rd of May 2013.



Eric Holtschke

Praha, 21st of May 2013

List of Content

LIST OF FIGURES.....	3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	5
1. INTRODUCTION.....	8
1.1 <i>Object of Research.....</i>	8
1.2 <i>Problem Statement.....</i>	10
1.3 <i>State of Research.....</i>	11
1.4 <i>Structure.....</i>	13
1.5 <i>Methodology.....</i>	15
2. DEFINITIONS.....	17
2.1 <i>Regionalism.....</i>	17
2.2 <i>Region.....</i>	19
2.3 <i>Transition.....</i>	20
3. THE TRANSITION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.....	22
3.1 <i>The End of the Autocratic System.....</i>	22
3.1.1 <i>Notice of Electoral Fraud.....</i>	23
3.1.2 <i>'Exit' from Prague, Budapest and Warsaw: Mass Departures, Escapes – and the Externalisation of the Transition.....</i>	23
3.1.3 <i>'Voice': The 'Peaceful Revolution' of October/November 1989.....</i>	25
3.1.4 <i>Economic Crisis.....</i>	28
3.1.5 <i>Changes in the International Political Framework.....</i>	29
3.1.6 <i>Loss of International Financial Aid Scheme.....</i>	30
3.2 <i>The Democratisation Process.....</i>	30
3.2.1 <i>The Beginning of Democratisation.....</i>	30
3.2.2 <i>Further Process of Democratisation.....</i>	32
3.2.3 <i>The End of the Democratisation Process.....</i>	33
3.2.4 <i>External Elements of the Democratisation Process and Germany's Reunification.....</i>	36
3.2.4.1 <i>The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany.....</i>	36
3.2.4.2 <i>The International Dimension of Germany's Reunification.....</i>	38
3.3 <i>The Consolidation of Democracy.....</i>	40
3.3.1 <i>The Socio-Economic Consolidation.....</i>	41
3.3.1.1 <i>Economic, Monetary and Social Union: Exchange of Currency and Trust Agency.....</i>	41
3.3.1.2 <i>A Comparison between Unemployment in East and West Germany.....</i>	44
3.3.1.3 <i>Domestic Migration between East and West Germany.....</i>	47
3.3.1.4 <i>Gross Domestic Product (GDP).....</i>	48
3.3.1.5 <i>Inflation.....</i>	50
3.3.1.6 <i>Conclusion.....</i>	51
3.3.2 <i>The Political Consolidation.....</i>	52
3.3.2.1 <i>Two Plus Four Negotiations.....</i>	52
3.3.2.2 <i>Coming to Terms with the Stasi Past and Official Transfer to one Federal Republic of Germany.....</i>	53
3.3.2.3 <i>International Community.....</i>	54
3.3.2.3.1 <i>European Union/European Community.....</i>	56
3.3.2.3.2 <i>North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).....</i>	59
4. THE TRANSITION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.....	62
4.1 <i>The End of the Autocratic System.....</i>	63
4.1.1 <i>'Voice' instead of 'Exit': The 'Velvet Revolution'.....</i>	63
4.1.2 <i>Opposition Movements.....</i>	65
4.2 <i>The Democratisation Process.....</i>	66
4.2.1 <i>The Beginning of Democratisation.....</i>	66
4.2.2 <i>Further Process of Democratisation.....</i>	67
4.2.3 <i>The End of the Democratisation Process.....</i>	68
4.3 <i>The Consolidation of Democracy.....</i>	70
4.3.1 <i>The Socio-Economic Consolidation.....</i>	70

4.3.2 <i>The Political Consolidation</i>	78
4.3.2.1 <i>Dissolution of Czechoslovakia</i>	78
4.3.2.2 <i>The Czech and Slovak Republics Return to Europe and to the International Community</i>	81
5. COMPARISON	93
6. CONCLUSION	98
BIBLIOGRAPHY	101
APPENDICES	111

List of Figures

Figure 1:	Relocations from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany 1981-1990	25
Figure 2:	Alphabetical List of Mass Demonstrations with Large Attendance on the Territory of the GDR in 1989/1990	27
Figure 3:	Key Figures of Economic Development in the GDR 1987-1989	28
Figure 4 :	Development of Unemployment Rate in West Germany (excluding Berlin) and East Germany (including Berlin), as well as Germany as a whole, based on Dependent Civil Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages	45
Figure 5:	Development of Unemployment Rate in East Germany and Berlin based on Dependent Civil Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages	46
Figure 6:	Comparison of Net Migration Development in East Germany 1990/2008	48
Figure 7:	Development of Gross Domestic Product compared to the previous year in West Germany (excluding Berlin), East Germany (including Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-2013 (in real terms and concatenated) in percentages	48
Figure 8:	Development of Gross Domestic Product (in real terms and concatenated) compared to the previous year in the new federal states of East Germany (excluding Berlin) in percentages	49
Figure 9:	Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in West Germany (including West Berlin), East Germany (including East Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-1999 in percentages	50
Figure 10:	Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in Germany as a whole 2000-2013 in percentages	51
Figure 11:	Membership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic of the most important International Organisations	55
Figure 12:	Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic 1989-2013 in percentages	74

Figure 13:	Graphs showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech territory of Czechoslovakia, and then the Czech Republic, between 1989-2013 in percentages according to the figures in 'Figure 12'	75
Figure 14:	Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia and then the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages	76
Figure 15:	Graph showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia, and the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages according to the figures in 'Figure 14'	77
Figure 16:	Membership of Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak Republics of the most important International Organisations	82

List of Abbreviations

AfD	Alternative for Germany
ANO	Action of Dissatisfied Citizens
ANS	Office for National Security
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BFD	Union of Free Democrats
BStU	Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CEI	Central European Initiative
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CSCE/KSZE	Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe
ČSFR	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
ČSSD	Czech Social Democratic Party
CSU	Christian Social Union in Bavaria
DM	German Mark
DS	Democratic Party
DSU	German Social Union
EC/EG	European Communities
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ESWMK	Coexistence-Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
EU	European Union

EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FDGB	Free German Trade Union Federation
FDP	Free Democratic Party
G7	Group of 7
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR/DDR	German Democratic Republic
HSD-SMS	Movement for Autonomous Democracy-Party for Moravia and Silesia
HZDS	Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
KDH	Christian Democratic Movement
KDU-ČSL	Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party
KPF	Communist Platform of the Left Party
KSČ	Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
KSČM	Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
LDPD	Democratic Agricultural Party of Germany
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MERCUSOR	Southern Common Market
MF	Marxist Forum
MfS	Ministry for State Security
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, biological, chemical weapons
NPD	National Democratic Party of Germany
ODA	Civic Democratic Alliance
ODS	Civic Democratic Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
OF	Civic Forum

OH	Citizens' Movement
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
REP	The Republicans
SED	Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SED/PDS	Socialist Unity Party/Party of Democratic Socialism
SKDÚ-DS	Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party
SL	Socialist Left
Smer-SD	Direction – Social Democracy
SNS	Slovak National Party
SPD	Social Democratic Party of Germany
SZ	Green Party
THA	Trust Agency
TOP 09	Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V4	Visegrád Four/Viesgrád Group
VPN	Public Against Violence
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. Introduction

1.1 Object of Research

When the people across the Eastern bloc of Central and Eastern Europe went out on the street demonstrating and uprising en masse against the Communist regime, firstly in October 1989 on the territory of East Germany and then in November 1989 in Prague, Bratislava and other large cities of Czechoslovakia, the aftermath of the ongoing revolution was not predictable for either the scholars or for those directly involved. On 9 October 1989 more than 70,000 people demonstrated in Leipzig; a week later this number had grown to 120,000, and almost one month later half of a million in East Berlin: “On 4 November [1989] East Berlin experienced the biggest demonstration not to be organised by the SED in post-war history.”¹ At the same time, demonstrations were also taking place in Czechoslovakia: on 24 and 25 November 1989, between 700,000 and 800,000² people demonstrated in Prague, the biggest mass demonstration the country has ever experienced. The progress of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ at the time in Czechoslovakia is deeply connected with, and most comparable to, the development of the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ in the GDR.³ The citizens of the Warsaw Pact countries did not, and could not, know that they would find themselves in the middle of a new chapter of their daily lives and the life of the global community. In fact, they were in the middle of a new chapter of historiography. The end of the Cold War and thus the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was, in the words of Mary Farrell, “one of the late twentieth century’s defining moments”⁴. Sharon Wolchik and Jane Curry described the situation in their book *Central and East European Politics – From Communism to Democracy* as follows: “In 1989, the unthinkable happened: communist rule collapsed, virtually like a house of cards, all over what had been the former Soviet bloc.”⁵ The former Communist bloc saw a gradual transition to democracy. The revolutions, upheavals and watershed events that ended the world’s bipolarity, with NATO on the one side and the Warsaw Pact on the other, took place at breathtaking speed. The political, social, societal and economic changes soon led to a new geopolitical order: former state unions were dissolved and new states emerged, old borders were abolished and new borders were drawn, old treaties expired and new treaties were

¹ Fraude, Andreas: Die friedliche Revolution in der DDR im Herbst 1989, p. 20 f.

² Comp. Juchler, Jakob: Osteuropa im Umbruch. Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen 1989-1993. Gesamtüberblick und Fallstudien, Zürich 1994, p. 325.

³ Comp. Ib., p. 322-324.

⁴ Farrell, Mary: The Global Politics of Regionalism. An Introduction, in: Farrell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice, 2005, p. 1.

⁵ Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): Central & East European Politics. From Communism to Democracy, 2nd edition, 2011, p. 3.

signed. “As Germany came together, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union came apart, creating, from what had been eight states, twenty-nine states, nineteen of which are geographically in Europe.”⁶ However, the most important geopolitical act of the former Warsaw Pact states was, and still is, their return to Europe by joining the European Communities (EC), NATO, European Union (EU), later the Schengen Agreement and finally the Euro Currency Zone among others – the last-mentioned of these applying to at least a few of them. The accession of the former Soviet satellite states to the EU can be judged as a logical consequence of the upheavals, but “it has complicated the EU’s politics and economics”⁷. Regionalism, as a result of the transition to democratic states, became an important topic from the mid-1980s and beginning of the 1990s, particularly in the former Communist states, which were considerably affected by both fragmentation and integration: “The early years of the twenty-first century have witnessed an intensification in regionalism across the globe.”⁸ Furthermore, it is said that “renewed interest in regionalism has seen even reluctant actors move towards deeper cooperative arrangements and enhanced integration with neighbouring countries through either formal or informal institutional frameworks”⁹. In addition, inter-regionalism and sub-regionalism, as well as regionalisation – which will be defined later on – also played a major role in the transition process.

While the German Democratic Republic, and later the *Neue Länder*¹⁰ in the reunited Federal Republic of Germany had the advantage of a rapidly progressing transition in almost all regards, the Slovak Republic fell into a brief period of political dictatorship. The Czech Republic performed inconspicuously, even though the rapid economic changes following the split from Slovakia led to a large number of people suffering from reduced social circumstances. Nevertheless, in the GDR as well as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the changes represented an opportunity to establish a democracy and its necessary institutional framework due to their “early and decisive break with the past”¹¹. In the words of Vaclav Havel: “You may ask what kind of republic I dream of. Let me reply: I dream of a republic independent, free, and democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially just; in short, of a humane republic that serves the individual and that therefore holds the hope

⁶ Ib.

⁷ Ib., p. 4.

⁸ Farrell, Mary: Ib., in: Ib. p. 1.

⁹ Ib.

¹⁰ *Neue Länder* is the German term for the so-called New Federal States which were a part of German Democratic Republic and became independent federal states following German reunification. Five new federal states emerged out of the GDR: Sachsen (Saxony), Thüringen (Thuringia), Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) and Sachsen-Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt).

¹¹ Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): Ib., p. 4.

that the individual will serve it in turn. Of a republic of well-rounded people, because without such people it is impossible to solve any of our problems – human, economic, ecological, social, or political.”¹²

1.2 Problem Statement

The transition as a topic in scientific research is generally well analysed. Especially the democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe in particular has been, and still is, at the centre of studies since the radical changes began in 1989/1990. There is a significant lack of scientific study concerning the transition of the German Democratic Republic following reunification with (West) Germany; nevertheless, significant distinctions between the West and the East of Germany with regard to society, economy and politics continue to be more than visible – these shall be mentioned addressed in the thesis. This thesis aims to help close the gap in transitional research concerning the GDR. With regard to the lack of research and literature, the transition of the GDR will be examined in relation to the transition in Czechoslovakia and its successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics. This will have three main advantages, which will positively influence the used methodology: firstly, it is easier to compare the transition process in an international context; secondly, the comparison of the GDR with the Czech Republic and Slovakia will both form part of the methodology. While comparative studies are a rarely used approach in the field of transition, they will be highly suitable for this type of investigation; and thirdly, one considerable advantage of the comparative approach is its high level of transparency.

The purpose of this thesis is to give an overview of the development and provide a comparison of the transition and consolidation processes in both former communist states, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, and their three successor states. With regard to Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the thesis shall examine the geopolitical framework and its consequences with regard to regionalism and membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union and the Eurozone, amongst others. This thesis intends to take detailed look at past events and identify the factors that will determine the transitional process into the future. Overall, the transformation of the GDR and Czechoslovakia will be examined on four core layers: a) research, b) analysis, c) evaluation and d) classification of the developments and the backgrounds of the transformational process. The key questions are: how can the development of the transition process of

¹² Havel, Vaclav: Angst vor der Freiheit. Reden des Staatspräsidenten, Reinbek/Hamburg 1991, p. 17.

Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic and their successor states be outlined? What are the similarities between the afore mentioned countries and what are the differences regarding the level of transition and where do these countries stand today, and how can the geopolitical impact of the transition be analysed and evaluated (with regard to the membership of the aforementioned states of international organisations)?

1.3 State of Research

Transformational research is a relatively new discipline. The first articles on the subject were published during the third wave of democratisation¹³ at the beginning of the 1970s¹⁴. Even though the tradition of this field of research is not a long one, transformational studies are an elementary and indispensable department of research within the field of political systems and institutions of (geo)political science. Initially, macro-sociological and structuralist theories of social sciences formed the dominant approach of scholars such as Talcott Parson (1951, 1969), Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) and Samuel Huntington (1969). During the 1980s, these early approaches shifted to a consideration of a micro-sociological and player-theoretical approaches. The most important representatives of the second wave of transitional studies were: Adam Przeworski (1986, 1991, 1992), Giuseppe Di Palma (1990), Samuel Huntington (1991), Sharon L. Wolchik (1991). Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) focused particularly on the process of consolidation within a transition. Their core publication is called “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation – Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe”¹⁵.

The theoretically-led discussion of transition in Germany, which fundamentally focuses on a conceptual approach, is mainly founded on the achievements of Wolfgang Merkel¹⁶. Other pioneering personalities included Klaus von Beyme¹⁷, Manfred G. Schmidt¹⁸

¹³ Transformational examined the military coup d'état in Portugal and the upheavals in Greece and Spain in the early to mid of 1970s before research moved on to the revolutions in Latin America in the early 1980s and in mid of 1980s to the changes in East Asia finally getting to the dissolution of the Socialist and Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe.

¹⁴ Comp. Thomaß, Barbara/Tzankoff, Michaela: Medien und Transformation in Osteuropa, 1st edition, Wiesbaden 2001, p. 11.

¹⁵ Comp. Linz, Juan J./Stepan, Alfred: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe, Baltimore 1996.

¹⁶ See the five volumes of „Systemwechsel“, edited and published by Wolfgang Merkel.

¹⁷ See Beyme, Klaus: Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

¹⁸ See Schmidt, Manfred G.: Der Januskopf der Transformationsperiode. Kontinuität und Wandel der Demokratietheorie, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 26 (1995), p. 182-210.

and Eckhard Jesse¹⁹. Beyme classified the changes in Central and Eastern Europe in a new fourth wave, while Schmidt was especially focused on the term ‘democracy’ and Jesse retrospectively analysed and classified all four German transitions. Unfortunately, the change of political system in East Germany in 1989/1990 has never been the main focus of scientific research in the reunited Germany. One key reason for this may be the rapid adoption of the West German political, societal, social and economic system in the newly-established federal states on the former territory of the GDR. However, this change of political structures did not, and still has not, led to a common political culture. That is: while the GDR was certainly converted to the West German system, the transition – or rather rapid change – did not lead *per se* to a democratic consolidation of the newly acquired democracy. Nevertheless, the adoption of West German structures significantly supported the process of consolidation in the east of the country. A further reason for this is described by Wolchik/Curry: “This volume does not deal with East Germany, for former German Democratic Republic, which went through many of the same processes in its shift to democracy but in the context of reunification with West Germany rather than a separate state.”²⁰ This shall be a reason why it is high time for the GDR to be included in transitional research.

The chief representatives of transitional research on Czechoslovakia and its successor states are Vít Hloušek (together with Lubomír Kopeček)²¹ and Sharon L. Wolchik²². Vít Hloušek significantly combined the interaction of a theoretical approach and practice in the study of the transition in Czechoslovakia and later in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. On the other hand, he concentrated on an analysis of political parties and their transition in Europe, while Wolchik mainly analysed the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe as a whole.

Regionalism as a scientific subject and object emerged during Second World War, even though regionalism itself is “as old as history”²³. According to Louise Fawcett²⁴ three waves of regionalism can be defined: the first wave occurred between 1945 and 1965 with the

¹⁹ See Jesse, Eckhard: *Systemwechsel in Deutschland: 1918/19 – 1933 – 1945/49 – 1989/90*, 2nd edition, Köln and others 2011.

²⁰ Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): *Ib.*, p. 5.

²¹ See Kopeček, Lubomír/Hloušek, Vít and others: *Democratic Institution Building Process. The Czech Republic’s Transition to Democracy*, viewed on <http://www.eduinitiatives.org/publications/democratic-institution-building-process-czech-republic%E2%80%99s-transition-democracy>, retrieved on 23 February 2014.

²² See Wolchik, Sharon L.: *Czechoslovakia in Transition. Politics, Economics and Society*, London 1991 and Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): *Central & East European Politics. From Communism to Democracy*, 2nd edition, 2011.

²³ Tavares, Rodrigo: *The State of the Art of Regionalism. The Past, Present and Future of a Discipline*, in: *UNI-CRIS e-Working Papers*, No. 10 (2004), viewed on <http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/WProdrigo%20tavares.pdf>, p. 7, retrieved on 7 March 2014.

²⁴ Comp. Fawcett, Louise: *Regionalism in World Politics. Past and Present*.

emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Community, the United Nations and NATO; the second, mainly during the 1970s, saw the emergence of the European Monetary Union, ASEAN and other organisations that emerged in Asia and Africa, such as ECOWAS; the third wave, which began in the mid-1980s and continues into the present day, has been characterised by the agglomeration of European Union and the foundation of new free trade areas (such as NAFTA or MERCUSOR). The most important representatives of the first wave of regionalism were Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg and David Mitrany.²⁵ The main scholars of modern regionalism, including Louise Fawcett, Mary Farrell and Björn Hettne²⁶, see themselves as followers of a so called ‘new regionalism’. According to Rodrigo²⁷, the three waves of regionalism can be distinguished by: 1) agency, 2) vectors/motivation, 3) direction and 4) coverage. Other representatives are Edward D. Mansfield/Helen V. Milner²⁸ and Andrew Hurrell²⁹, all of whom consider regionalism to be a global phenomenon. Barbara Lippert is considered a leading scholar in English and German scientific literature describing and analysing the path of post-Communist states towards European integration.³⁰

1.4 Structure

The thesis will start with a typical introduction to the topic of the thesis, including the object of research, the problem statement and the state of research, as well as a description of the methodology used. The first chapter is followed by three important and necessary definitions of regionalism, regions and transition, which are necessary for an in-depth understanding of the subject-matter. The third chapter will focus on the transition of the German Democratic Republic, particularly the end of the autocratic system and the democratisation and consolidation process. The six main features of the end of East Germany’s autocratic system are introduced: 1) notice of electoral fraud, 2) ‘exit’ (the departure of GDR citizens to West Germany), 3) ‘voice’ (mass demonstrations), 4) economic crisis, 5) changes in the international political framework and 6) loss of international financial benefits. Three stages of the democratisation process will be distinguished: 1) beginning, 2) further progress and 3)

²⁵ Comp. Farrell, Mary: *Ib.*, in: *Ib.*, p. 7.

²⁶ See Farrell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): *Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice*, 2005.

²⁷ Comp. Tavares, Rodrigo: *Ib.*, p. 10.

²⁸ See Mansfield, Edward D./Milner, Helen V.: *The New Wave of Regionalism*, in: *International Organizations*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1999), p. 589-627.

²⁹ See Fawcett, Louise/Hurrell, Andrew (editors): *Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order*, New York 2000.

³⁰ See Lippert, Barbara/Umbach, Gaby: *The Pressure of Europeanisation. From Post-Communist State Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System*, 1st edition, Baden-Baden 2005.

the end of the process, culminating in external elements of East Germany's democratisation process, such as the role played by the Federal Republic of Germany and the international dimension of Germany's reunification. The upheavals in the political sphere will be mainly considered by means of an explanation and description of the process of changing the political elite in 1989 and 1990. The last aspect considered will be that of the consolidation of East Germany, which will form the main part of the thesis. The author shall focus mainly on socio-economic consolidation such as unemployment rates (a comparison shall be made between West and East Germany), migration to the West, the development of GDP as well as inflation. The author shall thus cover the main economic indicators in the period between 1991/1992 and 2013. Research will further focus on economic, monetary and social union through currency change and the establishment of the *Treuhandanstalt* (Trust Agency) as important milestones in the consolidation of East Germany. The second part of the consolidation of East Germany shall be presented in chapter 3.3.2 ('Political Consolidation'). There, the core issue of the thesis shall be addressed through the use of regionalism as a key approach. The GDR's shift towards the European Community/European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall be the focus of attention due to its symbolism with regard to regionalism. Furthermore, GDR's path towards NATO and the EU can be evaluated as the most substantial one following the reunification of Germany. Generally, the international framework played a major role in the reunification of the two German states. Additionally, the thesis addresses two more aspects of the political consolidation: the Two Plus Four Negotiations, which officially permitted the reunification, as well as coming to terms with the Stasi past. Both aspects are integral to the transfer of political, social and economical institutions and structures from the West to the East.

The rapid change of the political system in Czechoslovakia and its division into two successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and the end of the autocratic system, will be only briefly described, while presenting two key aspects leading to the democratisation of Czechoslovakia: 'voice' (mass demonstrations) and the emergence of opposition movements. A distinction is made between three phases of the democratisation process: the beginning, progress and the end of the process; the same structure as previously used to describe the situation in the GDR. The author shall initially focus on the political upheavals in November and December 1989, followed by the establishment of democratic structures and institutions, as well as some elements of a market economy later on, concluding with an analysis of the first free and democratic elections, with a focus on their results and outcomes. The chapter on consolidation initially deals with socio-economic consolidation from 1990 to the present. First

of all, substantial rules and laws introduced under the newly elected government, which significantly changed the economic structures of Czechoslovakia and its successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, with regard to the market economy, will be described, while also focusing on the social impact of the change of economic system. The author will thus concentrate on the development of three key economic indicators: 1) inflation, 2) unemployment rate and 3) growth in GDP in both the Czech and Slovak Republics, illustrated using different graphs. The process of privatisation, as well as Václav Klaus's concept of neoliberalism, which led Czechoslovakia and, subsequently, the Czech Republic through a painful economic transition are also described, concluding with a personal view of Klaus, supplemented with further background information from the political and socio-economic spheres. In addition to this, the chapter on consolidation shall consist not only of an analysis, but also an evaluation, of the socio-economic path taken. In the second part, concerning the political consolidation, the author shall start with an overview of the progress of and reasons for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, which has to be the focus when studying its transition. Attention is then focused on the Czech and Slovak Republic's 'return to Europe', followed by their path towards accession to international organisations such as NATO, the EU/EC, CEFTA, CEI and V4 due to the fact that they are key geopolitical players. Accordingly, these international and sub-regional organisations are more than suitable for providing a description of the geopolitical framework of Czechoslovakia's (and the GDR's) transition.

The thesis will conclude with a brief comparison of the most substantial distinctions between the course of the transitions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia and its successor states. The conclusion will include a summary which will form the final chapter of the thesis, followed by bibliography of primary and secondary literature used, as well as Internet sources, newspapers and magazines.

1.5 Methodology

The core assignment of the thesis' methodology utilises three different methods. The first method shall consist of the classification of the transitional process of the German Democratic Republic (including its federal successor states) and Czechoslovakia, including its successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, into the theoretical framework of transition studies according to Wolfgang Merkel. The point of departure is marked by the beginning of the end of the autocratic system, followed by process of democratisation and, finally, consolidation. The historical steps will thus be classified, first chronologically and second, associatively,

although it will be impossible to completely avoid chronological overlaps. The democratisation process has a describing function, while consolidation consists of a wide range of figures and statistics with regard to contrasting the economic development of all involved states as the second key method; this will be analysed, and thus evaluated, with regard to socio-economic impacts. The consolidation of democracy in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and their successor states concluded with political consolidation, which mainly consisted of the accession and integration of the aforementioned countries into international organisations and sub-regional bodies. With regard to the co-operation and integration of the reunited Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics into international organisation, particular focus will be placed on the geopolitical framework, which will be presented through an explanation and analysis of the development of regionalism within these countries. Research was thus conducted through the explanation of the preconditions of their participation, followed by analysis, and then evaluation, of accession. The third methodology which will be used in the thesis is the method of comparison, which will be addressed in a separate chapter, in which the key distinctions between the transitions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia and its successor states will be presented, compared and evaluated.

Two further theoretical approaches of the thesis' methodology can be found: 1) two-level game theory and 2) domestic-level theory. Both theoretical methods are used to categorise regionalism and describe the regional development of the reunited Germany and the Czech and Slovak Republics in the chapters concerning political consolidation. Both theories are *de facto* used as expedients to analyse regional entrenchment. While the two-level game theory provides information about the dependency of negotiations (negotiations are a major issue when joining international organisations) on both domestic (i.e. negotiations between the two Germanies) and an international aspects (i.e. negotiations between the two Germanies with other countries), the domestic-level theory discusses "the role of shared domestic attributes or characteristics"³¹. There are three strands of domestic-level theory, these being: 1) regionalism and state coherence, 2) regime type and democratisation and 3) convergence theories. The first of these sees regionalism "as an alternative to the state or as a means of going 'beyond the nation state'", in which the possibilities of regional co-operation and integration "are likely to depend very heavily on the coherence and viability of the states and state structures within a given region". The second strand must be considered the most valuable for the present thesis due to "the commitment to multiparty democracy [which] was

³¹ Here and following: Hurrell, Andrew (editor): *Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective*, in: Fawcett, Louise/Hurrell, Andrew (editors): *Ib.*, p. 66 f.

an explicit feature of the Treaty of Rome”. It further focused on the re-evaluation of domestic aspects and the “impact of democracy and democratisation”. The second strand emerged in response to neoliberalism in economics, being based on the assumption that “democracies do not go to war with each other”, concerned with “general propositions about the behaviour of liberal states”. Thus, the “relationship between regionalism and democracy is complex”. The third strand “understands the dynamics of regional co-operation and especially regional economic integration in terms of converging domestic policy preferences among regional states” whilst taking into account that “domestic policy convergence has undoubtedly been an important factor in the resurgence of regionalism [...]”.

The thesis attempts to achieve at least a seamless introduction of the process of transition as a whole, with a focus on the period from 1989-1990, which must be considered the most important in the countries’ transition process. The particular focus on regionalism as part of the thesis can be justified by the considerable importance of regional involvement for states engaged in a democratic transition. Considering the scope of the thesis, the author concentrated on using a descriptive, analytical and comparative approach. Description was used as a method particularly in the chapters on the end of the autocratic system and beginning of democratisation. Unfortunately the present thesis cannot provide a comprehensive overview of the transition process as a whole; nor was this the intention, as can be seen in the chapters on consolidation. The author focused only on key aspects which can be justified by an almost unlimited range of content. Based to the thesis’ scope and the available timeframe, the concentration on socio-economic and political developments during the consolidation process can be considered adequate.

2. Definitions

2.1 Regionalism

The term ‘regionalism’ indicates a general endeavour of a region or entity for greater autonomy and personal responsibility against a unitary/central power or hegemon.³² It can be seen as a political process characterised by cooperation and coordination among countries. Furthermore, ‘regionalism in international relations’ describes political activity that wishes to achieve union or cooperation to settle or resolve specific issues of at least two or more states

³² Comp. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: Regionalismus, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/wissen/17F6KL>, retrieved on 25 February 2014.

within a particular region at the regional level.³³ A region or an entity can be distinguished from others by geographical, ethnic, historical or administrative boundaries. According to Mansfield/Milner, regionalism is defined as “an economic process whereby economic flows grow more rapidly among a given group of states (in the same region) than between these states and those located elsewhere”³⁴. Mary Farrell defined ‘regionalism’ as follows: “[Regionalism] is a response to globalisation a reaction to the diverse aspects of global processes in their entirety.”³⁵ Expressed in her words, regionalism is connected to the “many-faced phenomenon” of globalisation, with both positive and negative impacts on countries; for countries suffering from negative impacts, regionalism can be seen as a means to “respond through regionalism as both a defensive and offensive strategy”³⁶. According to Mary Farrell, the development of regionalism is based on a region’s internal structures and dynamics, as well as on the regional actors’ strategy and motivation. Regionalism is a multi-modelled, global approach without a dominating feature that might encompass all countries. Hence many different approaches to the understanding of the processes and concepts of regionalism can be found in literature. Cooperation is further a main goal, a result of and, at the same time, *de facto* an inherent reason for and a goal of regionalism. This interplay can be regarded as evidence that regionalism and cooperation are deeply connected to a transition to democracy, stressed by domestic-level theories especially in European regionalism with regard to NATO and the EU, because: “Substantial cooperation has emerged among democratic countries, partly out of necessity and partly driven by the political strategies of the countries involved.”³⁷ In other words: the higher the democratic consolidation of a country (or rather of a country’s democratic standards), the greater the international cooperation between global regions.

Regionalism can be divided into a number of sub-categories, e.g. military/security regionalism and economic regionalism. ‘Economic regionalism’ contributes to regionalism via “reproducing global governance at the regional level” and as a “form of resistance to globalisation”³⁸. Economic regionalism may solely focus on cooperation in economic issues, and be therefore one-dimensional rather than multi-dimensional, while an economically-based regionalism can be regarded as the goal of regionalism itself: “[Regionalism] is a political process characterized by economic policy cooperation and coordination among countries.”³⁹

³³ Comp. Ib.

³⁴ Mansfield, Edward D./Milner, Helen V.: Ib., p. 591.

³⁵ Farrell, Mary: Ib., in: Farrell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): Ib., p. 2.

³⁶ Ib.

³⁷ Ib., in: Ib., p. 4.

³⁸ Nesadurai, Helen E.S.: The Global Politics of Regionalism. Asia and the Asia-Pacific, in: Ib., p. 158.

³⁹ Mansfield, Edward D./Milner, Helen V.: Ib., p. 591.

Examples of economic regionalism are the European Economic Community (EEC), EC, EU, European Free Trade Association (EFTA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Implications to welfare are usually at the centre of economic regionalism approaches. Scholarly opinion on and approaches to the differences between ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’ vary. While Hettne/Katzenstein⁴⁰ recognise regionalisation as a process of interaction on a regional level and regionalism as a set of different principles and ideas, Fishlow/Haggard⁴¹ regarded regionalisation as a concentration of economic flows within a certain region. Fishlow and Haggard define regionalism as a political process characterised by coordination and cooperation among countries and among economic policies. Taking a different tack Gamble/Payne⁴² regard regionalism as a project led by states and regionalisation as primarily a societal construction. Based to the suffix ‘-ism’ regionalism, in my view, denotes more a theory or ideology than a process, which is rather related to the suffix ‘-sation’.

Thus, military regionalism – also known as security regionalism – is an aspect of regionalism that focuses on cooperation and exchange in the field of armies and armaments. It is described as the “earliest account of regional constructions reflect military dominions or strategic territorial possessions brought together by violence”⁴³. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the best-known current military organisation representing regionalism. Other organisations in the past included e.g. the Warsaw Pact (1955-1991) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), founded in 1994.

2.2 Region

After defining the term regionalism, it is a necessity to also define ‘region’. The word derives from the Latin ‘regio’ which can be translated as ‘direction’. It is also rooted in the Latin verb ‘rego’ which means ‘to rule’. The concept of a region “has frequently been used to denote ‘border’ or a delimited space, often a ‘province’”⁴⁴. ‘Region’ is deeply connected to territories, functions and rules. A further definition can be found in one online dictionary, which distinguishes between five different general types of region. A region is thus 1) “an extensive, continuous part of a surface, space, or body”, 2) “[...] the vast or indefinite entirety

⁴⁰ Comp. Tavares, Rodrigo: *Ib.*, p. 6, retrieved on 11 March 2014.

⁴¹ Comp. *Ib.*

⁴² Comp. *Ib.*

⁴³ *Ib.*, p. 7, retrieved on 7 March 2014.

⁴⁴ Söderbaum, Frederik: Exploring the Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism, in: Farell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): *Ib.*, p. 90.

of a space or area, or something compared to one”, 3) “a part of the earth’s surface (land or sea) of considerable and usually indefinite extent”, 4) “a district without respect to boundaries or extent” and 5) “a part or division of the universe, as the heavens”.⁴⁵

A region have different dimensions: a physiographical-geographical dimension, an historico-cultural dimension and socially as well as geologically, ecologically, economically and politically defined types of region.

2.3 Transition

According to Wolfgang Merkel⁴⁶ a transition can generally be defined as a process of the dissolution of an old dominant structure to a new one in terms of politics, policy, economy and society. O’Donnell and Schmitter defined transition as follows: “The ‘transition’ is the interval between one political regime and another [...] Transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return of some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.”⁴⁷ Ideally, a transition can be split into three distinct phases. The progress of these phases may overlap, with no clear boundary between the different phases. All three phases often operate in interplay with one another. The three phases are: 1) end of an autocratic system due to internal (‘voice’/‘exit’) and external reasons, 2) democratisation and 3) consolidation. A transition can occur from a non-democratic political system to a democracy, as well as vice versa; however, the change from an autocratic to an democratic political system will be described in these terms.

1) Further examples of internal reasons for a transition might be the loss of legitimacy of an autocratic system and/or economic developments leading to an internal modernisation of societal structures. External triggers for the beginning of a transition can be defeat in a military conflict or loss of the protection and/or support of another (outside) party. The end of an autocratic system can take four different continuous forms: (a) controlled change of a political system (initiated and directed by an elite), (b) forced change of a political system from the bottom up (e.g. through uprisings and demonstrations of an opposition, usually leading to a rapid succession of autocratic authorities), (c) negotiated change of a political

⁴⁵ Dictionary: Region, viewed on <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/region>, retrieved on 1 March 2014.

⁴⁶ Comp. Merkel, Wolfgang/Sandschneider, Eberhard and others: Einleitung. Die Institutionalisierung der Demokratie, p. 13, in: Merkel, Wolfgang/Sandschneider, Eberhard (editors): Systemwechsel, Opladen 1996.

⁴⁷ Mainwaring, Scott: Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation. Working Paper, No. 130 (November 1989), viewed on <https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/130.pdf>, p. 4, retrieved on 2 March 2014.

system (usually due to a stalemate between opposition and regime/government) and (d) a collapse of the autocratic system (with a total loss of legitimacy of old authorities due to external factors).

2) The next step is the process of democratisation, which can be divided into two phases. Democratisation itself can be described as a crossover of political reign of a person or a group of persons on a set of institutionalised rules. Democracy must be recognised as the goal of the transitional process by a clear majority of people in the changing political system in order to achieve a successful transition. (a) The first phase, the start of the democratisation process, can be recognised through a loss of political control by the old political, illiberal elites while the opposition responds directly via democratic processes. The outcome of these procedures cannot be determined *a priori*. (b) The second phase is the ending of the democratisation process when a democratic constitution is established and – as a consequence – political competition and political decisions are formally binding. A further direct result of the ending of the democratisation process is the establishment of all features of democratic institutions as well as the replacement of the rules and norms of the previous regime. The new political actors thus have a considerable scope for action due to the non-existence of rules and laws in the newly formed political system. A well-balanced consideration of the interest of several political actors and of the general public interest is necessary in order to achieve successful democratisation.

3) The final step in a transition is known as consolidation. The consolidation of democracy is the basis for the stabilisation of the newly established democratic institutions, and can start even before the establishment of democratic institutions. Consolidation usually take place on four different levels: (a) constitutional/structural consolidation, (b) representational consolidation, (c) behavioural consolidation of the conduct of informal political actors and (d) attitudinal consolidation of civic society. (a) Constitutional/structural consolidation involves the generation of a consensus on the constitution by all central constitutional institutions and serves to construct and maintain a stable and legitimate constitution. (b) Representational consolidation is used to develop stable, long-lasting intermediary structures of political parties and interest groups to mediate between the state and society. This level of consolidation leads to a securing of freedom, autonomy and pluralism in a democracy. The (c) behavioural consolidation of the conduct of informal political actors targets potential societal and political veto-holding powers such as the armed forces, large landowners, entrepreneurs and financial capital, as well as radical groups and movements. This level of consolidation can be preferred in the event of the deep consolidation

of the two previous layers due to the loss of the intervention potential of non-formal political actors. These political actors thus accept democracy and become compliant to democratic structures. The final level, the (d) attitudinal consolidation of civic society, is an important socio-cultural substructure and the foundation of the legitimacy of a functioning democracy. This is a long-term process, which can last decades and can have a protective effect on the previous three layers of consolidation. The primary function of the consolidation of civic society is to develop support for a democratic system independent of the performance of the economy and politics.

3. The Transition of the German Democratic Republic

3.1 The End of the Autocratic System

The end of the autocratic system of the German Democratic Republic occurred for a number of different internal and external political, military and economic reasons. Four key reasons for the internal end of the autocratic system can be found: 1) recognition of electoral fraud, 2) escapes and departures ('exit'; German: *Ausreise*), 3) the emergence of mass demonstrations ('voice') and 4) economic crash (e.g. fast-growing national debt, underdeveloped economic structures and lack of competitive ability). Two key external factors were also present: 1) the political changes in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries leading to discontinuation of backing following the *perestroika* and *glasnost* reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as 2) loss of aid from the Federal Republic of Germany, for example transfer benefits and other financial assistance.

The aforementioned internal and external reasons are interrelated; all were mutually dependent and influenced one other. The dividing line between the internal and external factors is not always clear. The GDR started to collapse following an increase of internal pressure due to a forced change of political system from the bottom up through uprisings and demonstrations of the opposition and civil rights activists, leading to a rapid change of autocratic authorities by the elite itself. It might therefore be possible to add a partly controlled change of political system (initiated and directed by the elite) as a second cause of the end of the dictatorship due to an exchange of the elite and by the elite itself, leading to a weakening of internal structures and support. This resulted in the wide modern acceptance of

the political party *Die Linke*⁴⁸, the successor party of the *SED*, in the societies of both the east and the west of Germany. A third form of change can be added to the above: a negotiated change of the political system. Negotiations took place primarily between Germany and the Soviet Union and further with the victorious Western powers of Great Britain, the USA and France, as well as with the German Democratic Republic. Helmut Kohl, the Federal Chancellor in Bonn, played a leading role in these negotiations. A further fourth cause of the end of the autocratic system might be found in the total collapse of the regime, although the loss of legitimacy by the authorities was a gradual process that started with a latent crisis of legitimacy and ended in an acute, all-encompassing crisis of legitimacy. However, there were two key causes of the end of the autocratic system in East Germany: change of the political system from the bottom up and negotiated change of the political system. Two more potential causes can be perceived or evaluated: controlled change of the political system (initiated and directed by the elite) and a collapse of the autocratic system.

3.1.1 Notice of Electoral Fraud⁴⁹

On 7 May 1989 civil rights activists and other opposition representatives declared the *de facto* simulated regional elections to be an electoral fraud, and the political elite lost its last remaining shred of legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Even though the *SED* was alerted towards the negative atmosphere in the bulk of the population, the party did not backtrack on its clear decision to directly manipulate the GDR regional elections. According to official figures, the election turnout in Leipzig-Mitte was 98.54%, while exactly 96% of voters elected for the so-called 'list of unity'. As a result of the fraudulent elections a small number of demonstrations broke out, particularly in Dresden and Leipzig.

3.1.2 'Exit' from Prague, Budapest and Warsaw: Mass Departures, Escapes – and the Externalisation of the Transition

A further internal reason for the end of the autocratic system even occurred a short period before mass demonstrations broke out in the GDR: the departures ('exits') and escape of thousands of East German citizens to West Germany and Western Europe (e.g. to Austria via

⁴⁸ Comp. Jesse, Eckhard: Zäsuren und Neuanfänge in der deutschen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts im Vergleich, in: Gallus, Alexander (editor): Systemwechsel in der deutschen Geschichte, Köln and others 2006, p. 291-327.

⁴⁹ Comp. Richter, Michael: Die friedliche Revolution. Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989/90, 1st edition, Göttingen 2009, p. 103-118.

Hungary). Departures and escapes to West Germany unequivocally led to later waves of demonstrations, even encouraging mass demonstrations and thus the collapse of the GDR. 'Exit' and 'voice' are, here interrelated: 'exit' primary led to 'voice' and 'voice' subsequently amplified 'exit'. Ever since the GDR's signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the government had faced continuous request for departure, primarily to West Germany. Between 1977 and 1989 316,000 GDR citizens (not including pensioners) officially applied to leave the country for the first time; only 176,200 applicants (including ransoms by Bonn) actually received permission.⁵⁰ More than 100,000 GDR citizens left the country in 1989 (up till September)⁵¹, and the West German embassies in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw became meccas for tens of thousands of refugees from the GDR.

Sporadic occupations of the US and Danish embassies by GDR citizens had been occurring in East Berlin since as far back the early 1980s.⁵² These events were usually resolved through official silence. By the end of July and beginning of August increasing numbers of citizens were going to the West German embassy in Budapest to apply for departure to West Germany. A majority stated that they would leave the embassy only when they were allowed to depart for the Federal Republic of Germany. On 7 August the West German⁵³ 'embassy' in East Berlin was occupied by people who wanted to leave the GDR, at which point the state authority decided to close the Federal Republic of Germany's Permanent Representation in the GDR. Following the Hungarian decision to open its borders with Austria on the night of 10-11 of September 1989, the GDR transition took on an international dimension. By the end of September more than 25,000 GDR citizens⁵⁴ had taken the opportunity to escape into West Germany via Hungary and Austria, leading to a significant deterioration in relation between East Germany and Hungary. In the second half of September 1989 attention turned towards the West Germany embassies in Prague and Warsaw. About 5,000 people⁵⁵ sought temporary refuge in the embassy in Lobkowicz Palace in Prague, nearly leading to a humanitarian disaster due to lack of hygiene and food, while about 800 people⁵⁶ awaited departure in Warsaw. Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the Socialist Unity

⁵⁰ Comp. Henke, Klaus Dietmar and others (editors): *Anatomie der Staatssicherheit. Geschichte, Struktur und Methoden. MfS-Handbuch. Teil 3: Wichtige Dienstleistungen. Teil 17: Die zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe Bekämpfung von Flucht und Übersiedlung*, Berlin 1995, p. 50.

⁵¹ Comp. Eisenfeld, Bernd: *Flucht und Ausreise, Macht und Ohnmacht*, in: Kuhrt, Eberhard (editor): *Opposition in der DDR von den 70er Jahren bis zum Zusammenbruch der SED-Herrschaft*, Opladen 1999, p. 399.

⁵² Comp. Here and following: Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: *Das Ringen um die Deutsche Einheit. Die Regierung Helmut Kohl im Brennpunkt der Entscheidungen 1989/90*, 1st edition, Freiburg 2009, p. 52.

⁵³ The Federal Republic of Germany never maintained an embassy in the GDR; only a so called 'Permanent Representative' with limited rights and power.

⁵⁴ Comp. Fraude, Andreas: *Die friedliche Revolution in der DDR im Herbst 1989*, p. 7.

⁵⁵ Comp. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: *Ib.*, p. 61.

⁵⁶ Comp. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: *Ib.*, p. 63.

Party, personally came to the decision to accept the departure requests of thousands of GDR citizens in Prague and Warsaw. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, announced an agreement on passage to West Germany on the balcony of Lobkowitz Palace in the evening of 30 September 1989; this was probably one of the most positive, impressive moments in German history. The East German refugees were subsequently conveyed by chartered train through the territory of the GDR⁵⁷ (via Dresden and Plauen) to Bavaria on 3-4 October 1989; brutal clashes broke out between police and demonstrators in Dresden⁵⁸ while the train passed through. As a consequence, the GDR authorities decided to close the borders with Czechoslovakia in order to stem the flow of refugees. This decision increased the internal pressure in the already tense, heated atmosphere of East Germany.

Figure 1: Relocations from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany 1981-1990⁵⁹

	<u>Relocations to West Germany (according to West Germany)</u>	<u>Approved relocations</u>	<u>Relocations to West Germany (according to East Germany)</u>
1990*	250,000	0	238,384
1989	343,854	101,947	203,116
1988	39,832	27,939	0
1987	18,958	11,459	0
1986	26,178	19,982	0
1985	24,912	18,752	0
1984	40,974	34,982	0
1983	11,343	7,729	9,154
1982	13,208	9,113	11,118
1981	15,433	11,093	13,166
Total	784,692	242,996	474,938

* estimated indication

3.1.3 'Voice': The 'Peaceful Revolution' of October/November 1989

The foundation of the GDR on 7 October 1949 as a separate, formally independent state was a direct result of the aftermath of World War Two in the eastern part of Germany. Forty years

⁵⁷ MDR: Die Botschaft von Prag, viewed on <http://www.mdr.de/damals/archiv/artikel88860.html>, retrieved on 10 March 2014.

⁵⁸ Comp. Richter, Michael: Die friedliche Revolution. Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989/90, p. 258.

⁵⁹ Comp. Mayer, Wolfgang: Flucht und Ausreise, 2002, p. 113 f. in: Statista: Übersiedlungen zwischen der DDR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990, viewed on <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/248905/umfrage/uebersiedlungen-zwischen-der-ddr-und-der-bundesrepublik-deutschland/>, retrieved on 12 March 2014.

later, when the political leadership was celebrating the country's fortieth anniversary, the GDR and its autocratic structures were hit by the biggest, most substantial crisis the country had ever experienced. The country was severely weakened internally by mass protests, a high concentration of which had begun only days before. The so-called 'Monday Demonstrations', mainly organised by and taking place in Christian churches, had already been taking place for a number of weeks. The first mass demonstration on the territory of the GDR, involving approximately 15,000 people, took place in Plauen on 7 October 1989, while the political leadership was celebrating the anniversary in East Berlin. One article about the event in the well-known German political periodical *Der Spiegel* read: "The unnoticed heroes"⁶⁰, and went on to say: "In Saxon Vogtland a city is fighting for its place in history books, because the state power was defeated first in Plauen – and not in Leipzig." Today, a memorial plaque is located near the municipal theatre and describes the historic event in the best terms possible: "At this place the first mass demonstration on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic began on 7 October 1989. It was the beginning of the change of our world." Of course, while a few thousand demonstrators could not change the nature of the world, they were a part of the change and they were at least one of the reasons for the continuing protests all over the territory of the GDR in the subsequent weeks and months. Two days later, on 9 October 1989, around 70,000⁶¹ people took to the streets to protest and demonstrate in Leipzig. That day would later be called the 'Day of Decision'; there was no violent intervention by police units. That day went down in history as the day on which the revolution became known as the 'Peaceful Revolution'. Further mass demonstrations took place over the next few days after in Leipzig, Berlin, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Halle, Magdeburg, Potsdam, Jena, Arnstadt and Plauen. The wave of protests culminated in Berlin on 4 November 1989 in⁶² and two days later in Leipzig. At both demonstrations more than half of a million protested against the political dictatorship, striving for a renewed GDR with democracy, freedom of speech and free elections – and not, primarily, for a reunited Germany. The initial guiding principal was 'We are the nation!' which later changed 'We are one nation!'. Further waves of protest consistently broke out all over the GDR. While the demonstrations on GDR territory lasted until the end of March and beginning of April 1990, the content of the protests changed.

⁶⁰ Berg, Stefan: Gedenken. Die unbemerkten Helden, in: *Der Spiegel*: No. 30 (2009), p. 44.

⁶¹ Comp. Das Wunder von Leipzig. Friedliche Revolution, viewed on http://php2.artel.tv/wundervonleipzig/index_de.php, retrieved on 8 March 2014.

⁶² Comp. Probst, R: 20 Jahre Mauerfall. Die größte Demo der DDR, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (17 May 2010), viewed on <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/jahre-mauerfall-die-groesste-demo-der-ddr-1.142212>, retrieved on 10 March 2014.

The historian John Connelly said the following about the ‘Peaceful Revolution’: “The first demonstrations [in Plauen on 7 October 1989], concluded two days later in Leipzig, were the decisive moment in the East German revolution. They showed that the SED had in its own terms lost the right to rule, for it had ceded part of its power to ‘class enemies’ [...] The demonstrations appeared suddenly like a few brilliant flashes of light on an otherwise darkened East German map. Excepting Berlin, all of these flashpoints emanated from the south, and most strongly from the industrial town of Plauen, located less than 20 miles from the West German border. Up to a quarter of its 80,000 citizens defied heavily armed state power that gloomy Saturday. Plauen was the first East German community to express a united will for change; it was the only city where the East German upheaval was from its inception a mass affair.”⁶³

Figure 2: Alphabetical List of Mass Demonstrations with Large Attendance on the Territory of the GDR in 1989/1990⁶⁴

<u>City</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Demonstrators*</u>
Berlin	4 November 1989	500,000
Dresden	8 October 1989	20,000
	23 October 1989	100,000
	15 January 1990	150,000
Halle	20 November 1989	100,000
Karl-Marx-Stadt	6 November 1989	100,000
Leipzig	9 October 1989	70,000
	16 October 1989	110,000
	23 October 1989	225,000
	30 October 1989	350,000
	6 November 1989	500,000
Magdeburg	6 November 1989	80,000
Plauen	21 October 1989	50,000
Schwerin	30 October 1989	80,000

* Number of demonstrators is approximate.

⁶³ Connelly, John: Moment of Revolution. Plauen (Vogtland), October 7, 1989, in: German Politics and Society, No. 20 (1990), p. 71.

⁶⁴ With information from: Kermas, Sören: Die Demonstrationsbewegung in der DDR 1989/90, viewed on http://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCs_derivate_000000001998/Kermas_Wissenschaftliche_Hauserarbeit.pdf;jsessionid=F1455A7B82DAF78C347B027E6B2D8B69?hosts, p. 13, retrieved on 10 March 2014; Die Zeit: Wendezeit 1989. Das Anfang vom Ende der DDR, viewed on <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2009-10/Ende-DDR>, retrieved on 10 March 2014; Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig: Demonstrationen vom 13. August 1989 bis 30. April 1990 in der DDR, viewed on <http://www.archiv-buergerbewegung.de/index.php/demonstrationen>, retrieved on 11 March 2014.

3.1.4 Economic Crisis

The natural underdevelopment of a centrally planned economy connected with a lack of competitive ability and – in the East German case – the loss of financial support and transfer benefits as an aid scheme by the Federal Republic of Germany led to a severe financial crisis in the GDR, deeply affecting its political system and its legitimacy, even though the GDR economy was not on the verge of bankruptcy⁶⁵. Finally, the crisis called the continued existence of the GDR into question. Economic mismanagement, public debts, a non-functioning, or at least only partly functioning economy, based on the supply of raw materials and manufactured goods rather than on the law of supply and demand shall be mentioned as reasons for the decline of the economy of the GDR. There is also the fact that the GDR leadership was not willing to introduce the necessary, important economic reforms. A consideration of the economic crisis in the GDR leads automatically to the fact that both internal and external reasons can be found as a cause for the end of the autocratic system with regard to economic reasons. The GDR did not collapse due to the desolate condition of its economy, but due to the country living beyond its means.⁶⁶ When considering the extent of this thesis, the economic crisis of the GDR shall not be at the centre of attention; just a few important pieces of information shall be provided to aid better understanding.

Figure 3: Key Figures of Economic Development in the GDR 1987-1989⁶⁷

	1987	1988	1989
External Debts (in billion US-Dollars)	16.8	18.5	-
GDP (in billion GDR Marks)	332.81	346.13	353.34
Growth Rate of GDP (in %)	2.5	2.8	2.3

The economic policy of the post-1971 GDR consisted of three non-combinable goals⁶⁸: 1) improvement of living standards, 2) debt repayment towards foreign creditors and

⁶⁵ Comp. Martens, Bernd: Die Wirtschaft der DDR, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/lange-wege-der-deutschen-einheit/47076/ddr-wirtschaft?p=all>, retrieved on 12 March 2014.

⁶⁶ Comp. Ib.

⁶⁷ With information from: Ritschl, Albrecht: Aufstieg und Niedergang der Wirtschaft der DDR. Ein Zahlenbild 1945-1989, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, No. 2 (1995), p. 37; Statistisches Amt der DDR, in: Statista: Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DDR) von 1980 bis 1989 (in Milliarden Mark der DDR), viewed on <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/249230/umfrage/bruttoinlandsprodukt-bip-der-ddr/>, retrieved on 12 March 2014; Heske, Gerhard: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung DDR/Ostdeutschland, in: Historical Social Research, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005), p. 282.

⁶⁸ Comp. Here and following: Martens, Bernd: Ib., retrieved on 14 March 2014.

3) capital investments in the country's own economic structures. The first two goals were off higher priority due to the potential for destabilisation of the populace. Instead of accepting destabilisation, the government focused on the meeting of basic needs through increased spending in the national budget. On the other hand, international financial transactions were seen as highly important for the GDR's national independence. By saving on costs in energy and infrastructure, the government wanted to reduce budgetary spending, however, this led to negative impacts in labour productivity. A further example for mismanagement can be found in the emergence of the GDR's delayed, and never competitive, microelectronics industry, which subsidised with billions of Marks.

3.1.5 Changes in the International Political Framework

The end of the autocratic system in East Germany is deeply connected with developments in international politics and policy, particularly in the Soviet Union. The announcement of Gorbachev in March 1985 as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and his *perestroika* and *glasnost* reforms, followed by his annulment of the Brezhnev Doctrine on 7 July 1989, must be mentioned here. The idea of *perestroika*, denoting the introduction of slight elements of market economy reforms, the restructuring of politics and society in the Soviet Union and the review of the central control system, and the idea of *glasnost* (the transparency and openness of leadership towards its citizens in order to achieve the increased acceptance of reforms) hit the GDR at its foundation, leading to a sudden change in foreign policy conditions, deeply affecting events both within and outside the GDR.

Development within the Soviet Union cannot be separated from progress towards democracy in other Warsaw Pact countries, e.g. Poland and Hungary. Helmut Kohl tried to lead events both the aforementioned states in order to influence the aftermath in the GDR: "In this situation it is very important for Helmut Kohl to promote the reform process in Hungary and Poland."⁶⁹ The West German government believed in aiding the transitional process in East Germany by promoting the events. Support mainly took the form of new credit⁷⁰ from West Germany. Furthermore, the Poles voted for the first non-communist Prime Minister on the territory of Warsaw Pact in the partially free elections held in June 1989. These events were of prime importance in accelerating the pace of events in the GDR.

⁶⁹ Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 64.

⁷⁰ Comp. Ib.

3.1.6 Loss of International Financial Aid Scheme

Even though Kohl's government was not interested in worsening political and economic conditions in East Germany, it certainly focused on its destabilisation⁷¹; however, this process of destabilisation would be controlled and led by Bonn. While the GDR repeatedly requested an amount of 15 billion DM as financial support from the West, Bonn was not willing to invest in a system that required fundamental renewal: "It will not solve the problems, it will just prolong them."⁷² The financial support provided by the Soviet Union had cancelled at the beginning of the 1980s⁷³. Following the Second Oil Crisis in 1979, the GDR profited from the differences in oil prices between the open, global market and the limited market in the East to obtain foreign currency through the export of oil-based products. The Soviet Union subsequently restricted the export of oil and pegged its export prices to global market prices.

The Bonn government then started to realise that the country had been presented with a unique historical opportunity: the reunification of the two Germanies after being separated for over forty years while results of World War Two might be changeable to a certain extent, particularly, but not exclusively, in the case of Germany. The uniqueness of the moment can be described as follows: "The GDR is in the middle of crisis in which the country is to the greatest possible extent isolated for the first time."⁷⁴ Internally, East Germany was isolated in respect of its population; the needless retention of power seemed utopian. Externally the GDR was isolated in respect of its foreign policy. The loss of the support in Moscow was followed by the loss of support in Bonn; finally, even East Berlin's last remaining allies – Prague, Warsaw and Budapest – were entirely influenced by Bonn.

3.2 The Democratisation Process

3.2.1 The Beginning of Democratisation

There is no clear dividing line between the start of the democratisation process and the end of the autocratic system; overlapping elements can be found in both processes. The prerequisite for a successful democratisation process is the acceptance of democratic elements by a majority of people living within a political entity. The first stage of democratisation began long before mass demonstrations and departures from the GDR, even though the initial phase

⁷¹ Comp. Ib., p. 66.

⁷² Ib., p. 182.

⁷³ Comp. Martens, Bernd: Ib., retrieved on 14 March 2014.

⁷⁴ Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 60.

of democratisation must be described as weak and far from being accepted by a clear majority of citizens. At the beginning of 1980s, people who were dissatisfied with the regime had started gathering and forming only small opposition groups of varying nature. Opposition groups primarily grew out of Christian and intellectual structures rooted in Protestantism. Churches took a leading role later on, especially in the 'Peaceful Revolution' which mainly emerged through the so-called 'Monday Demonstrations' that were held in churches. Churches offered an apparently safe and protected place, free from the influence of the Ministry for State Security (German: *Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Stasi, MfS*). The leading role of churches developed and due to two factors: At first the churches experienced a process of inherent development, based on their inner structure. Secondly, the progress gained momentum from the people and for the people. Churches started to offer opportunities to think about the bigger picture; and the people demanded more. Hence, churches were a means to an end. Pastors in particular became important representatives of a slightly changing democratic society in the GDR. One of them, pastor Rainer Eppelmann, published the so-called 'Berlin Appeal' on 25 January 1982⁷⁵. The appeal was entitled: 'Make peace without weapons' (German: *Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen*). This was the very first time that a pastor had expressed a view in public in this way; and he was permitted to do so by the authorities.

It took a couple of years until this wave of Christian protest put down deeper roots in East German society. Thus the first non-Christian movement, the 'Peace and Human Rights Initiative' (German: *Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte*)⁷⁶, the first non-church based opposition, was developed and founded in East Berlin in early 1986. In any case, it was still too early to call the situation a democratisation process. A spillover of the early stage of democratisation into other parts of society can be found in 1988. Following a demonstration in commemoration of Rosa Luxemburg on 17 January 1988, about 100 protestors calling for 'freedom for dissidents' were arrested.⁷⁷ This day marked the start of the expulsion of dissidents such as authors, musicians, actors, human rights activists and other public figures, as well as ordinary people, by the political elite. The beginning of the popular democratisation movement in the GDR can be dated to 7 May 1989, when demands for more democracy reached a large section of the populace. As mentioned above, electoral fraud was, at the same time, both a reason for the end of the autocratic system and of the beginning of the democratisation process. Dozens of citizens' movements were subsequently founded all over the country in the summer and autumn of 1989. The most significant of these were: 1) the

⁷⁵ Comp. Fraude, Andreas: *Ib.*, p. 49.

⁷⁶ Comp. *Ib.*

⁷⁷ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 50.

‘New Forum’ (German: *Neues Forum*), a political platform for the whole country, founded on 9 September 1989; 2) ‘Democracy Now’ (German: *Demokratie jetzt*), founded on 12 September 1989; 3) ‘Democratic Awakening’ (German: *Demokratischer Aufbruch*), founded on 2 October 1989; and 4) the Social Democratic Party of the GDR (German: *Sozialdemokratische Partei der DDR*), founded on 7 October 1989.⁷⁸ The foundation of several opposition movements and political parties was compelling evidence that the leadership of the GDR was losing power and control over the country, at first slowly, then rapidly. The beginning of the democratisation process was thus a two-dimensional one: the loss of political control by the old, illiberal political elites and the opposition’s direct response through democratic processes. The results of these processes, and the future path of the GDR, could not be and were not clear. While some parts of the society demanded a renewed society being based on more democratic features within the GDR, other sections of society saw a chance for a total overthrow of existing structures. Later, a new, so-called ‘third way’ emerged during the round-table talks. The ‘third way’ was based on the idea of a continuity of the GDR between capitalist and socialist political, economic and societal structures.

3.2.2 Further Process of Democratisation

The further course of the democratisation process was marked by rapid, radical upheavals of the status quo. People and politicians, mass media and publicity, foreign countries and scholars on both sides of the border were impressed by the speed of change. The loss of political power and authority by the ruling elite was more than obvious for a large section of society in mid-October 1989: The *SED* Politburo dismissed Erich Honecker on 18 October 1989. Honecker had been in power for more than eighteen years. He was replaced by Egon Krenz, who became the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the *SED*.⁷⁹ He promised a democratic renewal of Socialism in the GDR.⁸⁰ Following the countrywide mass demonstrations in October and November 1989, the Prime Minister Willi Stoph resigned from office on 7 November 1989 after thirteen years in office, followed by the resignation of the whole Politburo one day later.⁸¹ On 6 November 1989 Erich Mielke, chairman of the Ministry

⁷⁸ Comp. Ib., p. 59.

⁷⁹ Comp. Ib., p. 60.

⁸⁰ Comp. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 76.

⁸¹ Comp. Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ereignischronik. Zerfall der DDR, viewed on <http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/ereignischroniken/zerfallDerDDR/>, retrieved on 30 March 2014.

for State Security, declared the destruction of all records of the ministry.⁸² On the 10th meeting of the Central Committee between 8-10 November 1989 the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR enacted the implementation of free and independent political elections, as well as the admission of opposition groups, freedom of press, assembly and speech and also economic reforms; these processes were embedded in intraparty reforms, although Marxism and Leninism remained the Party's *weltanschauung*.⁸³ In the evening of 9 November 1989 the unexpected happened: Günter Schabowski, Secretary for Information of the Central Committee, announced the immediate abolition of the Berlin Wall during a press conference, which was a sensational event.⁸⁴ A few days later, on 13 November 1989, Hans Modrow was announced as the new Prime Minister.⁸⁵ "With the election of Hans Modrow political power was shifted from the political party towards the GDR government which corresponded with Modrow's self-understanding."⁸⁶

3.2.3 The End of the Democratisation Process

Events followed in quick succession in December 1989. On 1 December 1989 the Socialist Unity Party repealed Article 1 of the GDR constitution⁸⁷, which declared the leading role of the *SED* in the country, the leading role of labouring class and its Marxist-Leninist party. This decision was followed by a series of personnel changes. On 3 December 1989 the entire Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party, including Egon Krenz, resigned from office. Egon Krenz, the chairman of the Privy Council, officially resigned on 6 December 1989. Manfred Gerlach was announced as his successor until 5 April 1990.⁸⁸ Gerlach was the first member of the GDR government who was not a member of the *SED*, but of the *LDPD* (German: *Landwirtschaftlich-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands*), the Democratic Agricultural Party of Germany.

⁸² Comp. Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: 6. November 1989. Weisung des Ministers zur Aktenreduzierung in den Kreis- und Objektdienststellen, viewed on http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/November-1989/Dokumentenseiten/06-November_c/06_nov_c_text.html?nn=1930806, retrieved on 30 March 2014.

⁸³ Comp. Fraude, Andreas: *Ib.*, p. 25.

⁸⁴ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 60.

⁸⁵ Comp. *Ib.*

⁸⁶ *Ib.*, p. 28 f.

⁸⁷ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 61.

⁸⁸ Comp. *Ib.*

Gregor Gysi became the new chairman of the *SED* in December 1989.⁸⁹ Gysi, still a highly influential personality in the modern, reunited Germany and current parliamentary party leader of the political successor party *Die Linke* in the German *Bundestag*, started to transform the socialist political party into an apparently democratic or rather partly-democratic political party. Political science in Germany judges the *Die Linke* party to be a (partly) extremist party on the left side of the political spectrum⁹⁰; its representatives and policies are subject to observation by the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution. At least part of the party does have connections with the militant section of the left-wing movement. One of these is known as the Communist Platform of the Left Party (German: *Kommunistische Plattform der Partei Die Linke, KPF*), and stands for Marxism-Leninism, advocating a transition into socialism and the overcoming of capitalism.⁹¹ Other significant observed organisations and movements on the lefts are: Socialist Left (German: *Sozialistische Linke, SL*), Association Cuba Si (German: *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Cuba Si*) and the Marxist Forum (German: *Marxistisches Forum, MF*). Gysi's efforts cumulated in a change of designation of the party in mid-December 1989: the name *SED* was extended to include the abbreviation *PDS* (German: *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus*) – Party of Democratic Socialism. The newly renamed *SED/PDS* lost more than one and a half million former party members in the following months.⁹²

At the same time, on 7 December 1989, the so-called round-table talks based on the Polish model were institutionally established in the GDR.⁹³ The Central Round Table in particular, constituted in Berlin, addressed the whole of East Germany. Opposition groups and civil right movements, as well as representatives of *SED-PDS*, the Free German Trade Union Federation (German: *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB*) and other parties joined the round table, which was organised by *Demokratie jetzt*. The Central Round Table was a decisive element that strongly influenced the policy of Hans Modrow's government. The main achievements of the round table were⁹⁴ the implementation of free and democratic elections and the dissolution of the Ministry for State Security and its successor, the Office for National Security (German: *Amt für Nationale Sicherheit, ANS*). The dissolution of the security apparatus was approved by a national committee established on 8 February 1990.⁹⁵ Shortly

⁸⁹ Comp. Ib.

⁹⁰ Comp. Bundesministerium des Inneren: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2012, viewed on <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/vsbericht-2012.pdf>, retrieved on 31 March 2014.

⁹¹ Comp. Ib.

⁹² Comp. Fraude, Andreas: Ib., p. 45 f.

⁹³ Comp. Ib., p. 61.

⁹⁴ Comp. Ib., p. 33.

⁹⁵ Comp. Ib., p. 62.

before this, the headquarters of the Office for National Security had been stormed by a mob on 15 January 1990.⁹⁶ On 8 March 1990 all unofficial employees (approx. 100,000)⁹⁷ of the National Security were dismissed. The Round Table was a representative of the aforementioned, so-called 'third way' of a renewed GDR encompassing democracy, capitalism and socialism: democratic socialism. The activities of the Round Table Talks culminated in the first, and only, democratic elections held in the GDR on 18 March 1990.

But back to December 1989. Four important dates must also be mentioned regarding the transitional process in the GDR. First, on 8 December 1989, a case was opened by the GDR's state prosecution service against leading functionaries of the previous regime, accusing them of corruption and abuse of authority.⁹⁸ Secondly, political prisoners were released four days later following an amnesty.⁹⁹ Thirdly, the foreign ministers of NATO declared their will regarding to a feasible German reunification on 14 December 1989.¹⁰⁰ From the beginning of January 1990 the physical borders separating West and East Germany began to be removed. The Brandenburg Gate was opened for the unrestricted movement of people on 22 December 1989 by Hans Modrow and Helmut Kohl.¹⁰¹ The Brandenburg Gate had been the symbol for the division of Germany since 13 August 1961, remaining closed for twenty-eight years.

Later, on 4 February 1990, the *SED/PDS* was again renamed. The political authority removed *SED* from the name and the *PDS* was established as the direct successor to the *SED*. This was the beginning of the institutionalised transition of the political party system in the GDR towards the West German system. Agendas, contents and policies were changed, political leaders were substituted and the political parties in the West and in the East became increasingly closer. The symbolic demolition of the Berlin Wall, which had divided Germany, began on 13 June 1990, first over a length of forty-seven kilometres in Berlin, where the history of the divided Germany had once began and, almost forty years later, abruptly ceased.

⁹⁶ Comp. Ib., p. 41.

⁹⁷ Comp. Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: 8. März 1990. "Regierung entpflichtet einstige MfS-Informanten", viewed on http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/Januar-1990/Dokumentenseiten/08-Maerz/08_maerz_text.html?nn=1930546, retrieved 31 March 2014.

⁹⁸ Comp. Fraude, Andreas: Ib., p. 35.

⁹⁹ Comp. Ib., p. 36.

¹⁰⁰ Comp. Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung: Historischer Kalender, viewed on <http://www.bundesstiftung-aufarbeitung.de/kalendarium-1423.html?d=14-12>, retrieved on 29 March 2014.

¹⁰¹ Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Deutsche Einheit. Chronik der Ereignisse 1989-1990. Brandenburger Tor endlich wieder offen, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1989-12-22-brandenburger-tor.html?nn=704580, retrieved on 31 March 2014.

The final stage in the democratisation process were the first, and only, free and independent elections held in the GDR, on 18 March 1990¹⁰². This saw the beginning of the first democratic government under the leadership of Lothar de Maizière's Christian Democratic Union (German: *Christlich-Demokratische Union, CDU*). This election appeared to be democratic success: turnout was 93.4% and the result was judged to be a sensation. Contrary to expectations, only 21.9% of voters voted for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (German: *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD*); the great winner of the election was the so called Alliance for Germany (German: *Allianz für Deutschland*), a coalition of three political democratic parties/movements consisting of *CDU*, *DSU* (German: *Deutsche Soziale Union, DSU*) and Democratic Awakening. The Alliance gained 48.1% of the vote. The aftermath of the election saw the establishment of a Grand Coalition between the Alliance for Germany, the Social Democrats and the Union of Free Democrats (German: *Bund freier Demokraten, BFD*). According to the policies of the political parties forming the new government the result of the election can be interpreted as a clear vote for a German reunification: approx. 75% of all voters elected a political party advocating reunification.

3.2.4 External Elements of the Democratisation Process and Germany's Reunification

3.2.4.1 The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany played a major role in the early stages of the end of the autocratic system and subsequently the democratisation process. Helmut Kohl, the German Christian Democratic chancellor, was at the epicentre of the subversions in the East of the country. Helmut Kohl and his West German government made a causal contribution to the reunification of Germany, the results of which would probably not have occurred without him and his negotiating skills. Kohl saw his chance and floated, both at home and abroad, the prospect of a possible German reunification, and eventually went down in the history of the reunited Germany as the 'Reunification Chancellor', as he was known to the people.

Besides Hans-Dietrich Genscher's declaration about passage to West Germany from the balcony of the Lobkowitz Palace in the evening of 30 September 1989, Helmut Kohl introduced a 'Ten-Point Programme' (German: *Zehn-Punkte-Programm*) aiming at overcoming the division of Germany. The programme was presented as part of a government

¹⁰² Comp. Here and following: Fraude, Andreas: *Ib.*, p. 46.

declaration on 28 November 1989¹⁰³ and was connected to Hans Modrow's idea of a contract union between the two German states; obviously Kohl wanted more than merely a contract union. Kohl's 'Ten-Point Programme' was developed due to a non-existent concept for the case of Germany's reunification: "Surprisingly, 40 years after foundation of both German states, the day of open borders has come and the Federal Government did not have a practical concept for what to do. In particular, there are no current preparations, no schedules and no crisis scenarios at all for imminent reunification that could be used by the Chancellor's Office."¹⁰⁴ The 'Ten-Point Programme' aimed to achieve the following¹⁰⁵: 1) immediate action (economic and humanitarian aid for the healthcare system together with the facilitation of right of entry to the GDR), 2) extension of co-operation between both German states in traffic and transportation as well as environmental protection, 3) extensive economic aid in the event of domestic democratisation, 4) contract union (common commissions for culture, the environment, economy and traffic/transportation, 5) creation of confederal structures (a democratically elected government in East Berlin is required), 6) embedding of Germany within the European architecture, 7) co-operative openness of the European Community to the reforming states in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 8) strengthening of negotiations with the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 9) disarmament and arms control according to political developments, 10) a free, reunited Germany in a free and reunited Europe. "The reunification, *id est* recovery of national unity, remain the aim of the CDU", is written in the last and obviously most important point. Helmut Kohl clearly stated that German reunification remained the chief goal: "Nobody knows what a reunited Germany will finally look like. But I am sure that unity will come, if that is what the people of Germany want."

In summary, it can be stated that Kohl and his government connected the implementation of the 'Ten-Point Programme' to a democratic transition within the GDR. Kohl deliberately went through these processes without a fixed schedule. The 'Ten-Point Programme' can be judged a catalyst for the realisation of a discussed idea (Germany's imagined reunification) towards a goal of political practice. Helmut Kohl's speech on 28 November 1989 was seen as one of the most highly significant and consequential statements

¹⁰³ Comp. Kohl, Helmut: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik 1989, viewed on <http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?msg=559>, retrieved on 22 March 2014.

¹⁰⁴ Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: *Ib.*, p. 85.

¹⁰⁵ Comp. Here and following: Kohl, Helmut: 28. November 1989. Erklärung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik, viewed on <http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?msg=627>, retrieved on 22 March 2014.

in German history.¹⁰⁶ It is worth mentioning that Kohl informed neither his parliamentary party in the German *Bundestag* nor his Liberal coalition partner, the *FDP* (German: *Freie Demokratische Partei*), nor West Germany's allies in NATO.¹⁰⁷ Helmut Kohl's visit in Dresden on 19 December 1989 seemed to be a plebiscitary confirmation of his efforts to achieve a reunited Germany: crowds of people cheered him due to his commitment to this goal.

3.2.4.2 The International Dimension of Germany's Reunification

The international framework was of substantial importance to Germany's reunification. Events thus proceeded due to an interplay of Bonn's negotiations and East and Central European reforms embedded into negotiations, talks, encounters and conferences. The international scene cannot be described in its entirety; only few important aspects shall be presented, with a focus on the victorious powers of World War Two.

USA: the United States of America adopted a positive attitude towards any future German reunification. "They [the USA] want to bear down upon reunification within a slowly and carefully evolutionary process embedded in European unification."¹⁰⁸ Both the American President Bush and Mitchell, majority leader of Democrats in the Senate, spoke out in favour of German reunification.

France: the French government presented a legalist approach. President Mitterrand was of the opinion that the quest for a reunited Germany was embedded in a legitimate process, even if it might be a complicated, protracted procedure. On the one hand he demanded a peaceful and democratic development, and on the other he ruled out support by France; the French fear of a revitalised, reunited postwar Germany was still visible.

Great Britain: the British government in London, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, highlighted the right of self-determination of the Germans, particularly affirmed by Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. Hanns Jürgen Küsters analysed the situation as follows: "The government in London seems to act up to the principle: We stand for reunification because we know it will not happen."¹⁰⁹ France served as an ally for Great Britain: both were

¹⁰⁶ Comp. Kohl, Helmut: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik 1989, viewed on <http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?msg=559>, retrieved on 22 March 2014.

¹⁰⁷ Comp. Ib.

¹⁰⁸ Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 86.

¹⁰⁹ Ib., p. 87.

interested in self-determination of the Germans, but not in reunification. Later on, in her memoirs, Thatcher judged her foreign policy strategy to be a “flop”¹¹⁰.

Soviet Union: the situation in the Soviet Union must be viewed against the backdrop of domestic upheavals and the resulting loss of control by the Communist Party. The international dimension of the Soviet Union was determined by serious economic problems and the transition of its political system, as well as mass demonstrations and revolutions in other Warsaw Pact countries. The loss of power of the Soviet Union by the end of the 1980s was more than visible in almost all fields of politics, economics and society. It began by Gorbachev’s *perestroika* and *glasnost* reforms and initially resulted in the annulment of the Brezhnev Doctrine on 7 July 1989. Gorbachev’s speech to students in Moscow on 15 November 1989 must be mentioned as a milestone on the path to the reunification of Germany: in it, Gorbachev announced the possibility of a reunited Germany. This was the catalyst for Kohl’s “Ten Point Programme”.¹¹¹ In the end, the government in Moscow was open-minded¹¹² with regard to Germany’s reunification on condition of the retention of the pan-European peace policy, even though Kohl had a difficult road ahead of him in his efforts to convince the Soviet leadership in Moscow.

Israel: the Israeli government was traditionally suspicious of Germany. Prime Minister Shamir was unsettled by a feasible German reunification; in an interview he mentioned the Israeli fear of a possible repetition of the Holocaust following reunification.¹¹³ Israel obviously had insurmountable issues with an enlarged Germany.

The international dimension of the reunification of Germany proceeded as follows: Helmut Kohl participated in a special summit of the European Community on 18 November 1989. His mission seemed to be both simple and impossible at the same time: to do a lot of persuasion in favour of a reunited Germany. His ultimate objective was a European political, monetary and economic union, as well as assistance in the reform processes in Central and Eastern Europe: “The overcoming of Germany’s division has to come along with the overcoming of Europe’s division in the context of a stable blueprint for lasting peace.”¹¹⁴ It was at this moment that the foundations of today’s European Union were laid; this came, however, at the cost of the future discontinuation of the beloved *Deutsche Mark*.

The international community was especially apprehensive about the rapidity of these processes, while also recognising the opportunities and benefits for Europe as a whole:

¹¹⁰ *Ib.*, p. 99.

¹¹¹ Comp. Kohl, Helmut: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik 1989, *ib.*, retrieved on 22 March 2014.

¹¹² Comp. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: *Ib.*, p. 90 f.

¹¹³ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 99.

¹¹⁴ *Ib.*, p. 87.

economic growth, stable borders (the recognition of Poland's western border by a reunited Germany), European integration and the enlargement of NATO, as well as disarmament. Nevertheless, Helmut Kohl was criticised for, amongst other issues, his lack of a timetable. Poland in particular was concerned about the prospect of an enlarged Germany due to the possible non-recognition of its western border by a reunited Germany. On 4 December 1989 a NATO summit was held in Brussels and only a few days later, on 14 December 1989, the foreign ministers of NATO declared their will regarding a feasible German reunification. Francois Mitterrand was the first statesman of the three victorious Western powers to visit the GDR. Between 20-22 December 1989, Mitterrand declared in Leipzig that nowadays "two sovereign German states" existed who "cannot be redeemed out of reality at a single blow"¹¹⁵. One key question remained during all these negotiations: would a reunited Germany become a member of NATO?

Representatives of West and East Germany, as well as of the USA, France, Great Britain and the USSR, met in Ottawa to address this question, initially on 13 February 1990 at the so-called Two Plus Four Negotiations¹¹⁶, smoothing the way for the reunification of Germany.

3.3 The Consolidation of Democracy

The consolidation of the reform process towards democracy began even before the end of the democratisation process. The first and only free and democratic elections in the GDR were held on 18 March 1990 and marked a preliminary milestone at the end of the democratisation process. The requirement for an election based on democratic principles is the acceptance of democracy by a majority of people. An election turnout of almost 95% can be considered strong evidence for approval. Even though a democratic constitution had not yet been established, the first steps had been taken towards a new constitution, which would occur officially by accession to the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990. But before this, political competition and democratic political decisions were established; first democratic institutions were developed and the 'old' rules and norms of the previous regime replaced. The Unification Treaty (German: *Einigungsvertrag*) can be regarded as the first, and most important, step in the GDR's consolidation of its political system in a reunited Germany. While, unfortunately, the exact point of intersection of the end of democratisation and the

¹¹⁵ Fraude, Andreas: *Ib.*, p. 55.

¹¹⁶ See more about Two Plus Four Negotiations in Thesis' section 'Consolidation'.

beginning of consolidation cannot be definitely established, there is no doubt that the free elections marked the end of the democratisation process and the beginning of the consolidation of democracy. The GDR had been *de facto* democratised.¹¹⁷ After a brief period of democratisation the GDR became a liberal-democratic state six months before the reunification with the Federal Republic.¹¹⁸ “By accession [of scope of West Germany] one democracy was substituted by another”, Richter said, adding: “Within a short while East Germans lived in two democracies, whereby the first one was substantially self-created.”¹¹⁹ Subsequent elaboration shall be seen as an attempt at classification.

The transition, and thus consolidation, of East Germany must be viewed as a *Sonderweg* in many respects compared to all other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. First of all, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR had a partner who supported the transition process financially, politically, substantially, ideationally and with personnel. Secondly, the GDR simply assumed control of existing stable, sustainable and long-lasting institutional structures, with all their negative and positive aspects. Thirdly, the territory of what had previously been the GDR immediately joined NATO and other international organisations without a transitional period. The transition of the GDR can thus be described as shock therapy, while other countries experienced a gradual transition. The institutional transition proved particularly advantageous due to assistance given by West Germany, which absolved those in the East of the need to search for solutions.

3.3.1 The Socio-Economic Consolidation

3.3.1.1 Economic, Monetary and Social Union: Exchange of Currency and Trust Agency

The economic system experienced a rapid, literally overnight, change, including the introduction of modern banking and financial sectors embedded in an overall monetarisation, which were the preconditions for the introduction of the *Deutschmark* on the territory of the East and its integrated into the so-called economic, monetary and social union between the West and the East by 1 July 1990. The union was sealed in an agreement signed on 18 May 1990 by the Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere, as

¹¹⁷ Comp. Richter, Michael: Doppelte Demokratisierung und deutsche Einheit, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: DDR 1990, No. 10 (2010), p. 20.

¹¹⁸ Comp. Ib.

¹¹⁹ Ib.

well as the both Ministers of Finance, Theo Waigel and Walter Romberg.¹²⁰ Helmut Kohl later spoke of the birth of a free, united Germany.¹²¹ A heated public debate occurred with regard to the privatisation strategy of the Trust Agency (German: *Treuhandanstalt*, *THA*) and monetary union. “The transition-free introduction of the D-Mark in East Germany within few weeks was a feat of logistics”¹²², in the words of Hans-Jürgen Wagener. What seems more questionable is the non-involvement of the people of the GDR at the time. Decisions were made without the participation of the populace. Obviously, the transition of GDR’s monetary and price system took longer than the aforementioned overnight change of economy. Furthermore, none of the people had actually experienced the rules and behaviour of a capitalist economic system. A further aspect was the setting of the exchange rate between the *Deutschmark* and *Ostmark*. 1988 the exchange rate between the two currencies was 4.40 *Ostmark* to 1.00 *Deutschmark* for internationally traded goods, albeit the purchasing power parity for consumer goods, including services, was roughly level at 1:1.¹²³ Therefore a different exchange rate would not be acceptable to the people. There seemed to be a dilemma: on the one hand the transition should be done efficiently, and on the other, Bonn was interested in equity. This dilemma met inherent structural deficits of the GDR economy: outdated manufacturing facilities (almost 60% of East German businesses required redevelopment¹²⁴), the average wage in the manufacturing sector was only one-third that of West Germany and productivity was only one-third of the West German average for tradable goods, amongst others.¹²⁵ The economy in the East could not be transformed gradually and on its own terms. It was, rather, the unnatural shock that rapidly led to massive economic problems in the east of Germany, which was affected by the overall setting of wage and income policy. The assumption of assets and debts by West Germany became official with the Unification Treaty. The Unification Treaty regulated the integration of the GDR into the scope of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany by 3 October 1990. Even though the monetary union encountered problems, it can nevertheless be seen as a “successful operation, which stabilized the East German economy”¹²⁶. While the unemployment rate

¹²⁰ Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-05-18-waehrungsunion.html?nn=704580, retrieved on 25 March 2014.

¹²¹ Comp. *Ib.*

¹²² Wagener, Hans-Jürgen: Der deutsche Sonderweg der Transformation, p. 2.

¹²³ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 3.

¹²⁴ Comp. Rahmann, Tim: Wie die Treuhand bei der DDR-Abwicklung versagte, in: *Wirtschaftswoche* (26 September 2011), viewed on <http://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/rueckblick-wie-die-treuhand-bei-der-ddr-abwicklung-versagte/5220338.html>, retrieved on 31 March 2014.

¹²⁵ Comp. Wagener, Hans-Jürgen: *Ib.*, p. 3.

¹²⁶ *Ib.*, p. 4.

increased dramatically, inflation remained moderate. At an early stage the German Central Bank discussed an exchange rate of 2 *Deutschmark* to 1 *Ostmark*, leading to protests within East German. Exchange rates were eventually fixed by both German governments as follows¹²⁷: all current payments such as wages, salaries, pensions, rents, were made at a ratio of 1:1. Savings were treated differently, with a limitation imposed: retirees were permitted to exchange up to 6,000 *Ostmark* at a ratio of 1:1 and children up to 2,000 *Ostmark* at a ratio of 1:1, while average consumers could exchange up to 4,000 *Ostmark* at a ratio of 1:1. Any higher amount needed to be exchanged at a ratio of 1 *Deutschmark* to 2 *Ostmark*. The entire network of social benefits such as unemployment and social assistance, as well as the healthcare, pension and labour law systems were also converted to the West German model of a social market economy. One considerable political change was also implemented: by the beginning of 1 July 1990 entry into and departure from both German states was possible without an identity check.

The privatisation strategy of the Trust Agency, which was founded on 1 March 1990, remained controversial. Dozens of people disagreed with the agency's policy with regard to the processing of nationally-owned enterprises embedded in a global, market-based economy through the liquidation of enterprises labelled inefficient and non-competitive, immediately leading to a massive increase in unemployment, corruption and economic crime¹²⁸. Approximately 8,000 enterprises with more than four million employees were supervised by the Trust Agency. The agency's performance resulted in a black hole: by time the agency was disbanded on 31 December 1994, it had left behind debts amounting to 256 billion *Deutschmarks*. It is clear that the reason for these results can be found in the outdated structures of East German enterprises, as well as the bloated system of company benefits such as kindergartens, holiday facilities, libraries and double-digit percentage surpluses of employees. Political and economic decisions complicated the situation for the former GDR enterprises: sales figures decreased dramatically, as did export figures, due to monetary union and the resulting revaluation of the currency: East German goods simply increased in price. Within a twenty-month period 3,713 enterprises were liquidated and almost three million employees lost their jobs. The unemployment rate rocketed to 14.2% in the new federal states. In spring 1990 the value of GDR's state assets was estimated at 600 billion *Deutschmarks*.

¹²⁷ Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion, ib., retrieved on 31 March 2014.

¹²⁸ Comp. Here and following: Rahmann, Tim: Ib.

85% of enterprises sold were bought by West Germans, and only 5% by East Germans.¹²⁹ The rest of the property was acquired by foreigners. Rohweder, the Trust Agency's business executive, was murdered¹³⁰ in 1991.

3.3.1.2 A Comparison between Unemployment in East and West Germany

The economy of the new federal states in the reunited Germany have not recovered, even to this day. The failures of the economic transition are still visible, and the unemployment rate in the former territory of the GDR remains much higher in comparison to the west German states, although people do see light at the end of the tunnel. Certain regions, especially the bigger cities, are nowadays more wealthy and perform more healthily, particularly the Saxon metropolises of Dresden and Leipzig, both of which have populations in excess of half a million. Between 1991 and 2004 the unemployment rate¹³¹ in East Germany almost doubled from 10.2% to 20.1%, and the number of unemployed in the East increased from 1 million to 1.6 million. Compared to West Germany, the statistics sound like a nightmare: in 1990 West Germany show a unemployment rate of 6.4% (1.9 million in total). The differences appear to be marginal; but when the population is taken into account the figures¹³² become quite striking: in 1990 63.7 million people lived in the West and 16 million in the East (not including West Berlin). By 2000 the figures had changed: 67.1 million lived in West Germany and only 15.1 million in East Germany (not including West Berlin). In conclusion: the unemployment rate in East Germany increased while the population decreased. A turning point can be finally found in 2005/2006, when, for the first time, there was a significant decrease in the number of unemployed. In 2013¹³³ the unemployment rate of Germany as a whole was 7.7%, whereby the East was struggling with an unemployment rate of almost twelve percent: precisely 11.6% (870,000) of the people were out of work. The West showed an unemployment rate at a height of 6.7% or 2.08 million people; more than four percentage points less than in the East.

¹²⁹ Comp. Augstein, Franziska: DDR: Treuhand-Anstalt. Ausverkauf der Republik, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 May 2010), viewed on <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ddr-treuhand-anstalt-ausverkauf-der-republik-1.137266>, retrieved on 1 April 2014.

¹³⁰ Comp. Ib.

¹³¹ Comp. Here and following: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Die soziale Situation in Deutschland. Arbeitslose und Arbeitslosenquote, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61718/arbeitslose-und-arbeitslosenquote>, retrieved on 1 April 2014.

¹³² Comp. Here and following: Bevölkerungsentwicklung Deutschlands ab 1950. Einwohnerzahlen West- und Ostdeutschland, viewed on <http://www.pdwb.de/nd06>, retrieved on 1 April 2014.

¹³³ Comp. Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik. Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen (Monats-/Jahreszahlen), viewed on <http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statistikdaten/Detail/Aktuell/iiia4/alo-zeitreihe-dwo/alo-zeitreihe-dwo-b-0-xls.xls>, retrieved on 4 April 2014.

Figure 4: Development of Unemployment Rate in West Germany (excluding Berlin) and East Germany (including Berlin), as well as Germany as a whole, based on Dependent Civil Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages¹³⁴

Year	West Germany	East Germany	Germany
1991	6.2	10.2	7.3
1992	6.4	14.4	8.5
1993	8.0	15.4	9.8
1994	9.0	15.7	10.6
1995	9.1	14.8	10.4
1996	9.9	16.6	11.5
1997	10.8	19.1	12.7
1998	10.3	19.2	12.3
1999	9.6	18.7	11.7
2000	8.4	18.5	10.7
2001	8.0	18.8	10.3
2002	8.5	19.2	10.8
2003	9.3	20.1	11.6
2004	9.4	20.1	11.7
2005	11.0	20.6	13.0
2006	10.2	19.2	12.0
2007	8.3	16.7	10.1
2008	7.2	14.6	8.7
2009	7.7	14.5	9.1
2010	7.4	13.4	8.6
2011	6.7	12.6	7.9
2012	6.6	11.9	7.6
2013	6.7	11.6	7.7

The highest unemployment¹³⁵ rate in 1991 on a regional level could be found in the newly established federal state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with 12.5%. Compared to Baden-Wuerttemberg, with an unemployment rate of only 3.7%, the rate in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania was 338% higher. The lowest unemployment rate in East Germany in 1991 could be found in the Federal State of Saxony with 9.1%. In 2004 Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania again came last in the whole of Germany, with a 22.1% unemployment rate. Baden-Wuerttemberg still had the lowest unemployment rate (6.9%) in the whole of reunited Germany, while the Free State of Thuringia had the lowest unemployment rate in East

¹³⁴ Comp. Ib.

¹³⁵ Comp. Here and following: Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik. Zeitreihe für Länder ab 1950 (Jahreszahlen), viewed on <http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statistikdaten/Detail/Aktuell/iii4/laender-heft/laender-heft-d-0-xls.xls>, retrieved on 1 April 2014.

Germany (18.1%). Thuringia overtook Saxony, whose unemployment rate peaked at 19.4% in 2004. Saxony found itself in second position in East Germany, 12.5 percentage points higher than in Baden-Wuerttemberg. After 2005 the number of unemployed decreased significantly and the gap between the West and the East got smaller, although distinctions can still be found today. In 2013, twenty-three years after reunification, the highest unemployment rate in Germany, 13.9%, could be found in Berlin, with the second-worst figures being shown, exceptionally, by the Western federal state of Bremen, with 12.3%. All other western German federal states showed unexceptional percentages that were lower than those of the eastern German federal states. Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg were the undisputed leaders with unemployment rates of less than five percent: 4.4% in the southeast and 4.5% in the southwest of Germany. Almost the entire territory of the former GDR found itself at the bottom of the table: 12.9% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 12.1% in Saxony-Anhalt, 11.0% in Brandenburg and 10.5% in Saxony. The only East German state below ten percent was Thuringia, with 9.1%, which showed the best figures of all the East German states, even overtaking one western non-city state, although the margin was minimal: North Rhine-Westphalia with an unemployment rate of 9.2%.

Figure 5: Development of Unemployment Rate in East Germany and Berlin based on Dependent Civil Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages¹³⁶

<u>Year</u>	<u>Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania</u>	<u>Brandenburg</u>	<u>Berlin</u>	<u>Saxony- Anhalt</u>	<u>Thuringia</u>	<u>Saxony</u>
1991	12.5	10.3	10.6	10.3	10.2	9.1
1992	16.8	14.8	12.4	15.3	15.4	13.6
1993	17.5	15.3	12.8	17.2	16.3	14.9
1994	17.0	15.3	13.2	17.6	16.5	15.7
1995	16.1	14.2	13.6	16.5	15.0	14.4
1996	18.0	16.2	15.2	18.8	16.7	15.9
1997	20.3	18.9	17.3	21.7	19.1	18.4
1998	20.5	18.8	17.9	21.7	18.3	18.8
1999	19.4	18.7	17.7	21.7	16.5	18.6
2000	19.0	18.4	17.6	21.4	16.5	18.5
2001	19.6	18.8	17.9	20.9	16.5	19.0
2002	20.0	19.1	18.9	20.9	17.2	19.3
2003	21.7	20.4	20.2	21.8	18.1	19.4
2004	22.1	20.3	19.9	21.7	18.1	19.4
2005	22.1	19.9	21.5	21.7	18.6	20.0
2006	20.8	18.7	20.1	19.9	17.0	18.8

¹³⁶ Comp. Ib., retrieved on 4 April 2014.

2007	18.1	16.4	17.9	17.4	14.4	16.3
2008	15.5	14.4	16.1	15.2	12.3	14.3
2009	14.9	13.6	16.4	14.8	12.6	14.3
2010	14.0	12.4	15.8	13.5	10.9	13.1
2011	13.8	11.9	15.5	12.5	9.8	11.8
2012	13.2	11.3	14.5	12.4	9.4	10.9
2013	12.9	11.0	13.9	12.1	9.1	10.5

Summarising the above-mentioned figures, data and statistics, it must be concluded that structural distinctions with regard to the economy are still clearly visible, in the twenty-fourth year after reunification. A direct relationship between the transition process and the economic development of a particular region has still to be ascertained. German regions in transition show, on average, higher unemployment rates compared to regions in the West, even twenty-four years after. Nevertheless, a slight shifting of proportions in favour of East Germany has occurred in recent years. However, the shift remains very weak and there cannot yet be any talk of changes in trends.

3.3.1.3 Domestic Migration between East and West Germany

The difficult economic development has led to further social problems with regard to domestic migration from the East to the West.¹³⁷ Since 1990 there has been a significant reduction in the population of the eastern states: -11.7% (-1.7 million people), not including East Berlin, up until 2008. West German states registered an increase in population of +6.5% (+4 million people), not including West Berlin. Bavaria in particular performed well, registering a population increase of more than 1 million compared to the 1990s. In 2008 13 million people lived in the East and 65.5 million in the West. Saxony-Anhalt performed the worst of all the newly-founded East Germany federal states, registering a fall in population of -17.1% between 1990 and 2008, followed by Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (-13.5%), Thuringia (-13.2%) and Saxony (-12.0%). Only two western federal states showed a negative net migration in the period under consideration: Bremen (-2.9%) and Saarland (-4.0%). Brandenburg, the last remaining East German state, registered a negative net migration of only -2.2%. A direct link between unemployment rate and net migration is clearly visible: the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the domestic net migration within Germany. Thus,

¹³⁷ Comp. Here and following: Statistisches Bundesamt: 20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit. Wunsch oder Wirklichkeit, viewed on https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Regionales/20JahreDeutscheEinheit.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, p. 10, retrieved on 3 April 2014.

the East German states lost disproportionately more inhabitants due to higher unemployment rates than Western states, shown in the case of Bremen, with a relatively high unemployment rate but only moderate negative net migration.

Figure 6: Comparison of Net Migration Development in East Germany 1990/2008

<u>Federal State</u>	<u>1990</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>2008</u> <u>(in millions)</u>	<u>Difference</u> <u>(in percentages)</u>
Berlin	3.43	3.43	-0.1
Brandenburg	2.58	2.52	-2.2
Saxony	4.76	4.19	-12.0
Thuringia	2.61	2.27	-13.2
Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania	1.92	1.66	-13.5
Saxony-Anhalt	2.87	2.38	-17.1
West Germany (excl. East Berlin)	61.57	65.54	+6.5
East Germany (excl. West Berlin)	14.75	13.03	-11.7

3.3.1.4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

The gross domestic product (GDP) can be regarded as another key parameter showing the economic development of a particular region. Since 1992 GDP has been measured for the regions of both East and West Germany, with Berlin not being counted as entirely part of the East or West. GDP figures thus do not cover the entirety of the former territory of East Germany, but can still be used as a proper approximate value.

Figure 7: Development of Gross Domestic Product compared to the previous year in West Germany (excluding Berlin), East Germany (including Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-2013 (in real terms and concatenated) in percentages¹³⁸

<u>Year</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Germany</u>
1992	1.1	8.1	1.9
1993	-2.5	9.2	-1.0
1994	1.5	8.6	2.5
1995	1.1	4.8	1.7
1996	0.6	1.6	0.8
1997	1.9	0.7	1.7
1998	2.1	0.5	1.9
1999	2.0	1.5	1.9

¹³⁸ Comp. Statistische Ämter der Länder: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder. Bruttoinlandsprodukt, Bruttowertschöpfung in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1991 bis 2013 (Reihe 1, Länderergebnisse Band 1), viewed on http://www.vgrdl.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR/tbls/R1B1.zip, retrieved 4 April 2014.

2000	3.4	1.0	3.1
2001	1.8	0.2	1.5
2002	0.0	0.0	0.0
2003	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4
2004	1.2	0.9	1.2
2005	0.7	0.7	0.7
2006	3.8	3.4	3.7
2007	3.4	2.8	3.3
2008	1.1	1.3	1.1
2009	-5.5	-3.3	-5.2
2010	4.2	3.0	4.0
2011	3.6	1.9	3.3
2012	0.8	0.2	0.7
2013	0.5	0.3	0.4

In the first years after reunification, GDP grew much faster in East Germany. The most significant distinctions can be found in 1993, when West Germany recorded negative GDP growth of -2.5% while East Germany recorded positive growth of +8.6%. In subsequent years, GDP growth in the East slowed down and became almost equal between both West and East Germany. Nevertheless, the West recorded higher GDP growth between 1997 and 2007. The distinctions in GDP growth in the East German federal states below remain minimal.

Figure 8: Development of Gross Domestic Product (in real terms and concatenated) compared to the previous year in the new federal states of East Germany (excluding Berlin) in percentages¹³⁹

Year	Brandenburg	Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania	Saxony	Saxony-Anhalt	Thuringia
1992	9.1	8.7	9.6	9.8	18.0
1993	12.7	10.5	13.0	13.1	13.3
1994	11.3	11.4	13.0	10.6	12.4
1995	7.4	7.3	7.8	3.9	3.4
1996	3.5	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8
1997	2.5	1.8	-0.1	2.9	3.3
1998	1.0	-0.5	0.8	0.3	1.5
1999	4.1	2.4	1.5	1.5	2.5
2000	2.7	-0.2	0.1	1.0	1.3
2001	0.4	-0.6	1.6	-0.6	0.9
2002	-0.5	-0.3	1.6	1.9	-0.5
2003	-0.3	-0.7	0.9	-0.5	1.1
2004	1.7	1.4	2.0	1.2	1.9
2005	1.3	0.6	-0.1	0.1	0.3

¹³⁹ Comp. Ib.

2006	2.6	1.7	4.1	3.2	3.2
2007	1.5	4.3	2.7	2.3	2.8
2008	1.6	1.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3
2009	-2.7	-1.6	-4.2	-5.1	-5.3
2010	3.4	0.7	2.9	3.9	4.9
2011	0.4	1.5	2.5	-1.5	3.6
2012	0.7	0.7	-0.6	0.7	-0.6
2013	0.7	-1.1	0.3	-1.2	0.5

3.3.1.5 Inflation

As happened in other Central and East European Countries going through transition, the new federal states of the reunited Germany were also affected by inflation. In the first years following reunification in particular, East Germany faced an inflation rate of 13.4% in 1992 and 10.6% in 1993. Unfortunately, no data is available for the first common year 1992. One interesting fact is that the inflation rate stopped at the former inter-German border. While the East was suffering from inflation rates up to three times higher than in the West, the economic situation in the West remained stable: 3.9% in 1992 and 3.6% a year later. Between 1993 and 1994 the inflation rate in the East eased and the speed of price rises slowed down to moderate 3.6%, followed by only 1.9%. Since then, inflation in East Germany has remained low, between 1.9% in 1995 and only 0.4% in 1999. 1999 can be seen as a further milestone: for the first time ever, price increases remained 0.3 percentage points below the Western level.

Figure 9: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in West Germany (including West Berlin), East Germany (including East Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-1999 in percentages¹⁴⁰

Year	West Germany	East Germany	Germany
1992	3.9	13.4	5.1
1993	3.6	10.6	4.5
1994	2.7	3.6	2.6
1995	1.6	1.9	1.8
1996	1.3	1.9	1.4
1997	1.9	2.3	2.0
1998	0.9	1.1	1.0
1999	0.7	0.4	0.6

¹⁴⁰ Comp. Statistisches Bundesamt: Preise. Verbraucherpreisindizes für Deutschland. Lange Reihe ab 1948, viewed on https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Preise/Verbraucherpreise/VerbraucherpreisindexLangeReihenPDF_5611103.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, p. 5, retrieved 4 April 2014.

Until 1999 the inflation rate in Germany was measured for both West and East Germany; since 2000 the Federal Office of Statistics has ceased to distinguish between the two German regions, and thus only one uniform, nationwide inflation rate has been published. The inflation rate in Germany as whole between 2000 and 2013 remained low. The lowest inflation rate figure could be found in 2009 with 0.3%, and the highest, 2.6%, in the previous year. Generally, the inflation rate ranged between 2.0% (2001) and 1.1% (2010) with one exception (besides 2008/2009), when it reached 2.3% in 2007. Germany's inflation rate thus mainly fulfilled the European Union's stability criteria of inflation around, but below 2%.

Figure 10: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in Germany as a whole 2000-2013 in percentages¹⁴¹

<u>Year</u>	<u>Germany</u>
2000	1.4
2001	2.0
2002	1.4
2003	1.1
2004	1.6
2005	1.6
2006	1.5
2007	2.3
2008	2.6
2009	0.3
2010	1.1
2011	2.1
2012	2.0
2013	1.5

3.3.1.6 Conclusion

The economy can be categorised as a substantial element of the consolidation with regard to both civic society and informal political actors. A wealthy, healthy economy is an important socio-cultural foundation for a functioning democracy, with all its typical, necessary structures. Functioning economies can only be generated through a long-term, decades-long process, granting stability and legitimacy and leads to the associated adoption of democratic values by informal political actors.

Even though East Germany's economy is still catching up with the more prosperous West, a few hurdles have already been cleared. While the new federal states are slowly coming into a period of success, they can still not catch up with the West, and cannot overtake

¹⁴¹ Comp. Ib.

it at all. In any case, the East German economy can be judged to be consolidated after twenty-four years of struggle, although still lacking in major success.

3.3.2 The Political Consolidation

The political consolidation in the GDR is deeply connected with the third wave of regionalism, which started in 1985. According to Robert Putnam, international negotiations are based on the theory of the so-called “two-level game”¹⁴². In his opinion, statesmen are strategically positioned between two negotiating tables: domestic and international. “Diplomatic tactics and strategies are constrained simultaneously by what other states will accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify.” If a statesman concludes negotiations successfully, they “must bargain on these two tables, both reaching an international agreement and securing its domestic ratification”.

3.3.2.1 Two Plus Four Negotiations

German reunification needed to be discussed before it could be successfully concluded. For this reason the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, went to Washington on 2 February 1990 for talks with his counterpart, James Baker. While Genscher wanted to promote Germany’s possible reunification, he needed to get the statement of agreement from the victorious powers from the Second World War. Genscher’s vision: setting the foreign-policy framework of Germany’s reunification while having a domestic declaration of will by East German society with regard to a new reunified Germany, an archetypal ‘two-level game’. Thus the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France met in Ottawa on 13 February 1990. They announced talks with regard to the “outer aspects of the creation of German unity including the security of neighbouring countries”¹⁴³. The first talks between the six Foreign Ministers, better known as Two Plus Four Negotiations, were held in Bonn on 14 March 1990. On 12 September 1990 the road to the reunification of Germany was officially cleared by the Treaty on the Final Settlement with

¹⁴² Here and following: Moravcsik, Andrew: Double-Edged Diplomacy, viewed on <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/double.pdf>, p. 4, retrieved on 6 April 2014.

¹⁴³ *Ib.*

Respect to Germany¹⁴⁴, which included: 1) ultimate determination of Central European borders, including the new borders of a reunited Germany within the borders of West and East Germany, while Germany confirmed its waiver of territorial claims (including acceptance of Poland's Western borders), 2) restrictions on the size of German armed forces (the limit was fixed to 370,000 personnel), 3) notice of the abandonment by Germany of the production, disposal and possession of NBC weapons as well as of wars of aggression, 4) withdrawal of all Soviet troops by 1994, 5) the right to form alliances.

3.3.2.2 Coming to Terms with the Stasi Past and Official Transfer to one Federal Republic of Germany

The appointment of a high-level Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives (German: *Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, BStU*) took place on 7 June 1990¹⁴⁵. The first and only freely elected People's Chamber in the GDR established the agency for the purpose of the complete resolution and clearance of crimes committed by the State Security Service of the GDR. Joachim Gauck, now President of the Federal Republic of Germany, was the first head of the agency. With more than 90,000 official employees and about 150,000 unofficial employees, the *Stasi* spied on more than six million citizens of both East and West Germany. The establishment of the agency marked the beginning of the process of accounting for the past with regard to the crimes of State Security.

During a sitting of the People's Parliament on 23 August 1990, it was also decided that the GDR would be dissolved and merged with the Federal Republic. The sitting can be described as tumultuous: 294 Members of Parliament voted for accession to West Germany and 62 voted against.¹⁴⁶ The decision led to accession on 3 October 1990. In the ironic words of Gregor Gysi: "The Parliament did no less than decide on the demise of German Democratic

¹⁴⁴ Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in Bezug auf Deutschland, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/gesetze/zwei-plus-vier-vertrag/>, retrieved on 30 March 2014.

¹⁴⁵ Comp. Here and following: Die Bundesregierung: Grundsteinlegung für die Gauck-Behörde, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-06-07-grundsteinlegung-gauck.html;jsessionid=8C48946DAB3DF2AA0236E81EFC2B9A33.s2t2?nn=704580, retrieved on 6 April 2014.

¹⁴⁶ Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Die Einheit rückt näher, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-08-23-einheit-rueckt-naeher.html;jsessionid=8C48946DAB3DF2AA0236E81EFC2B9A33.s2t2?nn=704580, retrieved on 6 April 2014.

Republic as of 3 October 1990.”¹⁴⁷ Only one day later, on 31 August, the Unity Treaty was signed by the Federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble and the State Secretary of the GDR, Günter Krause. The contract governing the accession of East Germany, with particular regard to political and institutional issues, ran to 1,000 pages¹⁴⁸ and was drawn up in only four sittings. Berlin was re-established as the federal capital and five federal states were also re-established once the treaty came into force. The treaty also regulated the allocation, and resultant expansion, of the number of seats in the second chamber of parliament, the Federal Council (German: *Bundesrat*) of Germany. On 20 September 1990 both the German *Bundestag* and the People’s Parliament voted to ratify the treaty by the required two-thirds majority. 442 out of 492 voted in favour of the treaty in Bonn, and 299 out of 380 in favour in East Berlin.¹⁴⁹ The Federal Council voted unanimously.¹⁵⁰ This process can be seen as more or less unique: the peaceful and democratic self-dissolution of GDR.

3.3.2.3 International Community

The GDR had been accepted in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) as far back as 29 September 1950.¹⁵¹ In May 1955 the GDR was accepted as a member of the Warsaw Pact.¹⁵² The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955 following ratification of the so called General Treaty (German: *Deutschlandvertrag*).¹⁵³ Four years prior to this, in 1951, West Germany had been one of the six founding members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the predecessor of the European Union.¹⁵⁴ In 1957 these six countries founded the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC).¹⁵⁵ In 1961 the Federal Republic of Germany was among the founding members of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and

¹⁴⁷ *Ib.*

¹⁴⁸ *Comp. Ib.*

¹⁴⁹ *Comp.* Die Bundesregierung: Zustimmung zum Einigungsvertrag, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-09-20-einigungsvertrag.html?nn=704580, retrieved on 6 April 2014.

¹⁵⁰ *Comp. Ib.*

¹⁵¹ *Comp.* Weber, Hermann: *Dir DDR 1945-1990*, München 2006, p. 327.

¹⁵² *Comp. Ib.*, p. 47.

¹⁵³ *Comp.* Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Internationale Organisationen, viewed on <https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/24-deutschland/40496/internationale-organisationen>, retrieved 8 April 2014.

¹⁵⁴ *Comp.* Europäische Union: Ein friedliches Europa. Die Anfänge der Zusammenarbeit, viewed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945-1959/index_de.htm, retrieved 8 April 2014.

¹⁵⁵ *Comp. Ib.*: 1957, viewed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945-1959/1957/index_de.htm, retrieved on 8 April 2014.

Development (OECD).¹⁵⁶ The membership in the aforementioned organisations was followed by both West and East Germany joining the United Nations (UN) in 1973.¹⁵⁷ Both Bonn and East Berlin also participated in the Conferences on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE) starting in 1973 and both signed the Helsinki Final Act two years later.¹⁵⁸ With the Final Act the OSCE organisation itself was founded. Both German states participated as independent nations, which was of key importance for the GDR in particular. East Berlin wished to secure the status quo with regard to its international recognition. In 1975 Bonn also joined the Group of 7 (G7)¹⁵⁹. The reunited Germany joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.¹⁶⁰ Due to West Germany's profound and long membership in several international organisations, its role can be briefly assessed as a story of success. Even though both German states and, later, the reunited Germany faced temporary problems in the accession of the territory of the East to NATO and the European Union, the difficulties can be regarded as unimportant in this context. Germany's membership of the WTO in 1995 – the very first membership of the reunified Germany in an organisation of such significance – can thus be described as trouble-free. In any case the conflicts caused by the inclusion of the enlarged Germany in NATO and EU structures will be examined shortly.

Figure 11: Membership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic of the most important International Organisations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Federal Republic of Germany</u>	<u>German Democratic Republic</u>
1950		COMECON
1951	ESCS	
1955	NATO	Warsaw Pact
1957	EURATOM EEC	
1961	OECD	
1973	UN CSCE	UN CSCE

¹⁵⁶ Comp. Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der OECD in Paris: Mitgliedsstaaten der OECD, viewed on http://www.paris-oecd.diplo.de/Vertretung/parisoecd/de/03/Oecd__MS.html, retrieved on 8 April 2014.

¹⁵⁷ Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Internationale Organisationen, viewed on ib.

¹⁵⁸ Comp. Haus der Geschichte: Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE), viewed on <http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/DasGeteilteDeutschland/NeueHerausforderungen/SicherheitUndZusammenarbeit/ksze.html>, retrieved on 8 April 2014.

¹⁵⁹ Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Gruppe der Acht, viewed on <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/G8G20/G8-uebersicht.html;jsessionid=FACDB6F9E2C21182FBD908F8FCF49ED5.s4t2?nn=437032#doc115978bodyText2>, retrieved on 8 April 2014.

¹⁶⁰ Comp. World Trade Organization: Members and Observers, viewed on http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, retrieved on 8 April 2014.

1975	OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) G7	OSCE* (Helsinki Accords)
1995	WTO	

* The OSCE was not formally established until 1975

3.3.2.3.1 European Union/European Community

The GDR acceded to NATO and the European Community and their political and administrative structures overnight. Until 2 October 1990 the independent and democratic GDR had been part of the structures of the Warsaw Pact; next morning the population awoke as part of the structures of NATO, the former ideological enemy of the GDR. The bipolar division of the world was over – at least in Germany. But not only the NATO accession took place by joining scope of West Germany; the international community was facing structural conflicts with regard to the integration of the new German territory into its structures. The fair allocation of seats in the European Parliament in particular led to intense arguments, sometimes ideologically-driven, both for and against a reunited Germany. The integration of the reunited Germany into the structures of European Union led to deep discussions. A landmark decision of the European Council in Dublin in April 1990 in Dublin permitted the integration of East Germany as part of an expanded Federal Republic of Germany with no changes¹⁶¹ to the EEC treaty, reducing the immediate institutional and financial consequences for the European Community compared to standard accession pursuant to article 237. “The extension of the federal territory should be neutrally implemented for institutions of the community meaning allocations of seats and votes in Council, Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice remained unchanged.” The representation of the new citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany was provided by giving observer status to representatives of the newly-founded federal states. Compared to the far-reaching achievements of East Germany, the adaptabilities and measures of the EC towards East Germany must be judged as, at the very least, inadequate, showing sensitive intra-institutional balance of power and forced the European Community to reflect on legitimacy and the maturation of its democracy. With regard to the Community’s minimalism, the outcome for its structures could be seen as weak. The European Community was following an assumption based on the idea of imposing a full market economy on the territory of the GDR overnight without providing interim period for transition to the Single European Market.

¹⁶¹ Comp. Here and following: Lippert, Barbara: Einleitung. Denkschulen und Handlungsoptionen zur Europäischen Einbindung des vereinten Deutschlands, in: Lippert, Barbara/Günther, Dirk and others: Die EG und die neuen Bundesländer. Eine Erfolgsgeschichte von kurzer Dauer?, Bonn 1993, p. 19-34.

West Germany and the European Community faced the question of how to include 16 million new citizens at European level until the subsequent European parliamentary elections. The GDR had been given the aforementioned observer status, but only until the reunification process had been completed.¹⁶² There was only one problem: observer status did not exist at the time. At the same time the GDR requested to participate in European-level negotiations on reunification. The international community acceded to this request: experts from the East were invited to participate as members of the German delegation without a basis in legislation. The professionals were particularly involved in separate issues concerning East Germany.

The European Parliament's judiciary committee demanded the creation of such observer status by a special committee entitled 'German Reunification'. This status was to be for a fixed period only and dissolved at the same time as the next elections, in 1994: "By then a balanced solution for a adequate future representation of the citizens in the new federal states [...] shall be found." The amendment of the Community's internal regulations was associated with the establishment of observer status. The French, British, Spanish, Italian and Portuguese Members of the European Parliament in particular were against this amendment. Chiefly promoted by the German Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, a resolution on the establishment of observer status was successfully passed at a plenary session on 12 July 1990. The Parliament subsequently followed the resolution and advised all other institutions of European Community to officially invite observers from East Germany. Hence in September 1990 the People's Parliament of the GDR sent eighteen representatives to Strasbourg. There are different approaches to the number eighteen; the most likely was that the 'magic limit' of 100 representatives was due to the number of representatives already sent by Bonn. West Germany was represented by eighty-one Members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg; together with the eighteen additional observers, Germany remained just under the fixed number of one hundred representatives. The discussion continued after both German states had finally reunited. Initially, the problem was discussed within Germany alone. Rita Süßmuth, President of the German *Bundestag*, set preconditions for future observers at European level: 1) any observers must have their places of permanent residence on the territory of East Germany and 2) any observers must have a parliamentary seat either in Bonn or in the *Landtag* of one newly-founded federal states. Coincidentally, almost all of the existing observers fulfilled these criteria, even though the distribution of mandates had

¹⁶² Comp. Here and following: Viertel, Grit: Die Vertretung der neuen Bundesbürger in den Institutionen der Gemeinschaft, in: *Ib.*, p. 103-114.

slightly changed. On 24 October 1990 the European Parliament voted on the form of the observers' involvement in the parliament's structures: 346 Members of Parliament agreed on the creation of observer status, only 19 were against and 14 abstained. In accordance with the vote, Statute 136a came into effect immediately. The resolution included the following core provisions: 1) observers have the right to participate in parliamentary business while not having the right to speak, vote or be elected, 2) the number of observers is guaranteed by the President of the Parliament, 3) observers may participate in all parliamentary committees, and 4) the law will expire following the 1994 European Parliamentary elections. Some Members of the Parliament labelled the decisions "undemocratic and unacceptable", others called that "unsatisfactory" and others again judged that the situation was "without any alternatives", while some were advocated the re-election of the Parliament for the reunited Germany only. Finally, on 21 February 1991, the *Bundestag* delegated eighteen observers to Strasbourg, all of whom were former members of Peoples' Parliament elected in 1990 in the first, and only, free elections in the forty years of GDR history.

"The European Community contributed with regard to German reunification early and freely."¹⁶³ As early as 4 December 1990¹⁶⁴ the European Council had decided to transfer the Community's national regional support to the new federal states. Between 1991 and 1993 funding was covered by overall, flat-rate amounts. Initially, the federal government had no say in the distribution. In 1995 the European Commission promoted a gradual cessation of these methods of funding.¹⁶⁵

The case of GDR's accession to West Germany led to a wider debate about the procedures to be followed by the European institutions in the event of expansion of the Community. With regard to the allocation of seats, on 9 October 1991 the European Parliament passed a resolution fixing the number by which Germany's allocation would increase to eighteen, which came into force at the next subsequent European Parliamentary elections in 1994.

The integration of the reunited Germany into the European Community is based on a theoretical strategic concepts against the backdrop of the future position of Germany in Europe. Two schools of thought can be described with regard to different European perceptions of Germany's anticipated power: 1) integration policy approach and 2) realist approach. These approaches are influenced by two factors: 1) Germany's power in the future

¹⁶³ Comp. Sturm, Roland/Pehle, Heinrich: Das neue deutsche Regierungssystem, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 327.

¹⁶⁴ Comp. Ib., p. 327 f.

¹⁶⁵ Comp. Ib., p. 328 f.

and 2) courses of action to be taken by both Germany and the international community. The theoretical approach is associated with realism as a core school of thought and power-political zero-sum situation of international relations and the integration-oriented concept. Both approaches are in opposition to each other.

The so called ‘power perception’, on the one hand, provides information about the successful German unification, including Germany’s ability to overcome domestic economic and political problems within a moderate timeframe while increasing its political and economic power through its connections to Central and Eastern Europe. Germany’s position thus might be seen as that of a central anchor and a economic driver (realist approach) and as a global power dominating the continent’s economy (integration policy approach). Germany’s new political strategy might be the leadership and integration of Europe.

On the other hand is the so-called ‘weakness perception’, which provides information on the unsuccessful (partially successful) or rather less-successful reunification of Germany: Germany would not be able to overcome the conflicts arising following reunification, leading to a highly unstable situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Weak economic and political structures would lead to Germany developing a certain level of domestic instability for a considerable period of time. Germany’s traditional influence with regard to economic power, social consensus and political stability may decrease tendentially and could lead to negative spill-over effects in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of the weakness perception, Germany could be viewed as a possible unreliable partner (realist approach) while being a ‘normal’, co-equal state in Europe (integration policy approach). Even if the outcomes were negative for Europe as a whole, it still had the power to develop strong political instruments for the resolution of problems.

3.3.2.3.2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The accession of the enlarged Germany to NATO was preceded by a long series of public discussions. Controversies centring around the question of whether Germany could remain within NATO structures not had started long before reunification was definite. Eventually the unification of the GDR and West Germany led to changes in NATO’s inner structures. A new strategic concept was developed during a NATO meeting in London in July 1990: “At their meeting [...] NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognised that the

developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in future.”¹⁶⁶ NATO had already mentioned an enlarged Germany in November 1990: “In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity, and the enhancement of the role of the WEU are important factors for European security.”¹⁶⁷ Germany thus assumed a key role in NATO structures: NATO saw Germany as a future arbitrator between the states of Central and Eastern European who were not yet members of NATO. In addition to this: with Germany’s membership and the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1994, the long-awaited disarmament of Europe could begin. Furthermore, with Germany’s overcoming of territorial division after more than 40 years, it could also be said “that the division of Europe is also being overcome”¹⁶⁸, in the words of NATO’s London Declaration of 5 July 1990. NATO’s perception of Germany’s role was as follows: “A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.”¹⁶⁹

A continuance of Germany in NATO was thus uncertain during the entire reunification process. NATO was theoretically pursuing two main objectives: 1) expansion of its power as a political alliance and 2) the alliance’s function as an instrument of change had to be developed towards “island of change”.¹⁷⁰ While NATO supported the right of self-determination¹⁷¹, the continuity of Germany within NATO was not assured¹⁷². The USA¹⁷³ spoke in favour of a enlarged Germany being included in NATO and Helmut Kohl also wished to see Germany included in NATO structures.¹⁷⁴ However, the victorious Western

¹⁶⁶ NATO: The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=en, retrieved on 6 April 2014.

¹⁶⁷ *Ib.*, retrieved on 10 April 2014.

¹⁶⁸ NATO: Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23693.htm?selectedLocale=en, retrieved on 10 April.

¹⁶⁹ *Ib.*

¹⁷⁰ Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: *Ib.*, p. 59.

¹⁷¹ *Comp. Ib.*

¹⁷² *Comp. Ib.*, p. 123.

¹⁷³ *Comp. Ib.*, p. 97.

¹⁷⁴ *Comp. Ib.*, p. 100.

powers were afraid that Germany would be put under pressure by the Soviet Union: reunification and the European Community or no reunification and the continuity of Germany's membership in NATO was seen as feasible in Moscow.¹⁷⁵ However, the USSR's view started to change slightly and it later endorsed the integration of Germany into NATO. The USA in particular took a hard line over Germany's membership of NATO. At a meeting in Munich James Baker tried to persuade the powers of the senselessness of the enlarged Germany being neutral. Baker promoted the advantages of German membership of NATO and advocated giving NATO jurisdiction over the territory of the GDR¹⁷⁶. This was evidently a matter of self-interest, as the USA wished to maintain the presence of its armed forces in Germany. On the other hand, Genscher discussed five conditions¹⁷⁷ that Germany had to fulfil in order to achieve unity: 1) no enlargement of NATO onto the territory of GDR, 2) higher level of integration of the Soviet Union into European security structures, 3) the CSCE as instrument of a new security agreement, 4) CSCE summit meeting as a basic condition for negotiations about the German question and 5) finally, the institutionalisation of the CSCE. Genscher's declaration ran into opposition in both Washington and Bonn. The German government feared that it would be "preventive capitulation"¹⁷⁸ to the USSR. Genscher was feared a hardening of the USSR's attitude towards German reunification. Horst Teltschik, Agency Executive of German Chancellery, created his own concept¹⁷⁹ of a pan-European security architecture. Teltschik included four components of future German security policy in his strategic paper: 1) Germany's self-reflection as a core country of Europe, 2) Germany will not become nuclear power, 3) Germany disposes of unlimited capacities to forge alliances and 4) Germany would possess its own armed forces. Teltschik's strategy was mainly influenced by six security policy factors: 1) CSCE, 2) economic cooperation abilities, 3) dialogue on arms control and disarmament, 4) Germany's membership of NATO structures, 5) maintenance of the German armed forces and 6) stationing of American armed forces on German soil. However, Teltschik was aware that Germany had to go further in order to improve relations, and thus achieve rapprochement with Moscow; Germany had to offer a price worth paying for unity. Teltschik had five chief points in mind: 1) eschewal of NBC weapons, 2) negotiations on the extent of the German armed forces, 3) verifications of arms control, 4) permission of inspections for chemical weapons and 5) possibly assurances that no NATO troops or institutions would cross the inter-German border (but: the stationing of

¹⁷⁵ Comp. Ib., p. 123.

¹⁷⁶ Comp. Ib., p. 148.

¹⁷⁷ Comp. Ib., p. 150.

¹⁷⁸ Ib.

¹⁷⁹ Comp. Ib., p. 160.

German armed forces in the East would be allowed). In the event of the Soviet Union not relenting, the USA would have been willing to accept an extraordinary status in terms of security policy for former GDR territory in a reunited Germany by means of the non-jurisdiction of NATO over East German territory.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile, different approaches with regard to NATO jurisdiction over the eastern part of Germany led to disagreements¹⁸¹ between Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Gerhard Stoltenberg, Minister of Defence in Bonn. While Stoltenberg advocated the inter-German expansion of NATO, Genscher favoured a demilitarised zone in East Germany. Moscow's position on the NATO question remained unclear and fluctuating: "Moscow do not want a unilateral surrender of its achieved position in World War Two in Germany's Eastern part."¹⁸²

Article 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty were in the focus of subsequent negotiations. Finally, on 15 and 16 July 1990, Gorbachev agreed on the application of Articles 5 and 6 of NATO treaty to the whole of Germany during partly informal talks with Kohl in Moscow and in Gorbachev's hometown in the Caucasus¹⁸³, which were to remain in force despite the continued presence of Soviet troops in East Germany. Gorbachev's strategic points were: 1) eschewal of NBC weapons, 2) non-expansion of nuclear armed forces over GDR territory, 3) independent treaty between Bonn and Moscow about the stationing of Soviet troops, 4) Germany would be allowed to freely forge alliances. While Point 4 does not explicitly mention NATO itself, it *de facto* granted Germany the right to remain a member of NATO. Kohl consented to this under following conditions: 1) limitation of German armed forces at a height of 370,000 soldiers, 2) independent treaty with Soviet Union, 3) non-stationing of NATO troops in East Germany and 4) withdrawal of Soviet troops within three to four years. The results of negotiations were laid down in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany. Kohl later called the negotiations an "historic hour"¹⁸⁴ afterwards.

4. The Transition of Czechoslovakia

The Czechoslovakian transition was predominantly influenced by its specific internal points of departure and the already well-known external circumstances in the countries of the

¹⁸⁰ Comp. Ib., p. 162.

¹⁸¹ Comp. Ib., p. 188-198.

¹⁸² Ib., p. 236.

¹⁸³ Comp. Ib., p. 351

¹⁸⁴ Ib., p. 353.

Warsaw Pact, especially the USSR. Nevertheless, a lack of opposition movements¹⁸⁵, democratic-pluralistic attitude of society, as well as a relatively high adaptability led to a highly specific political situation which could be described as stable for a long time due to moderate positive economic development¹⁸⁶ such as wave increases, increase in GDP, low rates of unemployment and inflation and a relatively well-functioning supply situation. Apart from the above, the Czechoslovakian economy also faced the normal Communist underdevelopment¹⁸⁷: low productivity, high usage, and thus wastage, of resources and energy, regional environmental pollution, outdated mono-industrial structures and only marginal competitiveness. The following aspects¹⁸⁸ can therefore be recognised as Czechoslovakian's specific internal points of departure: the general and conflict-laden construction of the state, the division of the country into a Czech and a Slovak part (which later even led to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia) and a long tradition of the non-existence of anti-governmental movements and militant protest behaviour.

4.1 The End of the Autocratic System

The end of the autocratic system in Czechoslovakia occurred due to both internal and external factors. Mass demonstrations ('voice') can be seen as the reason for the internal loss of the regime's legitimacy, while the international political situation can be taken as external reasons for the end of the autocratic system in Czechoslovakia. Three different, continuous forms of the end of the autocratic system in Czechoslovakia are identifiable: 1) the controlled change of the political system, at least partially initiated and directed by the 'old' elite, 2) a forced change of the political system from the bottom up through uprisings and mass opposition demonstrations, which led to the rapid changing of the autocratic authorities, and 3) a negotiated change of Czechoslovakia's political system.

4.1.1 'Voice' instead of 'Exit': the 'Velvet Revolution'

Czechoslovakia is one of the nations whose autocratic system ended swiftly and non-violently, introduced by demonstrations and mass protests. The entire process of the end of the Communist dictatorship is described by the term 'Velvet Revolution'. The end of the

¹⁸⁵ Comp. Here and following: Juchler, Jakob: Osteuropa im Umbruch. Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen 1989-1993. Gesamtüberblick und Fallstudien, Zürich 1994, p. 321.

¹⁸⁶ Comp. Here and following: Ib., p. 320.

¹⁸⁷ Comp. Here and following: Ib., p. 321.

¹⁸⁸ Comp. Ib., p. 313.

autocratic system which was mainly led by orthodox Communist powers was brought about by mass demonstrations. The first protests took place as early as the beginning of January 1989¹⁸⁹ during various protest events held in remembrance of Jan Palach and his self-immolation. These demonstrations were brutally put down by the police, after which increasing numbers of demonstrators gathered to demand democratisation, or rather for democratic elements to be included in the Czechoslovakian constitution. More than 40,000 citizens¹⁹⁰ signed a petition between spring and autumn 1989 demanding open dialogue, criticism of the regime and democratisation. At this time a Green movement was established, in Slovakia in particular, advocating the renewal of state structures. During summer 1989 the situation in the country became even more febrile, caused on the one hand by external factors such as events in Poland and Hungary, and on the other by external factors which turned into internal factors: the exit of GDR refugees waiting for transport to West Germany from the embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Prague. Even though the churches did not play an important role in Czechoslovakia, they were involved in the democratisation process that was taking place between Aš and Košice. The protest movement in Czechoslovakia remained low-profile until as late as October 1989, with only a few thousand people participating in public demonstrations.¹⁹¹ The changing of the situation in Czechoslovakia was deeply connected to events in the GDR. It can be described as a change of mood. The power of the regime started to crumble, as did its legitimacy. In a survey held in 1989, only one-third of those asked recognised the leading role of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Czech: *Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ*).¹⁹² The youth of Czechoslovakia in particular had stopped believing in the system. The first illegal mass demonstration took place on 17 November 1989 and developed out of protests of students demanding the end of the Communist leadership. These were met with brutal interventions by the police. Between 15,000 and 50,000 students¹⁹³ joined the riots; sources are ambiguous about exact numbers. One day previously, students had taken to the streets of Bratislava. The demonstration in Prague and its bloody suppression were like the lighting of a powder keg. The long-simmering conflict was backed up by a social contract of non-intervention by state representatives as long as there was no public opposition by the population. In the following weeks more mass demonstrations were organised and held, mainly in Prague. Approximately

¹⁸⁹ Comp. Ib., p. 323 f.

¹⁹⁰ Comp. Ib., p. 324.

¹⁹¹ Comp. Ib.

¹⁹² Comp. Ib.

¹⁹³ While Jakob Juchler takes 50,000 participants into account, the German Federal Agency for Civic Education starts out from 15,000.

200,000 protestors participated in each event.¹⁹⁴ According to some reports Czechoslovakia's secret police interfered in these protests by infiltrating them with *agents provocateurs* to inflame the situation. These demonstrations naturally determined the further course of events: *perestroika*-style political reforms were no longer possible; the elite began to lose control over its actions and unintentionally accelerated the end of the autocratic system. 24-25 November 1989 saw the largest mass demonstrations that Czechoslovakia had ever experienced: between 700,000 and 800,000 people took to the streets of Prague to fight the Communist regime. These mass protests were accompanied by a general strike several days later, which increased the pressure on Party leadership. Strikers called for free elections, the unrestricted practice of religion, the resignation of Czechoslovakian President Gustáv Husák, as well as the condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968.¹⁹⁵

4.1.2 Opposition Movements

According Vít Hloušek¹⁹⁶ four aspects can be recognised that sealed the end of autocratic regime: 1) economic stagnation, 2) political dissatisfaction, 3) social stagnation and 4) intellectual and cultural stagnation. While the mass demonstrations can be regarded as Czechoslovakia's answer to economic stagnation and political dissatisfaction, the foundation of opposition movements and groups were the societal answer towards stagnation in culture and society.

Firstly, the Charta 77 movement, founded and initiated by Vaclav Havel¹⁹⁷ among others in 1977, was the very first organised opposition movement in Czechoslovakia, and the charter was signed by important public figures such as artists, actors, musicians and other intellectuals, as well as students. In the first months following Charta's foundation only a few hundred¹⁹⁸ followers had signed; approximately 1,200 by 1986. Unfortunately, the opposition movements remained weak for a long time. Their members "suffered various forms of repression during the years of the communist regime for their political convictions"¹⁹⁹,

¹⁹⁴ Comp. Ib., p. 325.

¹⁹⁵ Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, viewed on http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/GG2QVL,0,0,Politisches_System_nach_1989.html, retrieved on 18 April 2014.

¹⁹⁶ Comp. Hloušek, Vít: The Czech Republic's Transition to Democracy, p. 7 f.

¹⁹⁷ See: Havel, Václav: The Power of the Powerless, in: Tuathail, Gearóid Ó./Dalby, Simon and others: The Geopolitics Reader, New York/London 2003, p. 272-276.

¹⁹⁸ Comp. Juchler, Jakob: p. 320.

¹⁹⁹ Hloušek, Vít: Ib., p. 8.

Hloušek said. New opposition groups²⁰⁰ were founded on 19 November 1989, two days after the first mass demonstration: The Civic Forum (Czech: *Občanské fórum, OF*) in the Czech Republic and the Public Against Violence (Slovak: *Verejnost' proti násiliu, VPN*) in Slovakia. The Civic Forum consisted of several opposition groups such as Charta 77 and Communist dissidents of the Renaissance (Czech: *Obroda*) group, as well as members of political parties. The opposition groups and movements pressed for the resignation of the Communist government and renewal of the democratic system. Party Chairman Miloš Jakeš resigned from office on 24 November.²⁰¹ Afterwards, Václav Havel and Alexander Dubček appeared on a balcony at Wenceslas Square, both of whom were cheered by the crowds present. This can be seen as the beginning of the democratisation process in Czechoslovakia.

4.2 The Democratisation Process

4.2.1 The Beginning of Democratisation

The democratisation process started just after General Secretary Miloš Jakeš's resignation from office. On 29 November 1989 the Communist government took the decision to make significant changes to the Czechoslovakian constitution. Two important amendments must be mentioned: 1) the leading role of the Communist Party was abolished by the elite of the regime itself and furthermore 2) the leading role of Marxism-Leninism in society was also removed from the constitution.

However, the Communist dictatorship was still fighting for its survival. One faction of KSCĚ which was eager for reform made a final attempt to maintain its hegemony in early December 1989. A 'new' government was appointed. 16 out of 21 ministers in this government belonged²⁰² to the Communist Party while Ladislav Adamec became the new Communist Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia. This situation led to a new wave of protests. "After a tough bargaining the new government of national understanding was finally appointed on 10 December 1989 which only consisted of ten Communist ministers led by reform-minded Marián Čalfa."²⁰³ At the same time President Gustáv Husák resigned from office. For the first time since the Communists had taken power in Czechoslovakia after World War Two a majority of non-Communists ministers formed the government, even though Čalfa was still a representative of Communism. Important non-Communists now

²⁰⁰ Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, ib.

²⁰¹ Comp. Ib., retrieved on 15 April 2014.

²⁰² Comp. Juchler, Jakob: p. 325.

²⁰³ Ib.

participated in the new government. The most famous personalities were Václav Klaus, who later became Prime Minister, and then President, of the Czech Republic and Jiří Dienstbier, a dissident and former spokesman for Charta 77.

The time between Jakeš's resignation from office and the newly appointed government can also be seen as a important interim period setting the course of the further democratisation process in Czechoslovakia. Again, there is no single, clear turning point marking the end of autocratic system and beginning of democratisation, the same issue that affected the transition of the GDR's transition.

4.2.2 Further Process of Democratisation

By the end of December 1989 two symbolic figures of the opposition movement had been elected to the two most powerful positions in Czechoslovakia. On 29 December 1989²⁰⁴ Václav Havel and Alexander Dubček were announced as, respectively, the President of Czechoslovakia and the Chairman of the Parliament by the Communist National Assembly, which still held a majority.

Within only six weeks the political system of Czechoslovakia had been transformed into a semi-democratic framework with its first non-Communist heads of state. The process of democratisation continued in the subsequent months towards a political system based on democratic standards and embedded in a liberal environment. An internal process of the dismantling of Communist structures such as 'old' rules, laws and politics as well as dissolution of Czechoslovakian state security apparatus and the removal of the Communist Party from the national decision-making processes was initiated. The resetting of relations between state and the churches became a key item on the political agenda of 1990's and the following years.

The direction of transition and especially the way in which the structures should be changed was the subject of public discussion in Czechoslovakia. The further course of the democratisation, and thus consolidation, process was significantly determined by the abrupt, politically-driven change of regime. "The rejection of the previous system was deeply rooted [in Czechoslovakian society] even though the concrete route of societal restructuring remained controversial and unclear for most of the people."²⁰⁵ Communists still remained part

²⁰⁴ Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, ib., retrieved on 18 April 2014.

²⁰⁵ Juchler, Jakob: p. 326.

of the parliament, although a considerable majority of people wished to achieve²⁰⁶ essential political changes. The continuity of transition remained uncertain even within the Civic Forum, which actually represented a wide spectrum of political opinions and ideologies, from left-wing Socialism to right-wing conservatism. Due to the range of different opinions, the establishment of stable formal democratic structures took top priority. In the following weeks of January 1990, one hundred and twenty Communist Members of Parliament resigned; they were replaced with representatives of the opposition movement.

At the same time slight economic reforms²⁰⁷ such as 1) equalisation of the private sector, 2) establishment of joint stock companies, 3) break-up of state monopoly enterprises and 4) permission to found small businesses despite the slow start to the liberalisation of prices, and thus the economy as a whole. The main priorities in Czechoslovakia's transition were rather a political transition; the transition of economy remained of secondary importance.

4.2.3 The End of the Democratisation Process

The end of democratisation and the beginning of the consolidation process was marked by the free democratic elections held in June 1990. These elections can be regarded as a preliminary milestone of the end of democratisation. Nevertheless the elections could not provide a real political choice due to the lack of a clear range of political parties, brief preparation time, lack of formal election programme and specific political and societal divisions. The main divisions were between supporters of the 'old' and the 'new' regimes. The past significantly influenced the present. In other words: the election was used by the previous elite, embodied in the Communist Party, which eschewed a change of name and only went through a partial transition. Despite losing two-thirds of its members, the *KSČ* remained powerful in terms of its membership and disposed of considerable organisational and mobilisation potential.²⁰⁸ The Czech Civic Forum and the Slovak Public Against Violence gained more and more popularity in the weeks leading up to the elections. The Civic Forum was seen as a heterogeneous political party²⁰⁹ that, according to polls held just before the election, lacked prospects for success due to the short period of its existence and people's mistrust in the concentration of power. The same applied in Slovakia. Both the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence

²⁰⁶ Comp. Ib.

²⁰⁷ Comp. Ib., p. 327.

²⁰⁸ Comp. Ib., p. 328.

²⁰⁹ Comp. Ib.

struggled to establish transparent internal structures. The Civic Forum finally grew in popularity weeks before the election thanks to Václav Havel and his personal popularity and charisma. The Civic Forum was considered the most eligible candidate to overcome the Communist past.

Before the elections took place there was also a debate about the future federal structure of Czechoslovakia. As early as March 1990, the existence of the so-called Czechoslovakian Federal Republic led to massive protests in the Slovak entity²¹⁰ and was replaced on 22 April 1990 with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Czech: *Česká a Slovenská Federativní Republika, ČSFR*), which was accepted by a majority of people.

The first free elections to the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slovak National Council on 8 and 9 June 1990 resulted in the victory of the ‘new’ regime. Prior to the elections, a new electoral law and law on political parties being based on free competition, defining “the legal conditions for the activities of political parties and movements²¹¹” were adopted. The legislative period of the newly elected parliament was shortened to only two years. During its two-year term, the restructuring of the state began, including the drawing-up of a new constitution.²¹² The Civic Forum gained almost 50% of the vote (49.5%) in the Czech²¹³ entity in the election to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, followed by the Communist Party in second, with 13.2% of the vote. Two further political parties were elected to parliament: the Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (Czech: *Křesťanská a demokratická unie-Československá strana lidová, KDU-ČSL*) with 8.4% of the vote and the Movement for Autonomous Democracy-Party for Moravia and Silesia (Czech: *Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii-Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko, HSD-SMS*) with 10.0% of the vote. Voter turnout was 96.8% – a considerable number. In the Slovak²¹⁴ entity the Public Against Violence platform won the election with 29.4% of the vote, followed by the Christian Democratic Movement (*Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH*) with 19.2%, the Slovak National Party (*Slovenská národná strana, SNS*) with 13.9% and the Communist Party (*KSČ*) with 13.4%. The other parties that gained seats in the parliament were the Coexistence-Hungarian Christian

²¹⁰ Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, ib., retrieved on 19 April 2014.

²¹¹ Hloušek, Vít: Ib., p. 14.

²¹² Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, ib., retrieved on 26 April 2014.

²¹³ Comp. Český statistický úřad: Volby do České národní rady konané ve dnech 8.-9.6.1990. Celkové výsledky hlasování, viewed on <http://www.volby.cz/pls/cnr1990/u4>, retrieved on 19 April 2014.

²¹⁴ Comp. Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky: Výsledky volieb rok 1990, viewed on http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/snr1990/volby90_s/pph90.htm, retrieved on 19 April 2014.

Democratic Movement (*Spolužitie-Maďarské kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, ESWMK*) with 8.7%, the Democratic Party (*Demokratická strana, DS*) with 4.4% and the Green Party (*Strana zelených, SZ*) with 3.5% of the vote. Voter turnout was 95.4%. In Slovakia the VPN formed a coalition with *KDH* and *DS*. In the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic as a whole, the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence formed a coalition together with the Christian Democrats. The most important outcome of the elections was that the Communist Party was no longer in power in Czechoslovakia and the party slid into isolation. The new government of the Czech Republic was thus mainly led by former dissidents. Václav Klaus became Minister of Finance, Jiří Dienstbier took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Communist Marián Čalfa, now a member of Public Against Violence, became Prime Minister of the *ČSFR* as a whole while Havel remained president. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar became the new Prime Minister and in the Czech Republic Petr Pithart remained Prime Minister.

4.3 The Consolidation of Democracy

The consolidation of democracy in Czechoslovakia began even before the end of the democratisation process. The free elections marked a turning point in Czechoslovakia's transition, as essential democratic features were established and the Communist Party lost all its power. Nevertheless, a completely new constitution, based on democratic norms, had not yet been established.

4.3.1 The Socio-Economic Consolidation

The further progress of consolidation was mainly characterised by a robust discussion about the path of reform. Brief disagreements occurred after the elections: "After the victory over the Communists the unifying tie of the 'opposition movement' ceased to exist and disagreements erupted due to the upcoming important decisions about economic and social policy."²¹⁵ The country's future economic alignment remained unclear. There were two main points of view: 1) a rather social democratic approach favouring a slow, cushioned transition in social terms towards a market economy, against a 2) more radical neoliberal programme. A further so called 'third way' must also be mentioned here; but it was never a real option. Václav Klaus was an adherent of the neoliberal agenda while Deputy Prime Minister Valtr

²¹⁵ Juchler, Jakob: p. 329.

Komárek advocated the first option. In the words of Václav Klaus and Tomas Ježek on their economic worldview: “As true liberals, we should start with a very heavy dose of monetarist medicine – with economic policy measures, not with formal institutional reform – because with ‘easy money’ no real changes in economic behavior of any agents can be achieved.”²¹⁶ A clear shift of priorities is visible: while political reforms took priority in the decision-making processes of Czechoslovakia’s democratisation process, this shifted to new values focusing on economy and only then politics. In mid-September 1990²¹⁷ the second path, a neoliberal economic transition, was adopted by parliament. The first steps had already been taken in autumn 1990: 1) a new tax law was introduced to promote growth in the private sector, 2) the national currency was devalued in October 1990 to 54.5% of its previous value and 3) privatisation programmes such as the law on restitution and ‘minor privatisation’ regulating the sale of small-scale enterprises. Furthermore, a so-called ‘corporate tripartism’ – the joint ownership of institutions between official representatives of the state, employers and employees – was enacted in order to “establish social partnership organizations”²¹⁸. Additionally, a two-tier banking system was established as early as April 1990²¹⁹, together with unemployment compensation provisions, the abolition of both the Planning Commission and Prices Board, as well as the state monopoly of foreign trade. The main process of economic consolidation started in early 1991 with the unleashing of market mechanisms such as economic competition, including large-scale general privatisation, the increasing of prices for food in particular due to the reduction of subsidies, the convertibility of the Czech crown, import tax and “tax-based measures to restrict the growth of wages”²²⁰. From a macro-economic perspective, the Czechoslovakian government focused on a moderate rate of inflation, restrictive budgets and a tight monetary policy. The direct result of this was a deterioration in the social and economic situation²²¹ in both the Czech and Slovak Republics, based on a fall in real earnings, high rates of inflation and unemployment as well as reduced industrial production. “Czechoslovakia experienced a deep transition recession during the 1991-1992 period.”²²² Tensions then emerged between trade unions and government. However, large-scale strikes failed to occur. At the same time, people’s fears about the

²¹⁶ Dangerfield, Martin: Ideology and the Czech Transformation. Neoliberal Rhetoric or Neoliberal Reality?, p. 436, in: East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1997), p. 436-469.

²¹⁷ Comp. Juchler, Jakob: p. 330.

²¹⁸ Ivan T. Berend: Social Shock in Transforming Central and Eastern Europe, in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, No. 40 (2007), p. 272.

²¹⁹ Comp. Dangerfield, Martin: *Ib.*, p. 442.

²²⁰ *Ib.*

²²¹ Comp. Juchler, Jakob: p. 331.

²²² Beblavý, Miroslav: Slovakia’s Transition to a Market Economy and the World Bank’s Engagement, viewed on http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1530284, p. 2, retrieved on 24 April 2014.

dangers of economic change started to become more and more real; Czechs and Slovaks both pointed to growing dissatisfaction with regard to political and economic development²²³. The privatisation process²²⁴ in Czechoslovakia took place simultaneously to restructuring. The small-scale privatisation programme in 1990 (terminated by the end of 1993) was followed by large-scale privatisation in 1991 (conducted between 1992 and 1994) and so-called ‘voucher privatisation’ being implemented for the direct or indirect mass privatisation of approximately 2,000 companies in 1992. After 1993, privatisation remained centralised in the Czech Republic. The process was under state control; the state determined the speed and strategy of privatisation. 1996 saw a third wave of privatisation in the Czech Republic, with the privatisation of hospitals and other social institutions, while the third wave in the Slovak Republic was characterised²²⁵ by the sale of large industrial enterprises in the chemical, oil and paper industries. Additionally, following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Council for Economic and Social Agreement²²⁶ was created in both the Czech and Slovak Republics.

In the years following the country’s dissolution, the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced a kind of post-Communist ‘social shock’, characterised by unemployment, reduced income, poverty, corruption and social polarisation: “The main reason for social shock, however, was cultural, the sharp collision of state socialist, and traditional values on the one hand and new values and social behavioral requirements on the other. The doors opened widely, but most of the people were frightened to enter into an unknown world.”²²⁷ Despite all the negative phenomena such as reduced real wages, economic insecurity and “other uncertainties into their [people’s] daily lives”²²⁸, the neoliberal reforms can be seen as a success story in the Czech Republic. Slovakia, on the other hand, was hit much harder compared to the Czech Republic due to differing economic structures and a level of industrialisation.²²⁹ In the summary of Miroslav Beblavý: “Consequently, the transition recession was more painful in Slovakia [...]”; this shall be illustrated below.

After Czechoslovakia’s dissolution by 1 January 1993, Slovakia started to implement an independent economic policy after the end of the Czech-Slovak monetary union on 8 February 1993. The idea of independence was originally based on “a more gradualist path of transition including extensive state intervention in the economy and highly ambitious

²²³ Comp. Juchler, Jakob: *Ib.*

²²⁴ Comp. Here and following: Dangerfield, Martin: *Ib.*, p. 445 f.

²²⁵ Comp. Beblavý, Miroslav: *Ib.*, p. 4, retrieved on 24 April 2014.

²²⁶ Comp. Ivan T. Berend: *Ib.*

²²⁷ *Ib.*, p. 279.

²²⁸ Dangerfield, Martin: *Ib.*, p. 436 f.

²²⁹ Comp. Beblavý, Miroslav: *Ib.*, retrieved on 24 April 2014.

industrial policy”²³⁰. In the first years of Slovakia’s independency the country experienced an even more severe economic downturn. Fiscal transfers by Czech Republic did not happen, taxes went up, expenditure was cut and the country’s credibility in international financial markets remained low.²³¹

In a review²³² in 2006, Klaus settled scores with the former advocates of the so-called ‘third way’ in Czechoslovakia: “It seems almost unimaginable today, but for the majority of people the alternative to communism in our country was not capitalism.” Klaus called the visions of a third way “utopian”. Politically, third way adherents favoured non-political politics while seeking an “exceptional role for intellectual and cultural elites in the running of the country.” Klaus labelled them “neocollectivists” and “postdemocrats” who “reject liberal democracy”. Economically, in the words of Klaus, the supporters of the third way “did not wish to change the existing economic system”, but wanted to emphasise elements of *perestroika*. The advocates of the third way stood for a middle course between socialism and capitalism, similar to the ‘third way’ in the GDR. Klaus’ goals in the transition of Czechoslovakia were capitalism and parliamentary democracy: “The group, of which I was a part, pushed for the adoption of the Scenario for Economic Reform by the Federal Parliament of the then-Czechoslovakia in the fall 1990.” The compromise consisted of important policies which were needed to bring the economy into line on the path towards a free, liberal market economy, such as the dissolution of institutional structures of the centrally planned economy, repeal of Communist laws, bans and orders, liberalisation of prices, foreign trade and markets, as well as the privatisation of small- and large-scale public enterprises. Two things were essential for the creation of a liberal market economy: macro-economic stability and the establishment of infrastructure on which a functioning market could be based. “All of us who were thinking about economic reforms at that time knew that it was necessary to take all of those steps simultaneously.” According to Mitchell A. Orenstein, Klaus’ ideas about the economic path of Czechoslovakia can be seen as “radical”²³³. In spite of this, the neoliberal economic path became the dominant item on Czechoslovakia’s transition and consolidation agenda.

²³⁰ Ib.

²³¹ Comp. Ib.

²³² Comp. Here and following: Klaus, Václav: The Economic Transformation of the Czech Republic. Challenges Faced and Lessons Learned, in: CATO Institute: Economic Development Bulletin. Project on Global Economic Liberty, No. 6 (February 2006), viewed on <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb6.pdf>, retrieved on 20 April 2014.

²³³ Orenstein, Mitchell A.: What Happened in East European (Political) Economies? A Balance Sheet for Neoliberal Reform, p. 483, in: East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 2009), p. 479-490.

Figure 12: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic 1989-2013 in percentages²³⁴


	<u>Inflation</u>	<u>General Unemployment Rate</u>	<u>Gross Domestic Product</u>
1989	1.4	-	-
1990	9.7	-	-
1991	56.6	2.3	-10.0
1992	11.1	3.3	-2.0
1993	20.8	4.3	1.2
1994	10.0	4.3	2.9
1995	9.1	4.0	6.2
1996	8.8	3.9	4.5
1997	8.5	4.8	-0.9
1998	10.7	6.5	-0.2
1999	2.1	8.7	1.7
2000	3.9	8.8	4.2
2001	4.7	8.1	3.1
2002	1.8	7.3	2.1
2003	0.1	7.8	3.8
2004	2.8	8.3	4.7
2005	1.9	7.9	6.8
2006	2.5	7.1	7.0
2007	2.8	5.3	5.7
2008	6.3	4.4	3.1
2009	1.0	6.7	-4.5
2010	1.5	7.3	2.5
2011	1.9	6.7	1.8
2012	3.3	7.0	-1.0
2013	1.4	-	-

The inflation rate in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia increased dramatically from 9.7% to 56.5% between 1990 and 1991 due to the new economic measures such as devaluation of the national currency and neoliberal market reforms. In other terms: the prices for goods and services rose by more than 580% within a year. During the next three years the unemployment rate remained double-digit, reaching 20.8% in 1993 and subsequently falling

²³⁴ With information from: World Bank: World DataBank. World Development Indicators, viewed on <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>, retrieved on 22 April 2014; Český statistický úřad: Zaměstnanost a nezaměstnanost v České republice podle výsledků výběrového šetření pracovních sil (VŠPS), viewed on http://m.czso.cz/cz/cr_1989_ts/0501.pdf, retrieved on 22 April 2014; Český statistický úřad: Základní ukazatele národního hospodářství v České republice, viewed on http://m.czso.cz/cz/cr_1989_ts/0401.pdf, retrieved on 22 April 2014; Český statistický úřad: Míra inflace, vývoj spotřebitelských cen vybraných výrobků v České republice, viewed on http://m.czso.cz/cz/cr_1989_ts/0304.pdf, retrieved on 22 April 2014.

to 10.0% one year later. Between 1995 and 1998 the inflation rate remained relatively high, reaching 9.1% in 1995 and 10.7% in 1998. In 1998 the Czech Republic recorded its last two-digit inflation rate until the present day. Since 1999 inflation has been moderate, varying between 0.1% (2003) and 6.3 (2008). The inflation rate in 2003 was the lowest ever measured. The unemployment rate was never seen as a major problem in the Czech Republic.

Figure 13: Graphs showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech territory of Czechoslovakia, and then the Czech Republic, between 1989-2013 in percentages according to the figures in 'Figure 12'



During the final years of the existence of Czechoslovakia the unemployment rate remained low: 2.3% (1991) and 3.3% (1992). In the years following the division of Czechoslovakia, the rate remained low and stable, at around 4%, until the end of 1997. In 1998 6.5% of Czechs were out of work; in subsequent years this varied between 8.8% (2000) and 7.1% (2006). The unemployment rate in the year 2000 was the highest ever recorded, while remaining moderate. Between 2007 and 2008 the unemployment rate fell to 4.4%. Since 2009 the unemployment rate has remained stable at around 7%. The unemployment rate never reached two digits.

In 1991 and 1992 the Czech Republic experienced a negative annual GDP growth of -10% and -2%. In 1993, after the split, the Czech Republic's GDP development amounted to positive growth of 1.2%, reaching 6.2% in 1995. This positive development was interrupted in

1997 and 1998, when the Czech Republic faced slight negative growth of -0.9% and -0.2%. In the following years the GDP growth remained stable at between 1.7% (1999) and 3.8% (2003), before reaching a unique, robust growth level of 7.0% in 2006. Since 2009 the Czech Republic has faced the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, recording its second highest negative GDP growth of -4.5% (2009), followed by weak GDP growth. In 2012 GDP growth was again negative (-1.0%). The way out of the crisis remains a difficult one for the Czech Republic.

Figure 14: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia and then the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages²³⁵

<u>Year</u>	<u>Inflation</u>	<u>General Unemployment Rate</u>	<u>Gross Domestic Product</u>
1989	-	-	1.2
1990	-	-	-2.7
1991	-	11.1	-14.6
1992	-	10.9	-6.7
1993	-	12.2	-3.7
1994	13.4	13.7	6.2
1995	9.9	13.1	5.8
1996	5.8	11.3	6.9
1997	6.1	11.9	4.4
1998	6.7	12.6	4.4
1999	10.6	16.4	0.0
2000	12.0	18.8	1.4
2001	7.3	19.3	3.5
2002	3.3	18.6	4.6
2003	8.6	17.5	4.8
2004	7.5	18.1	5.1
2005	2.7	16.2	6.7
2006	4.5	13.3	8.3
2007	2.8	11.0	10.5
2008	4.6	9.6	5.8
2009	1.6	12.1	-4.9
2010	1.0	14.4	4.2
2011	3.9	13.5	3.0
2012	3.6	13.9	1.8
2013	-	-	-

²³⁵ Comp. World Bank: World DataBank. World Development Indicators, viewed on <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>, retrieved on 22 April 2014.

In comparison to the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic faced massive social problems with regard to post-Communist economic development. Compared to the Czech Republic, the inflation rate remained relatively low, reaching a high of 13.4% in 1994 before falling to 5.8% (1996) and 6.1% (1997). Between 1998 and 2000 inflation increased dramatically, from 6.7% (1998) to 10.6% (1999) and 12.0% (2000). In 2000 – ten years after the collapse of Communism – the second highest inflation rate ever was recorded. The inflation rate subsequently remained unstable: 7.3% in 2001, 3.3% in 2002, 8.6% in 2003 and 2.7% in 2005. In 2010 the Slovak Republic experienced its lowest ever measured inflation rate of only 1.0%, followed by a relatively moderate 3.9% (2011) and 3.6% (2012).

A bigger problem has been the unemployment rate, which has remained high even up to the present. In 1991 and 1992 the Slovaks were confronted with a unemployment rate amounting to 11.1% and 10.9% followed by a stable, but high, rate of between 13.7% (1994) and 11.3% (1996). Afterwards the unemployment rate increased significantly, reaching a maximum of 19.3% in 2001. The rate remained high, fluctuating between 18.6% (2002), 17.5% (2003) and 18.1% (2004) before falling from 16.2% (2005) to 9.6% in 2008. This was the first and only time that a single-digit unemployment rate was recorded. Since 2009 the Slovak Republic has experienced the negative results of the global financial and economic crisis, with a further increase in the number of people out of work.

Figure 15: Graph showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia, and the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages according to the figures in 'Figure 14'



Between 1991 and 1993 the Slovak Republic recorded negative GDP growth four times in a row reaching a record low of -14.6% in 1991. Between 1994 and 1998 Slovakia showed positive, stable GDP growth varying between 6.2% and 4.4%, followed by non-growth in 1999 (0.0%). In 2000 and 2001 the GDP improved by 1.4% and 3.5% before reaching a robust rate of 5.1% in 2004. GDP thus developed significantly reaching its first and only two-digit figure of 10.5% in 2007. In 2009 the development of the Slovak Republic was suddenly interrupted by the economic crisis, with negative GDP growth of -4.9%. Only one year later, however, GDP stabilised at +4.2% (2010). In 2011 and 2012 GDP growth remained moderate and stable, varying between 3.0% and 1.8%.

4.3.2 The Political Consolidation

Two key aspects will be examined with regard to the political consolidation: the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as well as the Czech and Slovak Republic's return to Europe and the international community. In this, the second current of domestic-level theories – the regime type and democratisation – will provide the theoretical framework for the examination of the international co-operation and integration of the Czech and Slovak Republics.

4.3.2.1 Dissolution of Czechoslovakia

Arguments between the opposition movements and between the autonomous Czech and Slovak Republics within Czechoslovakia about the future direction of reforms with regard to the restructuring of politics and economics started immediately after the first elections in June 1990. The main political movements, Civic Forum in the Czech Republic and Public Against Violence in the Slovak Republic, broke under the pressure. Both platforms were experiencing insurmountable differences of opinion about the further course of the transition. While Public Against Violence was moving towards becoming a political party with a strong hierarchical structure, the Civic Forum strived for decentralised structures and the integration of members.²³⁶ The Civic Forum was shaken by power and leadership struggles between right-wing, liberal and left-wing factions.²³⁷ In February 1991 the Civic Forum split²³⁸ into three parties. The first of these was the Civic Democratic Party (Czech: *Občanská demokratická*

²³⁶ Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, ib., retrieved on 26 April 2014.

²³⁷ Comp. Juchler, Jakob: Ib., p. 332.

²³⁸ Comp. Here and following: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, ib.

strana, ODS) which, under the leadership of Václav Klaus, became a major player in the Czech political landscape in the following years. The second was the Citizens' Movement (Czech: *Občanské hnutí, OH*), which attracted former dissidents. The third was the Civic Democratic Alliance (Czech: *Občanská demokratická aliance, ODA*). The same process took place in Slovakia a mere two months later. The *VPN* was dissolved and transformed into the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Slovak: *Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS*) led by Vladimír Mečiar, which became the leading political party in post-Communist Slovakia. The split led to a political crisis in Slovakia when Mečiar and his followers were thrown out of the government. The political landscape became more fragmented, more polarised and more heterogeneous compared to late 1989 and the early 1990s.

Potential for conflict also existed with regard to the devolution of powers to both autonomous regions and the issue of self-administration. Even the mere name of the country was a source for friction, as described in previous chapters. The Slovak Republic strove for a higher degree of autonomy and disengagement²³⁹ from the hegemony of Prague. As early as June 1990, several federal ministries were dissolved and their powers transferred to the autonomous governments, followed by substantial powers in taxation and budgeting. Negotiations on the restructuring of powers between the two entities had begun in August 1990. After much to-ing and fro-ing, the first solutions were found in November, concluding with tough, suspenseful parliamentary debates in December 1990: "The Slovak leaders threatened with a constitutional crisis [...]". Slovak laws were thus to take priority over federal laws. Finally, the bill was accepted with only minor changes. In a survey in November 1990 only a small minority of the people wanted the country to split into autonomous regions: while 12% of people in Czech Republic favoured the division of Czechoslovakia, 16% were in favour in Slovakia.

Even though the conflict between both entities seemed to have been resolved in the winter of 1990, the conflict heated up again during 1991. The new constellation of political parties led to further clashes. Protracted negotiations failed in the autumn 1991. Even Václav Havel²⁴⁰ was not able to mediate successfully. Nevertheless, his idea of holding a referendum was accepted by parliament; however, this could not be implemented due to Slovak resistance²⁴¹. A further step towards the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics was the unequal economic development of the two territories. A resolution to the so-called 'Slovak question' was forced by, in particular, Mečiar's circle and *SNS* members who wanted to

²³⁹ Comp. Here and following: Juchler, Jakob: *Ib.*, p. 333.

²⁴⁰ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 337.

²⁴¹ Comp. *Ib.*

promote national Slovak interests while being on a collision course regarding to the new government of the Slovak part of the federation, which had been led by the Christian Democrat Ján Čarnogurský since Mečiar's exclusion from the Slovak government following the restructuring of political landscape. The elections of June 1992 can thus be seen as the final milestone in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The result of the elections can be regarded as the pre-programming of division.²⁴² Klaus's *ODS* became the strongest party in the Czech Republic and Mečiar's *HZDS* the strongest in Slovakia. The points of conflict between Klaus and Mečiar were insurmountable. Klaus advocated a federation model and Mečiar a confederation.²⁴³ Once both Klaus and Mečiar saw that a compromise could not be reached, both pursued the division of Czechoslovakia: Klaus, because he wished to have free rein in the configuration of *his* territory, particularly with regard to *his* economic policy; and Mečiar, because he wished to achieve economic advantages. Havel's endeavours to discourage the division were not successful and he resigned from office on 17 July 1992. On the same day the Slovak declaration of independence was adopted. Thus a new president could not be elected and a federal interim government was established.

Meanwhile, dates for more than ten meetings²⁴⁴ between Klaus and Mečiar were set. By the end of October 1992 agreement had finally been reached that regulated most critical aspects of the process. On 25 November 1992²⁴⁵ the Federal Assembly ratified the dissolution of Czechoslovakia as of 1 January 1993. "The division was carried out peacefully on the basis of mutual agreement."²⁴⁶ Approximately thirty agreements were required between both federal governments governing future relations between the two countries. The core points of the agreement were: 1) establishment of single market, 2) customs union, 3) monetary union and 4) dividing property 2:1 in favour of the Czech Republic. The allocation of land ownership remained unresolved. "Thereby the separation took place in a well-arranged and legal way, certainly an exceptional phenomenon in the modern history of state units falling apart [...]."²⁴⁷ Additionally, new democratic constitutions were adopted by 1 January 1993²⁴⁸ in both, now-separated countries.

²⁴² Comp. Here and following: *Ib.*, p. 341.

²⁴³ Comp. Hloušek, Vít: *Ib.* p. 12.

²⁴⁴ Comp. Juchler, Jakob: *Ib.*, p. 342.

²⁴⁵ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 342 f.

²⁴⁶ Hloušek, Vít: *Ib.* p. 12.

²⁴⁷ Juchler, Jakob: *Ib.*, p. 343.

²⁴⁸ Comp. Hloušek, Vít: *Ib.*, p. 15.

The discussion²⁴⁹ about the reasons for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia remains a difficult one. On the one hand, experts see the reasons in the history of nation-building in Czechoslovakia in 1918, and on the other hand the establishment of Communism is seen as a factor in later efforts for independence due to the emergence of the first tensions between Czechs and Slovaks within the Communist Party. Furthermore, the ‘Velvet Revolution’ might be seen as the third reason for the separation as it led to the establishment of new political parties (and new political streams/ideologies) and inequalities in economic development. Both the Czech and Slovak Republics had different visions about how the transition should be achieved. Worth mentioning is the fact that a majority of neither Czechs nor Slovaks ever supported the separation²⁵⁰ of the two entities according to different surveys: “[...] the state was actually divided against the wishes of its citizens”, but divided by “the consensus of the Czech and Slovak political elites”.

4.3.2.2 The Czech and Slovak Republics Return to Europe and to the International Community

The inhabitants of Prague, Bratislava and elsewhere are currently celebrating the tenth anniversary of their countries’ accession to the EU; but the foundations for this had been laid in 1989 and 1990. Prior to this, Czechoslovakia had been a member of most important international organisations such as the United Nations (1945), COMECON (1949), the Warsaw Pact (1955) and the entire process of CSCE and OSCE (1973/1975). A new dimension of membership in international institutions was reached during and after the ‘Velvet Revolution’. In 1990 Czechoslovakia joined CEI; one year later the so-called Visegrád Group was established. Following Czechoslovakia’s dissolution in 1993, both the Czech and Slovak Republics used their new powers to join all previous international organisations as separate states, with the exception of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, which had been disbanded. The Czech Republic succeeded in joining further international organisations before the Slovak Republic, e.g. the OECD; Slovakia only joined the OECD five years later. The Czech Republic also became a member of NATO five years before the Slovak Republic. However, in 1995 both countries joined the WTO at the same time. 2004 can be regarded as a special year for both the Czech and Slovak Republics, as both became

²⁴⁹ Comp. Here and following: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, ib.

²⁵⁰ Comp. Hloušek, Vít: Ib. p. 12.

members of the European Community on 1 May and Slovakia also joined NATO. The opposite applied in 2009, when only Slovakia became a member of the Eurozone.

Figure 16: Membership of Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak Republics of the most important International Organisations

Date	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic
1945	United Nations (as Czechoslovakia)	
1949	COMECON (as Czechoslovakia)	
1955	Warsaw Pact (as Czechoslovakia)	
1973	CSCE (as Czechoslovakia)	
1975	OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) (as Czechoslovakia)	
1990	CEI (as Czechoslovakia)	
1991	Visegrád Group (as ČSFR)	
1993	United Nations Visegrád Group CEFTA (until 2004) CEI OSCE	United Nations Visegrád Group CEFTA (until 2004) CEI OSCE
1995	OECD WTO	WTO
1999	NATO	
2000		OECD
2004	EU	EU NATO
2009		Eurozone

* The OSCE was not formally established until 1975

The Czech and Slovak Republics' membership in international organisations was determined by the Russian threat from the very beginning of their existence in 1993. The governments in Prague and Bratislava tried to find answers to Russia's hegemony and self-perception as a global power. The key response to this hegemonic supremacy was regionalism by means of integration and co-operation. In particular, the NATO membership of both the Czech and Slovak Republics can be judged as the core anchor of military defence. The geopolitical fear of Russia and its desire for territorial enlargement can be finally judged to have come true: the current issue, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia with regard to Crimean Peninsula and the eastern territories of Ukraine, can be seen as evidence of this. This trend was fortunately foreseen by Klaus in the 1990s²⁵¹. Hence, both successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, responded through membership of different international, sub-regional and regional bodies so as to embed themselves, firstly politically and secondly

²⁵¹ Comp. NATO, Europe, and the Security of Democracy. Václav Havel. Selected speeches, articles, and interviews 1990-2002, p. 42 and 49, viewed on http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/docs/ostatni/HAVEL_anj_OK.pdf, retrieved on 1 May 2014.

economically. In summary, it can be stated that NATO and EU can be considered as the most important international organisations for both the Czech and Slovak Republics, followed by the Visegrád Group. NATO, the EU and the V4 will thus subsequently be at the centre of research, while the CEI and CEFTA will be only briefly presented.

First of all, Czechoslovakia joined the Central European Initiative (CEI) in 1990. The CEI, founded in November 1989, is a “regional intergovernmental forum committed to supporting European integration through cooperation” through the combination of “multilateral diplomacy and project management, both as donor and recipient, while bridging Europeans macro-regions”²⁵². The CEI’s goals²⁵³ are: 1) support for member states on their path to EU integration, 2) alignment of member states to EU standards, 3) deepening of co-operation among member states not only in politics, but also the economy and the environment. The CEI also addresses technology, culture and society. However, the regional organisation “operates in a flexible manner to promote intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary and business cooperation”²⁵⁴. Nevertheless, the CEI does not and did work well for states in transition in Central and Eastern Europe; apart from this, the CEI now concentrates on the Balkan states. There the CEI can be recognised as an important regional player, but neither for the Czech Republic nor for the Slovak Republic due to weak structures and inadequate organisation.

In late 1992 the Central European Free Trade Agreement was established²⁵⁵ following to the Visegrád Declaration of 15 February 1991 and the Cracow Declaration of 6 October 1991 by the same group of states that founded the Visegrád Four: the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary. The agreement entered into force on 1 March 1993. Membership expired on the accession of these countries to European Union in May 2004. CEFTA was originally formed as preparation for a country’s path to EU accession. The main objectives²⁵⁶ are: 1) co-operation in European economic integration being based on a market economy, competition and financial stability, 2) elimination of trade barriers, 3) expansion of (global) trade and productivity, 4) improvement of living conditions and employment standards. The agreement is a classic free trade treaty focusing solely on economic development and relations, to the exclusion of politics. Nevertheless, Article 19 mandates the

²⁵² Central European Initiative, viewed on <http://www.cei.int>, retrieved on 1 May 2014.

²⁵³ Comp. Ib.: Mission and Objectives, viewed on <http://www.cei.int/content/mission-objectives>, retrieved on 1 May 2014.

²⁵⁴ Ib.: Functioning and Structure, viewed on <http://www.cei.int/content/functioning-structure>, retrieved on 1 May 2014.

²⁵⁵ Comp. Central European Free Trade Agreement, viewed on <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/cefta.pdf>, retrieved on 1 May 2014.

²⁵⁶ Comp. Ib.

non-proliferation of NBC weapons. From a European perspective, membership of CEFTA is an important criteria for the future accession to the EU of Central and South European states through regional economic development and co-operation leading to stable and peaceful conditions: “The speed with which the parties ratified this ambitious agreement indicates the importance of this agreement to economic development in the region.”²⁵⁷ Thus the agreement is entirely compliant with EU regulations, as well as WTO rules: “Effectively implemented, the agreement provides an excellent framework for the Parties to prepare for EU accession, thus continuing the tradition of the original CEFTA, whose founding members are now in the EU.”²⁵⁸

One year before CEFTA was signed, the Visegrád Group was created in 1991 by three states: Czechoslovakia/ČSFR, Poland and Hungary. After Czechoslovakia’s dissolution its successor states the Czech and Slovak Republics succeeded in 1993. The Visegrád Group “reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a number of fields of common interests within all-European integration”²⁵⁹. The group was founded, on the one hand, due to the strong traditional ties among the aforementioned countries, who shared a common Communist heritage and similar culture and values, while being territorially and geographically connected to each other and facing similar issues with regard to the transition towards a market economy and democracy. The declaration’s signatories consider that all states in the Visegrád Group had the same point of departure, thus giving the best conditions for the resolution of common problems. On the other hand, the Visegrád countries are the core of Central Europe and wished to create a counterpoint to the Western European countries, which were already deeply involved in international organisations and co-operation with each other. Co-operation between four previous Communist states was further seen as a response to the Russian threat. “In the wake of post-1989 changes, three [...] countries decided to forge closer cooperation with the aim of ‘returning’ to Europe”²⁶⁰, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic assessed. Even though the V4 is an “informal grouping” it is considered to be a “living and informal regional structure” that is regarded as a very important sub-regional body of political and economic international co-operation, below the EU and NATO. The structures

²⁵⁷ Central European Free Trade Agreement Secretariat: CEFTA 2006, viewed on <http://www.cefta.int>, retrieved on 1 May 2014.

²⁵⁸ *Ib.*

²⁵⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic: Visegrád Group, viewed on http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/international_organisations/visegrad_group/index.html, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁶⁰ Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic: The Visegrád Group – V4, viewed on http://www.mzv.sk/en/foreign_policy/the_visegrad_group, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

of the V4 can be regarded as dynamic. The current key goals are: 1) strengthening co-ordination and consultation in the fields of economy, regional development and culture, 2) regional representation of developing democracy and 3) achieving common opinions, options and positions with regard to foreign and European policies. The key objectives in 1991 differed and were tailored with regard to the special needs of countries in transition, such as: 1) restoration of states' sovereignty, 2) abolition of Communist structures in the political system, 3) support of transition towards parliamentary democracy, 4) establishment of a competitive market economy and 5) membership of the "European political, security, economic and legal system"²⁶¹. Slovakia in particular benefits from its membership of the Visegrád Group. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany judges Slovakia's membership to be important.²⁶² Slovakia uses this as a platform to coordinate positions with regard to NATO and EU. Even though the structures of the V4 "began to slacken due to the prevalence of the idea that individual efforts towards accession to the Euro-Atlantic integration formations will be more efficient"²⁶³, Slovakia assessed the work of the Visegrád Group positively: "For more than 20 years, regional cooperation of the V4 has successfully developed in the intersectoral/interministerial field, e.g. in such areas as the economy, infrastructure, energy, cross-border cooperation, cultural exchanges and scholarships, coordination of foreign policy positions and pursuance of common interests within the EU and vis-à-vis third countries/regions."²⁶⁴ The V4 was most important in the "initial period of existence"²⁶⁵, between 1991 and 1993, when talks with NATO and EU took place. The Visegrád Group was resumed in 1998.

Apart from this, the two most important memberships of the Czech and Slovak Republics are the supra-national, inter-governmental bodies of the European Union and the transatlantic, inter-governmental military alliance NATO, based on the North Atlantic Treaty. In the words of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The most important goals of Slovak foreign policy were achieved by means of the country's integration in European Union and NATO"²⁶⁶. With regard to the Czech Republic, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be

²⁶¹ *Ib.*

²⁶² Comp. Auswärtiges Amt: Slowakei. Außenpolitik, viewed on http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Slowakei/Aussenpolitik_node.html, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁶³ The Visegrád Group: History of the Visegrád Group, viewed on <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about/history>, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic: *Ib.*

²⁶⁵ The Visegrád Group: *Ib.*

²⁶⁶ Auswärtiges Amt: Slowakei. Außenpolitik, *ib.*

regarded as a cornerstone of its national security policy.²⁶⁷ However, the road towards integration in EU and NATO structures was a rocky one. The Czech Republic became a member in NATO seven years after independence, while Slovakia needed to wait more than ten years. The belated accession of Slovakia may be explained by the brief, interim period of autocracy, led by the “autocratic Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar”²⁶⁸, at the beginning of the consolidation process between 1994 and 1998. Slovakia thus fell behind the Czech Republic with regard to its political system and the economic development. In that time Slovakia’s democracy faced “many setbacks”²⁶⁹. In the further evaluation of ‘Freedom House’: “[...] the ruling coalition fought with the opposition over the very rules of the political game [and] the process of building the institutions of the new state took place against the backdrop of the democratic opposition’s efforts to preserve the degree of freedom and democracy achieved during the initial transition period [...]”²⁷⁰. Slovakia’s democratic consolidation actually started in the post-1998 era under Mikuláš Dzurinda, who brought the country to successful negotiations on accession to the EU and NATO, which did not occur under Mečiar’s autocratic leadership. Freedom House labelled Dzurinda’s premiership a “turning point”²⁷¹. While the Czech Republic joined NATO in the first wave of post-Cold War enlargement, Slovakia was supposed to join in the second wave. Prague’s accession to NATO can be considered recognition of the country’s successful consolidation. As mentioned previously in the chapter about the GDR’s accession to NATO, the international organisation found itself being embedded in a new political and military environment after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War “opened up the possibility of further NATO enlargement”²⁷². Thus the accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics was a direct consequence of the upheavals in previous Communist countries and their transition towards democracy. In a process comparable to the debate in Germany on the accession of the territory of the GDR to NATO, the possible membership of the Czech and Slovak Republics also led to public discussion. The modality and timeframe of the accession were of particular importance: “[...] Czech and Slovak leaders began a campaign to join existing European and transatlantic institutions” in the early 1990s, and thus “the EU and NATO were main targets

²⁶⁷ Comp. Auswärtiges Amt: Tschechische Republik. Außenpolitik, viewed on http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_D0D9A6509FE1D464B90166E4AB7A930F/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Tschechische-Republik/Aussenpolitik_node.html, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁶⁸ Freedom House: Nations in Transit, Slovakia (2003), viewed on <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2003/slovakia#.U2PDCCiXZB8>, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁶⁹ *Ib.*

²⁷⁰ *Ib.*

²⁷¹ *Ib.*

²⁷² NATO: Member countries, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

of these efforts”²⁷³. While Slovakia’s accession to NATO and the EU was determined by particular politicians, the Czech Republic did not depend on such personalities to join NATO and the EU, even though Václav Klaus, who held office of Prime Minister between 1992 and 1998, is not known as an adherent of the European Union and its structures. However, Klaus, who continues to be a vocal critic of the EU, is an European; this is what distinguishes Klaus from Mečiar. Another great European was leading the Czech Republic at that time: Václav Havel, President of the Czech Republic between 1993 and 2003. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic’s accession to the NATO was of greater priority for both Havel and Klaus. As a consequence the Czech Republic was invited, together with Hungary and Poland, to begin accession talks at the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997. Two years previously the Alliance had published “the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of admitting new members and how they should be brought in”²⁷⁴. The study can be seen as a milestone on the road to accession to NATO: “The Study further concluded that enlargement would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including the establishment of civilian and democratic control over military forces; fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, consultation and consensus-building characteristic of relations among members of the Alliance; and promoting good-neighbourly relations.”²⁷⁵ The end of the Cold War was thus considered an opportunity to improve security and stability within the region. According to the study the formal requirements²⁷⁶ for NATO accession negotiations were: 1) functioning democratic structures, 2) market economy, 3) recognition of minorities, 4) peaceful resolution of disputes, 5) capacity for a military contribution to NATO operations and 6) commitment to civil/military relations and institutional structures. Before negotiations took place, NATO took five key approaches²⁷⁷ to former Warsaw Pact states: 1) internal change/transformation of NATO structures according to the new political and military conditions, 2) building partnerships and co-operation, 3) establishment of “regular diplomatic liaisons”, 4) reduction of distrust and 5) establishment of meetings, summits, talks and dialogues. The Czech

²⁷³ Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): *Ib.*, p. 194.

²⁷⁴ NATO: Member countries, *ib.*

²⁷⁵ NATO: NATO enlargement. 1995 Study on Enlargement, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁷⁶ *Comp. Ib.*

²⁷⁷ NATO: Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23693.htm?selectedLocale=en, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

Republic's objectives²⁷⁸ in NATO are to: 1) fulfil the North Atlantic Treaty, 2) protect members' freedom and security by political and military means, 3) promote democracy and its values, 4) recognise liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In a survey in 2001²⁷⁹, two years after accession, 70% of Czechs were in favour of Prague's accession to NATO, with 24% against. Russia, on the other hand, was against the accession of the Czech Republic to NATO, regarding which Václav Havel said (2001): "Lack of the natural self-confidence of an entity that is sure of its identity, and thus also of its boundaries, seems to be replaced by a slightly imperialistic rhetoric accompanied by nationalist bombast, which we know so well from people like Mr. Zhirinovsky, but which appears in Russia in a more cultured form on a much wider scale. For example, I find it almost absurd that such a large and powerful country should be alarmed by the prospect of three small democratic republics at its borders joining a regional grouping which it does not control [...]"²⁸⁰ Havel always wanted to show that Prague's accession to NATO was not in opposition to Russia, while promoting the internal transformation of NATO and the CSCE as the most stable foundation for future talks.²⁸¹ In the early 1990s Havel also said the following: "We know that for many different reasons we cannot become full members of NATO at present. At the same time, however, we feel that an alliance of countries united by a commitment to the ideal of freedom and democracy should not remain permanently closed to neighbouring countries which are pursuing the same goals. History has taught us that certain values are indivisible; if they are threatened in one place, they are directly or indirectly threatened everywhere."²⁸² Following the Alliance's experience in accession negotiations of the first wave of NATO's post-Cold War enlargement, the so-called Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched at the Washington Summit in April 1999. This had been established to support countries with their preparations for their future accession. Slovakia thus participated in the MAP along with six other countries. Slovakia joined accession talks at the Prague Summit (2002). Two years later, on 29 March 2004, Slovakia became a member of NATO, "making this the largest wave of enlargement in NATO history"²⁸³. Slovakia sees its NATO membership as the "main

²⁷⁸ Comp. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic: NATO, viewed on http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/international_organisations/nato_north_atlantic_treaty_organisation/index.html, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁷⁹ Comp. Radio Praha: Nachrichten. 70 Prozent der Tschechen befürworten NATO-Beitritt, viewed on <http://www.radio.cz/de/rubrik/bulletin/nachrichten--170>, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁸⁰ NATO, Europe, and the Security of Democracy. Václav Havel. Selected speeches, articles, and interviews 1990-2002, p. 13, ib., retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁸¹ Comp. Ib., p. 18.

²⁸² Ib., p. 29,.

²⁸³ NATO: Member countries, ib., retrieved on 2 May 2014.

guarantee of [national] security”²⁸⁴. Bratislava’s key objectives²⁸⁵ in NATO are to: 1) maintain strong trans-Atlantic links and active participation, 2) achieve success and the effective functioning of structures, resources and capabilities, 3) maintain peace and stability, 4) prevent conflicts through the “advancement of a deeper partnership and cooperation between the EU and NATO in the area of crisis management”, 5) strengthen of joint defence commitments and 6) develop strategic concepts.

With regard to the accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics to the European Union, five different chronological dimensions²⁸⁶ according to Lippert/Becker have to be mentioned: 1) initial stage of bilateral agreements with regard to trade and economic co-operation in 1989, including the establishment of PHARE (transfer of know-how and democracy programme), 2) first round of ‘cumbersome’ Europe Agreements in December 1991, such as the prospects for EU membership, “asymmetrically scheduled opening of markets” with regard to a free trade area for industrial goods, rules regarding freedom of movement, co-operation in economic matters and institutionalised political dialogue, 3) two-level clarification of qualitative future membership requirements in June 1993 for associate members (stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, recognition of human rights, protection of minorities and functioning market economy based on competition) and towards the EU itself (“the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European Integration [...]”), 4) the “pre-accession strategy” (influenced by a re-launch of PHARE) in December 1994 consisted of two paths: (a) European Agreements as a bilateral track covering economic pre-accession and (b) “structured relations with the institutions of the Union as the multilateral track” covering political pre-accession, and 5) an informal questionnaire in April 1996 to all applicant countries as part of ‘Agenda 2000’ launched in July 1997. The negotiated European agreements towards *ČSFR* membership concluded in 1991 and entered into force in the now-divided Czech and Slovak Republics in 1995, “whereas provisions on trade and related aspects had already taken effect in March 1992 [...]”. The European Community was surprised by the rapidity of upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe. The EC was thus not prepared to re-establish Europe. The EU’s approach during Europe’s restructuring was judged to be “dilatory, technical and ad hoc rather than as determined and coherent”. In March 1998 the EU opened accession talks with the Czech

²⁸⁴ Government Office of the Slovak Republic: Strengthening the Position of the Slovak Republic in the European Union and the World, viewed on <http://www.vlada.gov.sk/strengthening-the-position-of-the-slovak-republic-in-the-european-union-and-the-world>, retrieved on 2 May 2014.

²⁸⁵ Comp. Ib.

²⁸⁶ Comp. Here and following: Lippert, Barbara/Becker, Peter (editors): Towards EU-Membership. Transformation and Integration in Poland and the Czech Republic, Bonn 1998, p. 22-26.

Republic and, in February 2000, with the Slovak Republic.²⁸⁷ “The perspective of EU-membership likewise deeply affects the internal order and political-administrative ‘constitution’ of the new democracies.”²⁸⁸ The domestic-level theory focusing on regime type and democratisation is the underlying theoretical assumption of a correlation between transition and consolidation of democracy, as well as European integration as component of regionalism: “[...] the EU is regarded as a relevant external actor that tries to influence the path of transformation by setting strategic objectives (free trade area, membership), conditions (provisions in Association/European agreements), membership criteria) and by giving political and financial assistance and incentives (PHARE; privileged cooperation and consultation e.g. through structured dialogue).”²⁸⁹ The Czech and Slovak Republics’ EU integration was embedded in an international context and can be evaluated as an enhanced factor in the consolidation of both democratic and economic systems. Transformation, or rather consolidation, and EU integration are two rooted components, determining each other. Three levels of EU implementation have to be considered: 1) political and legal, 2) institutional and administrative and 3) economic and business.

The Czech Republic, part of the so-called Luxembourg Group, applied for EU membership on 17 January 1996 and Slovakia (part of the Helsinki Group) on 27 June 1995.²⁹⁰ Bratislava’s accession to the EU was endangered following the country’s step backwards with regard to the consolidation of democracy.²⁹¹ Prague always had an ambivalent perspective on EU accession. Klaus knew about the advantages that Europe would bring to his country, even though he had never been sure about the timetable of the Czech Republic’s membership. Klaus also wished to achieve a “velvet revolution”²⁹² in the EU. In his view, the entry of the Czech Republic would influence EU’s nature, stopping a shift of “socialism from the West to the East”²⁹³. After its experience with Communism, Prague has always been afraid of the influence of external powers. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic’s transformation strategy is “partly legitimized by [...] indivisible from the ‘return to Europe’”²⁹⁴. Four so-called joint bodies²⁹⁵ were used to implement the Europe Agreement: 1)

²⁸⁷ Comp. Auswärtiges Amt: Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union, viewed on http://web.archive.org/web/20011225021241/http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eu_politik/vertiefung/erweiterung_html#5, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

²⁸⁸ Lippert, Barbara/Becker, Peter (editors): *Ib.*, p. 17.

²⁸⁹ Lippert, Barbara/Becker, Peter (editors): *Ib.*, p. 20.

²⁹⁰ Comp. Demokratiezentrum Wien: Zeittafel der EU-Erweiterung, viewed on <http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wissen/timelines/zeittafel-der-eu-erweiterung.html>, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

²⁹¹ Comp. Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): *Ib.*, p. 207.

²⁹² Dangerfield, Martin: *Ib.*, p. 450.

²⁹³ *Ib.*

²⁹⁴ *Ib.*, p. 462.

the Association Council, 2) the Association Committee, 3) subcommittees and 4) the Parliamentary Association Committee. Furthermore, every country took a different approach to accession negotiations. Usually the process was embedded in institutionalised structures led by mediators from the EU and the country in question.²⁹⁶

The accession of Prague and Bratislava to the EU must be considered a gradual process, concluding with full, official EU membership in 2004 as part of the fourth, and biggest, enlargement of the European Union. The EU membership of the Czech and Slovak Republics can be seen as a milestone and as a success story, both political and economical. In the Slovak Republic, the GDP grew four times in a row after 2004 and the unemployment rate decreased five times in a row, while the rate of inflation remained relatively low and stable. Politically, the negotiations that started in 2000 and concluded in 2002, boosted Bratislava's democratic performance. In 1998, the EU judged that Slovakia did not meet the political criteria for accession. Four years later the country fulfilled the same criteria. Two years later, Slovakia became a fully-fledged member state of the European Union as a well-consolidated democracy thanks to Dzurinda's reforms. In the words of Freedom House: "The successful negotiations came during a period of democratic consolidation that began in 1998. As a sign of the country's political maturity, Slovakia made important progress during this time despite being ruled by a broad coalition of parties that often bickered over ideology and policy priorities."²⁹⁷ Similar phenomena could be observed in the Czech Republic: the unemployment rate decreased five times in a row and GDP grew three times in a row, while the rate of inflation also remained stable and low. According to Freedom House: "Thanks to government policies and imminent EU membership, the Czech economy has experienced a boost in direct foreign investment."²⁹⁸ Freedom House also attested that Prague's EU membership came about due to "the country's hard work"²⁹⁹. In 2004, fourteen years after the 'Velvet Revolution', "the Czech Republic has reached an important stage in the development of its democracy"³⁰⁰.

The accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics to the EU was concluded at the Copenhagen Summit on 12-13 December 2002, where the membership of ten states was

²⁹⁵ Comp. Lippert, Barbara/Becker, Peter (editors): *Ib.*, p. 110-113.

²⁹⁶ Comp. Lippert, Barbara/Umbach, Gaby: *The Pressure of Europeanisation. From Post-Communist State Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System*, 1st edition, Baden-Baden 2005, p. 118-120.

²⁹⁷ Freedom House: *Nations in Transit, Slovakia* (2003), *ib.*, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

²⁹⁸ Freedom House: *Nations in Transit, Czech Republic* (2004), viewed on http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2004/czech-republic#.U2Z8_CiXZB8, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

²⁹⁹ Freedom House: *Nations in Transit, Czech Republic* (2003), viewed on <http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2003/czech-republic#.U2Z8iiiXZB8>, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

³⁰⁰ Freedom House: *Nations in Transit, Czech Republic* (2004), *ib.*

accepted. On 9 April 2003 the European Parliament clearly³⁰¹ voted in favour of EU enlargement: 458 members of the parliament voted in favour of enlargement, 68 against and 41 abstained. The European Parliament vote was followed by referendums in each of the ten future member states. On 16-17 May 2003³⁰² the people of Slovakia voted in favour of accession to the EU: 92.46% voted for membership, with voter turnout of 52.15%. The referendum in the Czech Republic took place on 13-14 June 2003³⁰³: 77.33% voted in favour of EU accession, with voter turnout of 55.21%. It is worth mentioning that the Treaty of Accession was signed by all future member states on 16 April 2003 in Athens³⁰⁴, i.e. before the referendum was held in the Czech Republic. Prague's key objectives in EU³⁰⁵ are to: 1) provide assistance with regard to economic development in the context of single market, 2) safeguard south-eastern and eastern European enlargement and neighbourhood policy, 3) protect the Czech Republic's and the Union's relations with the USA. Slovakia's key objectives in EU³⁰⁶ are to: 1) deepen European integration and common foreign and security policy, 2) provide assistance with regard to economic and social development, 3) introduce the Euro currency (successfully achieved in 2009), 4) assist with environmental protection, 5) fill higher managerial positions within the EU, 6) support the decision-making process and multi-annual strategic EU issues. "Slovakia's performance in the EU was marked by the continuing effort to achieve further integration into European structures."³⁰⁷

In conclusion, there is a clearly visible link between regional integration and transition. Complex cause-and-effect relations³⁰⁸ can be found; both regionalisation and the transition to democracy occur at the same time. Lippert/Umbach called this process "double transformation"³⁰⁹. They also speak about a "EU adaptation pressure" that "increases with the degree of institutional incompatibilities"³¹⁰. The pressure should be stronger in candidate countries, leading to domestic change with regard to political conditions. Nevertheless, the so-

³⁰¹ Comp. Demokratiezentrum Wien: Ib.

³⁰² Comp. Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic: Referendum 2003. Results on Voting of Eligible Citizens in Referendum, viewed on http://volby.statistics.sk/ref/ref2003/webdata/en/menu_a.htm, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

³⁰³ Comp. Český statistický úřad: Referendum on Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union held on 13-14 June 2003, viewed on <http://www.volby.cz/pls/ref2003/re13?xjazyk=EN>, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

³⁰⁴ Comp. Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Czech Republic: The Czech Republic in the EU, viewed on http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/european_union/the_czech_republic_in_the_eu.html, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

³⁰⁵ Comp. Auswärtiges Amt: Tschechische Republik. Außenpolitik, ib., retrieved on 4 May 2014.

³⁰⁶ Comp. Auswärtiges Amt: Slowakei. Außenpolitik, ib., retrieved on 4 May 2014.

³⁰⁷ Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic: European Affairs, viewed on https://www.mzv.sk/en/foreign_policy/european_affairs, retrieved on 4 May 2014.

³⁰⁸ Comp. Lippert, Barbara/Umbach, Gaby: Ib., p. 22.

³⁰⁹ Ib.

³¹⁰ Ib., p. 24.

called “double transformation” is not “exclusively caused by and connected with EU integration [...]”³¹¹.

5. Comparison

Two different terms are key to the recent history of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and their successor states: the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ with regard to East Germany and the ‘Velvet Revolution’ with regard to Czechoslovakia. Even though two different words are used, both revolutions stand for a common event: the dissolution of the autocratic Communist regime and the transition towards democratic consolidation and a market economy. Despite all similarities in the bigger picture, considerable distinctions can be drawn between the aforementioned countries. Six core reasons can be determined with regard to the end of the hegemony of SED in the German Democratic Republic: 1) electoral fraud, 2) the ‘exit’ to West Germany, 3) mass demonstrations (‘voice’), 4) economic crash, 5) political changes in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, 6) loss of transfer benefits and financial assistance from West Germany. Thus, the end of the GDR’s autocratic system was due to internal and external factors. Only two major reasons can be found with regard to the end of the ‘old’ political system in Czechoslovakia: 1) mass demonstrations (‘voice’) and 2) changed international conditions. These two internal and external reasons must be considered valid factors in the end of the autocratic system in both the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, the external factors with regard to the GDR were deeply connected to West Germany, while in the case of Czechoslovakia they were more connected to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Thus all four theoretical continuous forms could be recognised in the GDR, and only the first three (controlled change, forced change, negotiations) could be found in Czechoslovakia. Both countries were facing economic problems; nevertheless, this was a bigger issue in East Germany than in Czechoslovakia. Mass demonstrations took place in East Germany before they began in Czechoslovakia. The first so-called mass demonstrations began on 7 October 1989. Only two days later, on 9 October, approximately 70,000 people took to the streets in Leipzig. The first mass protests in Bratislava and Prague took place on 16-17 November 1989. The upheavals in Czechoslovakia are deeply connected to the situation in the GDR: the populace was influenced by East Germany’s mass demonstrations and furthermore by refugees waiting in the West German embassy in Prague. With regard to opposition movements, Czechoslovakia can be judged as forerunner: Charta 77 was founded in 1977,

³¹¹ Ib., p. 22.

while the first GDR opposition movement, the 'Berlin Appeal', was founded five years later. In the GDR the churches played a major role during mass demonstrations, but not in Czechoslovakia.

The democratisation process in Czechoslovakia began on 24 November 1989, or even slightly before, only a few days after the first mass demonstrations. The starting-point for democratisation in East Germany was long before this, with the recognition of electoral fraud on 7 May 1989. Thus, recognition of electoral fraud can be judged both a reason for the end of the autocratic system and beginning of the democratisation process. The further process of democratisation was characterised in both countries by a rapid change of the political elite. This change at first took place much more rapidly in Czechoslovakia than in Germany, but slowed down after the initial wave. Seven weeks passed between the dismissal of Erich Honecker on 18 October 1989 and the appointment of the first non-Communist leader, Manfred Gerlach, on 6 December 1989 and exactly five months between the dismissal of Honecker and the first and only free elections in the GDR, which were held on 18 March 1990. Slightly more than five weeks passed in Czechoslovakia between the resignation of Jakeš on 24 November 1989 and the appointment of the government of national understanding on 10 December 1989 and six and a half months between Jakeš and the first free elections. 18 March 1990 marked the end of democratisation in East Germany, 8-9 June 1990 in Czechoslovakia (or, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic). The process of democratisation in East Germany was highly influenced by external players such as West Germany, the Soviet Union, the USA, France and Great Britain, as well as NATO; and in Czechoslovakia only by the Soviet Union.

With regard to the consolidation of democracy, the processes that took place in the two countries were quite distinct due to the widely differing conditions in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic and their successor states. While the GDR was absorbed by the structures of the Federal Republic almost overnight, the political and economic consolidation in the Czech and Slovak Republics following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia lasted for decades. East Germany was at an advantage due to its transition into a functioning market economy based on well-established democratic elements such as a party political system, political culture and membership of regional and sub-regional bodies such as NATO and the European Union. On the other hand, the Czech and Slovak Republics did not have a 'big brother' leading them into democracy. All elements needed to be created and developed on their own terms. This evaluation can be clarified by taking a look at integration into regional organisations: East Germany became an integral part of NATO and EU immediately

after reunification, virtually overnight. While the concrete implementation remained initially unclear, it was resolved over the next few years. The accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics to international organisations, for example CEFTA, began immediately after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, even though the road to accession to NATO and the EU remained long and rocky. Prague became a member of NATO structures in 1999 (nine years after East Germany) and Bratislava in 2004 (fourteen years after East Germany). Both countries acceded to the European Union at the same time, fourteen years after the territory of East Germany acceded. The Euro was adopted by Germany in 1999 and in Slovakia ten years later, while it has not yet been adopted by the Czech Republic.

Economic development can be evaluated as ambivalent in all three successor states. On the one hand, the new German federal states, as well as the Czech and Slovak Republics, shared common economic problems with regard to unemployment rate. On the other hand, the growth of inflation and the growth, or rather negative growth, of GDP can be taken as a huge distinction between them. In the first years after the reunification of Germany, the unemployment rate in the eastern territories increased dramatically from 10.2% (1991) to 19.2% (1998) and 20.1% (2003). The Slovak Republic faced similar problems: the unemployment rate increased from 11.1% (1991) to 16.4% (1999) and then to 19.3 (2001); however, the unemployment rate remained relatively low in the Czech Republic, even though it increased moderately from 2.3% (1991) to 6.5% (1998) and 8.8% (2000). The development of the rate of inflation has to be seen as dramatic; especially Prague experienced several intermittent leaps. In the Czech Republic the inflation rate increased from 9.7% to 56.6% between 1990 and 1991, before decreasing to 11.1% in 1992, then reaching 20.8% in 1993, and falling back to 10.0% one year later. Compared to the Czech Republic, the rate of inflation in the Slovak Republic remained relatively moderate and stable at between 13.4% (1994) and 12.0% (2000). East Germany also faced a relatively moderate inflation in the first two years following reunification: 13.4% in 1992 and 10.6% in 1993, before decreasing to a stable, low level of 3.6% in 1994. East Germany's rate of inflation in the first two years can be compared to Slovakia's performance in the first years after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, a high inflation rate has never been a big issue in the East of Germany. Significant distinctions between all three successor states can be found when one takes a look at GDP growth. While East Germany experienced a rapid, stable GDP growth to a high level of between 8% and 9% in the first three years after reunification, the Slovak Republic was facing a minus growth in 1993, the first year after Czechoslovakia's dissolution, while the Czech Republic showed a weak growth of +1.2% in 1993. The further development

of Prague's GDP growth remained moderate, but stable. Not so in East Germany: GDP growth slowed to +1.6% (1996), stuttered along between +1.5% (1999), -0.4% (2003) and +0.7% (2005).

Further geopolitical aspects must be mentioned and evaluated: firstly, a common feature of all the aforementioned countries is their origin. Both East Germany and Czechoslovakia were founded on the aftermath of World War Two. Compared to the previous *German dictatorship*, the Third Reich, the Socialism in the German Democratic Republic was not a German dictatorship, but a dictatorship on *German territory*. The same statement applies to Czechoslovakia: Communism was neither a Czech nor a Slovak dictatorship, but a dictatorship on their territories. Both countries further shared similar geopolitical features with regard to their position in Central Europe. The GDR and Czechoslovakia had common borders with West Germany and with Poland; both countries were connected (and separated) by a common border. Population exchange took place regularly. Additionally, both the GDR and Czechoslovakia experienced two turning points during the Communist era: Berlin 1953 and Prague 1968. Both dates significantly determined the future development of the dictatorship. Finally, as a late result of World War Two, both states, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, were dissolved: one in 1990, the other on by the end of 1992. This similarity at the same time led to a distinction: the dissolution of the GDR did not result in the emergence of a new country, but the dissolution of Czechoslovakia resulted in the emergence of two new states: the Czech and Slovak Republics.

Further elements worth mentioning are the current attitudes of political parties and the populace with regard to their countries' membership of international, regional and sub-regional organisations. The current political situation in Germany can be viewed as a wide consensus on Germany's integration processes. All established political parties agree with Germany's engagement in the country's membership of several organisations. Within the established parties only The Left represents 'soft' Euroscepticism. The Left rejects the Treaty of Lisbon as a base for further European integration³¹²; furthermore, the former Communist Party of East Germany advocates the dissolution of NATO³¹³. Another established party, the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (German: *Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU*) also

³¹² Comp. Oberkirch, Thomas/Schild, Joachim: Working Papers on European Integration. Wachsender Euroskeptizismus. Anatomie eines Phänomens, No. 6 (2004), p. 54, viewed on http://www.eao-otzenhausen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Content_Ueber_uns_Dokumente/Publikationen/Arbeitspapiere_Europaeische_Integration_6_10.pdf, retrieved on 8 May 2014.

³¹³ Comp. Die Linke: Programm der Partei Die Linke. Frieden in Solidarität statt Kriege, viewed on <http://www.die-linke.de/partei/dokumente/programm-der-partei-die-linke/iv6-wie-schaffen-wir-frieden-abruestung-kollektive-sicherheit-und-gemeinsame-entwicklung/frieden-in-solidaritaet-statt-kriege>, retrieved on 8 May 2014.

advocates ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. ‘Hard’³¹⁴ Euroscepticism can only be found among non-established political parties in the radical right-wing spectrum, such as the National Democratic Party of Germany (German: *Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD*), The Republicans (German: *Die Republikaner, REP*) and the newly-emerged Alternative for Germany (German: *Alternative für Deutschland, AfD*), which currently has a real chance of gaining seats in the European Parliament for the first time.

The party political system in the Czech Republic can be seen as highly polarised³¹⁵ with regard to Euroscepticism. While the Czech Social Democratic Party (Czech: *Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD*), the *KDU-ČSL* and Tradition/Responsibility/Prosperity (Czech: *Tradice, odpovědnost, prosperita, TOP 09*) stand for a moderate pro-European attitude, the *ODS* is an adherent of ‘soft’³¹⁶ Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, while supporting membership of NATO (along with the Social Democrats and *KDU-ČSL*)³¹⁷, as well as the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Czech: *Akce nespokojených občanů, ANO*)³¹⁸, as far as can be judged. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Czech: *Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM*), along with the Dawn of Direct Democracy (Czech: *Úsvit přímé demokracie, Úsvit*), represent ‘hard’³¹⁹ Euroscepticism. The Communist Party further advocates the dissolution of NATO structures³²⁰.

The situation in the Slovak Republic can be described as follows: the most important anti-European movement in Slovakia is represented by the Slovak National Party³²¹, which advocates ‘hard’ Euroscepticism. The *KDH*³²², on the other hand, advocates ‘soft’ Euroscepticism, while the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party (Slovak: *Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická strana, SDKÚ-DS*) can be judged as an adherent of NATO³²³ and moderate pro-Europeanism³²⁴. One pro-European party that

³¹⁴ Comp. Oberkirch, Thomas/Schild, Joachim: *Ib.*, p. 54.

³¹⁵ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 67, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³¹⁶ Comp. *Ib.*, p. 68.

³¹⁷ Comp. Libor, Frank: Views of Selected Czech Parliamentary Political Parties on the Professionalization of the Czech Armed Forces, viewed on http://www.mocr.army.cz/mo/obrana_a_strategie/1-2001eng/frank.pdf, p. 30-44, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³¹⁸ Comp. Van de Rakt, Eva: Political Earthquake in the Czech Republic. Rejection of Established Parties, viewed on <http://www.boell.de/en/2013/10/31/political-earthquake-czech-republic-rejection-established-parties>, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³¹⁹ Comp. Oberkirch, Thomas/Schild, Joachim: *Ib.*, p. 67.

³²⁰ Comp. Libor, Frank: *Ib.*, p. 38.

³²¹ Comp. Hartleb, Florian/Grabow, Karsten: Europa – Nein Danke? Studie zum Aufstieg rechts- und nationalpopulistischer Parteien in Europa, Berlin 2013, viewed on http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36200-544-1-30.pdf, p. 13, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³²² Comp. Štefančík, Radoslav: Christlich-demokratische Parteien in der Slowakei, Trnava 2008, p. 90.

³²³ Comp. Kopeček, Lubomír/Šedo, Jakub: Czech and Slovak Political Parties and their vision of European Integration, in: Central European Political Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2003), viewed on <http://www.cepsr.com/seps/clanek.php?ID=12>, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

also supports membership of NATO are the Social Democrats³²⁵ (Slovak: *SMER – sociálna demokracia, SMER-SD*). Euroscepticism has never been a major issue in Slovakia, and more in the Czech Republic: “Slovakia, unlike the Czech Republic – above all in person of President Václav Klaus, did not exhibit open, party-based Euro-scepticism, nor would the relevant public actors criticize the EU integration.”³²⁶

6. Conclusion

While many things have already been said about the topic, some puzzles still remain. The focus of the author in writing this thesis was on the description of the transition in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and their successor states. The end of the autocratic system, the process of democratisation and the political consolidation with regard to democracy, economy and regional integration was presented, embedded in a historical-descriptive approach based on theorisation, analysis and evaluation. Thus the underlying theoretical assumptions, especially the domestic-level theory, must be judged as valid following practical examination. Nevertheless, what has not been in the focus of research yet is: what did and do people in Germany and the Czech and Slovak Republics think about their country’s membership of international structures such as the European Union? How does the populace judge it? A majority of the German populace agrees with their country’s membership of the European Union according to Eurobarometer surveys. In autumn 2004, the year of the Czech and Slovak Republics’ accession to the EU, 60% of the populace saw Germany’s EU membership as “a good thing”, 45% said that the Czech Republic’s membership “is a good thing”, while 57% in Slovakia were of the opinion that their country’s membership is a “good thing”.³²⁷ Two years later, public opinion on the same question improved in the Czech (51%) and Slovak (61%) Republics, while acceptance was lower in Germany (58%).³²⁸ In autumn 2008 public opinion in Germany (64%) and Slovakia (62%)

³²⁴ Comp. Štefančík, Radoslav: Ib., p. 89.

³²⁵ Comp. Kleine Zeitung: Sternstunde der Euro-Freunde, viewed on <http://www.kleinezeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/eu/2968127/sternstunden-euro-freunde.story>, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³²⁶ Gyárfasová, Olga: EU ante portas or is there a new Division Line in Slovak Politics?, in: Österreichische Zeitung für Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2013), p. 279-293, viewed on http://www.oezp.at/pdfs/2013_3-3-Gyarfasova.pdf, p. 281, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³²⁷ Comp. European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 62. Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 68, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb_62.de.pdf, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³²⁸ Comp. European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 66. Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 7, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

improved, while the acceptance in the Czech Republic decreased by five percentage points to 46%.³²⁹ In 2002, two years before the accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics to the EU, 43% in the Czech Republic and 58% in Slovakia said that EU membership is a “good thing”.³³⁰

Nowadays, all three countries – Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics – are an integral part of the European Union and NATO. Germany has taken a leading role in EU structures. Politically, Germany fulfils a key function due to its reputation with regard to foreign policy; economically, Germany is seen as the driving force due to its prosperity. Compared to Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics can play only a minor role in the European family due to being smaller countries, with smaller populations, and hence limited power. Nevertheless, the development of the GDR, the Czechoslovakia and thus the Czech and Slovak Republics and the new federal states in Germany can be seen as a success story, even though Slovakia’s consolidation started late. Today, the consolidation in all these aforementioned countries can be judged to have concluded. Of course, some aspects still function as witnesses of the past. Whilst taking into account the development of the political party system, the landscape of political parties shows typical post-Communist structures in the successor states: Communist successor parties remain strong and influential in Germany and the Czech Republic, while radical right-wing political parties rule Slovakia. On the other hand, almost every year sees the emergence of new – or the dissolution of old – political parties in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The shifting of votes in elections remains chaotic, and voter turnout is relatively weak in the successor states of Czechoslovakia, as well as in East Germany. Nevertheless, a political phenomenon such as the meteoric rise of the Czech political party ANO could never happen in Germany, where the political party system is well-consolidated. Both, ‘Freedom House’ and the ‘Bertelsmann Transformation Index’ indicate that the Czech and Slovak Republics’ democracies are consolidated. ‘Freedom House’ on the Czech Republic: “The institutions of governance in the Czech Republic are stable and democratic.”³³¹ On a list consisting of 128 states in transition on the ‘Bertelsmann Transformation Index’, the Czech Republic is placed second and the Slovak Republic

³²⁹ Comp. European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 70. Public Opinion in the European Union, p. 33, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_first_de.pdf, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³³⁰ Comp. European Commission: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002. First Results, p. 3, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2002/cceb_2002_highlights_en.pdf, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³³¹ Freedom House: Nations in Transit. Czech Republic (2013), viewed on <http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/czech-republic#.U2zUUiiXZB8>, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

ninth.³³² “Slovakia has consolidated democratic and market economy structures”,³³³ Bertelsmann concluded. To give a brief outlook, the future main challenges for Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics might be found in the final resolution of the global financial and economic crisis, as well as the stabilisation of the Euro. The possible rise of Eurosceptic parties in the next EU parliamentary election could lead to a new internal conflict amongst the states of Europe. The refugee problem could become a significant internal and external problem, especially for Germany. The prospects of NATO could be a problem with regard to foreign affairs due to different perceptions of the regional organisation in Europe and beyond: while NATO’s member states view the military alliance as a regional organisation maintaining peace and stability, Russia considers NATO to be an organisation promoting military aggression.³³⁴

The thesis opened with a statement of Václav Havel and it will be closed by him: “We may all be different, but we are all in the same boat. We can fight for our places and means of coexistence on this boat, but we also can agree on them peacefully. I understand European unity as a magnanimous attempt to choose the second of these possibilities, and to give Europe for the first time in its history the kind of order that would grow out of the free will of everyone, and be based on mutual agreement and a common longing for peace and cooperation. It would be a stable and solid order, one based not merely on military and political treaties, which anyone can break or ignore at will, but on such a close cooperation between European nations and citizens that it would limit, if not exclude, the possibility of new conflicts. This is not a mere dream.”³³⁵

³³² Comp. Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Transformationsindex BTI 2014, viewed on <http://www.bti-project.de/bti-home>, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³³³ Comp. Ib.: BTI 2014. Slovakia Country Report, viewed on <http://www.bti-project.de/reports/laenderberichte/ecse/svk/index.nc>, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

³³⁴ Comp. Friedman, George: *The Next Decade*, 1st edition, New York 2011, p. 122.

³³⁵ Havel, Václav: Speech in the European Parliament on 8 March 1994, viewed on http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=221_aj_projevy.html&typ=HTML, retrieved on 9 May 2014.

Bibliography

Books & Volumes:

Beyme, Klaus: Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

Kuhr, Eberhard (editor): Opposition in der DDR von den 70er Jahren bis zum Zusammenbruch der SED-Herrschaft, Opladen 1999.

Farell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice, 2005.

Fawcett, Louise/Hurrell, Andrew (editors): Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization and International Order, New York 2000.

Fawcett, Louise: Regionalism in World Politics. Past and Present.

Fraude, Andreas: Die friedliche Revolution in der DDR im Herbst 1989.

Friedman, George: The Next Decade, 1st edition, New York 2011, p. 122.

Gallus, Alexander (editor): Systemwechsel in der deutschen Geschichte, Köln and others 2006.

Havel, Vaclav: Angst vor der Freiheit. Reden des Staatspräsidenten, Reinbek/Hamburg 1991.

Henke, Klaus Dietmar and others (editors): Anatomie der Staatssicherheit. Geschichte, Struktur und Methoden. MfS-Handbuch. Teil 3: Wichtige Dienststellen. Teil 17: Die zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe Bekämpfung von Flucht und Übersiedlung, Berlin 1995.

Hloušek, Vít: The Czech Republic's Transition to Democracy.

Jesse, Eckhard: Systemwechsel in Deutschland: 1918/19 – 1933 – 1945/49 – 1989/90, 2nd edition, Köln and others 2011.

Juchler, Jakob: Osteuropa im Umbruch. Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen 1989-1993. Gesamtüberblick und Fallstudien, Zürich 1994.

Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Das Ringen um die Deutsche Einheit. Die Regierung Helmut Kohl im Brennpunkt der Entscheidungen 1989/90, 1st edition, Freiburg 2009.

Linz, Juan J./Stepan, Alfred: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe, Baltimore 1996.

Lippert, Barbara/Becker, Peter (editors): Towards EU-Membership. Transformation and Integration in Poland and the Czech Republic, Bonn 1998.

Lippert, Barbara/Günther, Dirk and others: Die EG und die neuen Bundesländer. Eine Erfolgsgeschichte von kurzer Dauer?, Bonn 1993.

Lippert, Barbara/Umbach, Gaby: The Pressure of Europeanisation. From Post-Communist State Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System, 1st edition, Baden-Baden 2005.

Merkel, Wolfgang/Sandschneider, Eberhard (editors): Systemwechsel, Opladen 1996.

NATO, Europe, and the Security of Democracy. Václav Havel. Selected Speeches, Articles, and Interviews 1990-2002, viewed on http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/docs/ostatni/HAVEL_anj_OK.pdf.

Richter, Michael: Die friedliche Revolution. Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989/90, 1st edition, Göttingen 2009.

Štefančík, Radoslav: Christlich-demokratische Parteien in der Slowakei, Trnava 2008.

Sturm, Roland/Pehle, Heinrich: Das neue deutsche Regierungssystem, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 2005.

Thomaß, Barbara/Tzankoff, Michaela: Medien und Transformation in Osteuropa, 1st edition, Wiesbaden 2001.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó./Dalby, Simon and others: The Geopolitics Reader, New York/London 2003.

Wagener, Hans-Jürgen: Der deutsche Sonderweg der Transformation.

Weber, Hermann: Die DDR 1945-1990, München 2006.

Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): Central & East European Politics. From Communism to Democracy, 2nd edition, 2011.

Wolchik, Sharon L.: Czechoslovakia in Transition. Politics, Economics and Society, London 1991.

Newspapers, Magazines & Journals:

Augstein, Franziska: DDR: Treuhand-Anstalt. Ausverkauf der Republik, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 May 2010), viewed on <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ddr-treuhand-anstalt-ausverkauf-der-republik-1.137266>.

Berend, Ivan T.: Social Shock in Transforming Central and Eastern Europe, in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 40 (2007), p. 269-280.

Berg, Stefan: Gedenken. Die unbemerkten Helden, in: Der Spiegel: No. 30 (2009), p. 44-45.

Connelly, John: Moment of Revolution. Plauen (Vogtland), October 7, 1989, in: German Politics and Society, No. 20 (1990), p. 71-89.

Dangerfield, Martin: Ideology and the Czech Transformation. Neoliberal Rhetoric or Neoliberal Reality?, in: East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 1997), p. 436-469.

Die Zeit: Wendezeit 1989. Das Anfang vom Ende der DDR, viewed on <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2009-10/Ende-DDR>.

Gyarfasova, Olga: EU ante portas or is there a new Division Line in Slovak Politics?, in: Österreichische Zeitung für Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2013), p. 279-293, viewed on http://www.oezp.at/pdfs/2013_3-3-Gyarfasova.pdf.

Heske, Gerhard: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung DDR/Ostdeutschland, in: Historical Social Research, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005), p. 238-328.

Klaus, Václav: The Economic Transformation of the Czech Republic. Challenges Faced and Lessons Learned, in: CATO Institute: Economic Development Bulletin. Project on Global Economic Liberty, No. 6 (February 2006), p. 1-2, viewed on <http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb6.pdf>.

Kleine Zeitung: Sternstunde der Euro-Freunde, viewed on <http://www.kleinezeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/eu/2968127/sternstunden-euro-freunde.story>.

Kopeček, Lubomír/Šedo, Jakub: Czech and Slovak Political Parties and their Vision of European Integration, in: Central European Political Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2003), viewed on <http://www.cepsr.com/seps/clanek.php?ID=12>.

Mainwaring, Scott: Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation. Working Paper, No. 130 (November 1989), viewed on <https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/130.pdf>.

Mansfield, Edward D./Milner, Helen V.: The New Wave of Regionalism, in: International Organizations, Vol. 53, No. 3 (1999), p. 589-627.

Orenstein, Mitchell A.: What Happened in East European (Political) Economies? A Balance Sheet for Neoliberal Reform, in: East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 2009), p. 479-490.

Probst, R: 20 Jahre Mauerfall. Die größte Demo der DDR, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 May 2010), viewed on <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/jahre-mauerfall-die-groesste-demo-der-ddr-1.142212>.

Rahmann, Tim: Wie die Treuhand bei der DDR-Abwicklung versagte, in: Wirtschaftswoche, (26 September 2011), viewed on <http://www.wiwo.de/politik/deutschland/rueckblick-wie-die-treuhand-bei-der-ddr-abwicklung-versagte/5220338.html>.

Richter, Michael: Doppelte Demokratisierung und deutsche Einheit, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: DDR 1990, No. 11 (2010), p. 20-26.

Ritschl, Albrecht: Aufstieg und Niedergang der Wirtschaft der DDR. Ein Zahlenbild 1945-1989, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, No. 2 (1995), p. 11-46.

Schmidt, Manfred G.: Der Januskopf der Transformationsperiode. Kontinuität und Wandel der Demokratietheorie, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 26 (1995), p. 182-210.

Additional Online Sources:

Archiv Bürgerbewegung Leipzig: Demonstrationen vom 13. August 1989 bis 30. April 1990 in der DDR, viewed on <http://www.archiv-buergerbewegung.de/index.php/demonstrationen>.

Auswärtiges Amt: Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union, viewed on http://web.archive.org/web/20011225021241/http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/eu_politik/vertiefung/erweiterung_html#5.

Auswärtiges Amt: Slowakei. Außenpolitik, viewed on http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/Slowakei/Aussenpolitik_node.html.

Auswärtiges Amt: Tschechische Republik. Außenpolitik, viewed on http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_D0D9A6509FE1D464B90166E4AB7A930F/DE/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Laenderinfos/TschechischeRepublik/Aussenpolitik_node.html.

Beblavý, Miroslav: Slovakia's Transition to a Market Economy and the World Bank's Engagement, viewed on http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1530284.

Bertelsmann Transformation Index: BTI 2014. Slovakia Country Report, viewed on <http://www.bti-project.de/reports/laenderberichte/ecse/svk/index.nc>.

Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Transformationsindex BTI 2014, viewed on <http://www.bti-project.de/bti-home>.

Bevölkerungsentwicklung Deutschlands ab 1950. Einwohnerzahlen West- und Ostdeutschland, viewed on <http://www.pdwb.de/nd06>.

Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik. Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen (Monats-/Jahreszahlen), viewed on <http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statistikdaten/Detail/Aktuell/iiia4/alo-zeitreihe-dwo/alo-zeitreihe-dwo-b-0-xls.xls>.

Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik. Zeitreihe für Länder ab 1950 (Jahreszahlen), viewed on <http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statistikdaten/Detail/Aktuell/iiia4/laender-heft/laender-heft-d-0-xls.xls>.

Bundesministerium des Inneren: Verfassungsschutzbericht 2012, viewed on <http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/vsbericht-2012.pdf>.

Bundesstiftung Aufarbeitung: Historischer Kalender, viewed on <http://www.bundesstiftung-aufarbeitung.de/kalendarium-1423.html?d=14-12>.

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Die soziale Situation in Deutschland. Arbeitslose und Arbeitslosenquote, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61718/arbeitslose-und-arbeitslosenquote>.

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Internationale Organisationen, viewed on <https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/24-deutschland/40496/internationale-organisationen>.

Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: Regionalismus, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/wissen/17F6KL>.

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in Bezug auf Deutschland, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/gesetze/zwei-plus-vier-vertrag/>.

Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechien. Politisches System nach 1989, viewed on http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/GG2QVL,0,0,Politisches_System_nach_1989.html.

Central European Free Trade Agreement Secretariat: CEFTA 2006, viewed on <http://www.cefta.int>.

Central European Free Trade Agreement, viewed on <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/cefta.pdf>.

Central European Initiative, viewed on <http://www.cei.int>.

Central European Initiative: Functioning and Structure, viewed on <http://www.cei.int/content/functioning-structure>.

Central European Initiative: Mission and Objectives, viewed on <http://www.cei.int/content/mission-objectives>.

Český statistický úřad: Míra inflace, vývoj spotřebitelských cen vybraných výrobků v České republice, viewed on http://m.czso.cz/cz/cr_1989_ts/0304.pdf.

Český statistický úřad: Referendum on Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union held on 13-14 June 2003, viewed on <http://www.volby.cz/pls/ref2003/re13?xjazyk=EN>.

Český statistický úřad: Volby do České národní rady konané ve dnech 8.-9.6.1990. Celkové výsledky hlasování, viewed on <http://www.volby.cz/pls/cnr1990/u4>.

Český statistický úřad: Základní ukazatele národního hospodářství v České republice, viewed on http://m.czso.cz/cz/cr_1989_ts/0401.pdf.

Český statistický úřad: Zaměstnanost a nezaměstnanost v České republice podle výsledků výběrového šetření pracovních sil (VŠPS), viewed on http://m.czso.cz/cz/cr_1989_ts/0501.pdf.

Das Wunder von Leipzig. Friedliche Revolution, viewed on http://php2.arte.tv/wundervonleipzig/index_de.php.

Demokratiezentrum Wien: Zeittafel der EU-Erweiterung, viewed on <http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wissen/timelines/zeittafel-der-eu-erweiterung.html>.

Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: 6. November 1989. Weisung des Ministers zur Aktenreduzierung in den Kreis- und Objektdienststellen, viewed on http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/November-1989/Dokumentenseiten/06-November_c/06_nov_c_text.html?nn=1930806.

Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik: 8. März 1990. "Regierung entpflichtet einstige MfS-Informanten", viewed on http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/Januar-1990/Dokumentenseiten/08-Maerz/08_maerz_text.html?nn=1930546.

Dictionary: Region, viewed on <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/region>.

Die Bundesregierung: Deutsche Einheit. Chronik der Ereignisse 1989-1990. Brandenburger Tor endlich wieder offen, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1989-12-22-brandenburger-tor.html?nn=704580.

Die Bundesregierung: Die Einheit rückt näher, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-08-23-einheit-rueckt-naeher.html;jsessionid=8C48946DAB3DF2AA0236E81EFC2B9A33.s2t2?nn=704580.

Die Bundesregierung: Grundsteinlegung für die Gauck-Behörde, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-06-07-grundsteinlegung-gauck.html;jsessionid=8C48946DAB3DF2AA0236E81EFC2B9A33.s2t2?nn=704580.

Die Bundesregierung: Gruppe der Acht, viewed on <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatischeSeiten/Breg/G8G20/G8-uebersicht.html;jsessionid=FACDB6F9E2C21182FBD908F8FCF49ED5.s4t2?nn=437032#doc115978bodyText2>.

Die Bundesregierung: Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-05-18-waehrungsunion.html?nn=704580.

Die Bundesregierung: Zustimmung zum Einigungsvertrag, viewed on http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Deutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-09-20-einigungsvertrag.html?nn=704580.

Die Linke: Programm der Partei Die Linke. Frieden in Solidarität statt Kriege, viewed on <http://www.die-linke.de/partei/dokumente/programm-der-partei-die-linke/iv6-wie-schaffen-wir-frieden-abruestung-kollektive-sicherheit-und-gemeinsame-entwicklung/frieden-in-solidaritaet-statt-kriege>.

Europäische Union: 1957, viewed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945-1959/1957/index_de.htm.

Europäische Union: Ein friedliches Europa. Die Anfänge der Zusammenarbeit, viewed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945-1959/index_de.htm.

European Commission: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2002. First Results, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2002/cceb_2002_highlights_en.pdf.

European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 62. Public Opinion in the European Union, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb_62.de.pdf.

European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 66. Public Opinion in the European Union, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf.

European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 70. Public Opinion in the European Union, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb70/eb70_first_de.pdf.

Freedom House: Nations in Transit. Czech Republic (2003), viewed on <http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2003/czech-republic#.U2Z8iiiXZB8>.

Freedom House: Nations in Transit. Czech Republic (2004), viewed on http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2004/czech-republic#.U2Z8_CiXZB8.

Freedom House: Nations in Transit. Czech Republic (2013), viewed on <http://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2013/czech-republic#.U2zUUiiXZB8>.

Freedom House: Nations in Transit. Slovakia (2003), viewed on <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2003/slovakia#.U2PDCCiXZB8>.

Government Office of the Slovak Republic: Strengthening the Position of the Slovak Republic in the European Union and the World, viewed on <http://www.vlada.gov.sk/strengthening-the-position-of-the-slovak-republic-in-the-european-union-and-the-world>.

Hartleb, Florian/Grabow, Karsten: Europa – Nein Danke? Studie zum Aufstieg rechts- und nationalpopulistischer Parteien in Europa, Berlin 2013, viewed on http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36200-544-1-30.pdf.

Haus der Geschichte: Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE), viewed on <http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/DasGeteilteDeutschland/NeueHerausforderungen/SicherheitUndZusammenarbeit/ksze.html>.

Havel, Václav: Speech in the European Parliament on 8 March 1994, viewed on http://www.vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=221_aj_projevy.html&typ=HTML.

Kermas, Sören: Die Demonstrationsbewegung in der DDR 1989/90, viewed on http://edocs.fu-berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCs_derivate_000000001998/Kermas_Wissenschaftliche_Hausarbeit.pdf;jsessionid=F1455A7B82DAF78C347B027E6B2D8B69?hosts.

Kohl, Helmut: 28. November 1989. Erklärung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik, viewed on <http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?msg=627>.

Kohl, Helmut: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik 1989, viewed on <http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?msg=559>.

Kopeček, Lubomír/Hloušek, Vít and others: Democratic Institution Building Process. The Czech Republic's Transition to Democracy, viewed on <http://www.eduinitiatives.org/publications/democratic-institution-building-process-czech-republic%E2%80%99s-transition-democracy>.

Libor, Frank: Views of Selected Czech Parliamentary Political Parties on the Professionalization of the Czech Armed Forces, viewed on http://www.mocr.army.cz/mo/obrana_a_strategie/1-2001eng/frank.pdf.

Martens, Bernd: Die Wirtschaft der DDR, viewed on <http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-einheit/lange-wege-der-deutschen-einheit/47076/ddr-wirtschaft?p=all>.

Mayer, Wolfgang: Flucht und Ausreise, 2002, in: Statista: Übersiedlungen zwischen der DDR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990, viewed on <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/248905/umfrage/uebersiedlungen-zwischen-der-ddr-und-der-bundesrepublik-deutschland/>.

MDR: Die Botschaft von Prag, viewed on <http://www.mdr.de/damals/archiv/artikel/88860.html>.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic: NATO, viewed on http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/international_organisations/nato_north_atlantic_treaty_organisation/index.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic: The Czech Republic in the EU, viewed on http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/european_union/the_czech_republic_in_the_eu.html.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic: Visegrád Group, viewed on http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/international_organisations/visegrad_group/index.html.

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic: The Visegrád Group – V4, viewed on http://www.mzv.sk/en/foreign_policy/the_visegrad_group.

Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic: European Affairs, viewed on https://www.mzv.sk/en/foreign_policy/european_affairs.

Moravcsik, Andrew: Double-Edged Diplomacy, viewed on <https://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/double.pdf>.

NATO: Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23693.htm?selectedLocale=en.

NATO: Member countries, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm.

NATO: NATO enlargement. 1995 Study on Enlargement, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm.

NATO: The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, viewed on http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=en.

Oberkirch, Thomas/Schild, Joachim: Working Papers on European Integration. Wachsender Euroskeptizismus. Anatomie eines Phänomens, No. 6 (2004), viewed on http://www.eao-otzenhausen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Content_Ueber_uns_Dokumente/Publicationen/Arbeitspapiere_Europaeische_Integration_6_10.pdf.

Radio Praha: Nachrichten. 70 Prozent der Tschechen befürworten NATO-Beitritt, viewed on <http://www.radio.cz/de/rubrik/bulletin/nachrichten--170>.

Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic: Referendum 2003. Results on Voting of eligible citizens in referendum, viewed on http://volby.statistics.sk/ref/ref2003/webdata/en/menu_a.htm.

Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky: Výsledky volieb rok 1990, viewed on http://volby.statistics.sk/nrsr/snr1990/volby90_s/pph90.htm.

Statistische Ämter der Länder: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder. Bruttoinlandsprodukt, Bruttowertschöpfung in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1991 bis 2013 (Reihe 1, Länderergebnisse Band 1), viewed on http://www.vgrdl.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR/tbls/R1B1.zip.

Statistisches Amt der DDR, in: Statista: Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DDR) von 1980 bis 1989 (in Milliarden Mark der DDR), viewed on <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/249230/umfrage/bruttoinlandsprodukt-bip-der-ddr/>.

Statistisches Bundesamt: 20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit. Wunsch oder Wirklichkeit, viewed on https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publicationen/Thematisch/Regionales/20JahreDeutscheEinheit.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

Statistisches Bundesamt: Preise. Verbraucherpreisindizes für Deutschland. Lange Reihe ab 1948, viewed on https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publicationen/Thematisch/Preise/Verbraucherpreise/VerbraucherpreisindexLangeReihenPDF_5611103.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der OECD in Paris: Mitgliedsstaaten der OECD, viewed on http://www.paris-oecd.diplo.de/Vertretung/parisoecd/de/03/Oecd__MS.html.

Stiftung Haus der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Ereignischronik. Zerfall der DDR, viewed on <http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/ereignischroniken/zerfallDerDDR/>.

Tavares, Rodrigo: The State of the Art of Regionalism. The Past, Present and Future of a Discipline, in: UNI-CRIS e-Working Papers, No. 10 (2004), viewed on <http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/WProdrigo%20tavares.pdf>.

The Visegrád Group: History of the Visegrád Group, viewed on <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about/history>.

Van de Rakt, Eva: Political Earthquake in the Czech Republic. Rejection of Established Parties, viewed on <http://www.boell.de/en/2013/10/31/political-earthquake-czech-republic-rejection-established-parties>.

World Bank: World DataBank. World Development Indicators, viewed on <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>.

World Trade Organization: Members and Observers, viewed on http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.

Appendices

Figure 1: Relocations from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany 1981-1990

	<u>Relocations to West Germany (according to West Germany)</u>	<u>Approved relocations</u>	<u>Relocations to West Germany (according to East Germany)</u>
1990*	250,000	0	238,384
1989	343,854	101,947	203,116
1988	39,832	27,939	0
1987	18,958	11,459	0
1986	26,178	19,982	0
1985	24,912	18,752	0
1984	40,974	34,982	0
1983	11,343	7,729	9,154
1982	13,208	9,113	11,118
1981	15,433	11,093	13,166
Total	784,692	242,996	474,938

* estimated indication

Figure 2: Alphabetical List of Mass Demonstrations with Large Attendance on the Territory of the GDR in 1989/1990

<u>City</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Number of Demonstrators*</u>
Berlin	4 November 1989	500,000
Dresden	8 October 1989	20,000
	23 October 1989	100,000
	15 January 1990	150,000
Halle	20 November 1989	100,000
Karl-Marx-Stadt	6 November 1989	100,000
Leipzig	9 October 1989	70,000
	16 October 1989	110,000
	23 October 1989	225,000
	30 October 1989	350,000
	6 November 1989	500,000
Magdeburg	6 November 1989	80,000
Plauen	21 October 1989	50,000
Schwerin	30 October 1989	80,000

* Number of demonstrators is approximate.

Figure 3: Key Figures of Economic Development in the GDR 1987-1989

	<u>1987</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1989</u>
External Debts (in billion US-Dollars)	16.8	18.5	-
GDP (in billion GDR Marks)	332.81	346.13	353.34
Growth Rate of GDP (in %)	2.5	2.8	2.3

Figure 4: Development of Unemployment Rate in West Germany (excluding Berlin) and East Germany (including Berlin), as well as Germany as a whole, based on Dependent Civil Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages

<u>Year</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Germany</u>
1991	6.2	10.2	7.3
1992	6.4	14.4	8.5
1993	8.0	15.4	9.8
1994	9.0	15.7	10.6
1995	9.1	14.8	10.4
1996	9.9	16.6	11.5
1997	10.8	19.1	12.7
1998	10.3	19.2	12.3
1999	9.6	18.7	11.7
2000	8.4	18.5	10.7
2001	8.0	18.8	10.3
2002	8.5	19.2	10.8
2003	9.3	20.1	11.6
2004	9.4	20.1	11.7
2005	11.0	20.6	13.0
2006	10.2	19.2	12.0
2007	8.3	16.7	10.1
2008	7.2	14.6	8.7
2009	7.7	14.5	9.1
2010	7.4	13.4	8.6
2011	6.7	12.6	7.9
2012	6.6	11.9	7.6
2013	6.7	11.6	7.7

Figure 5: Development of Unemployment Rate in East Germany and Berlin based on Dependent Civil Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages

<u>Year</u>	<u>Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania</u>	<u>Brandenburg</u>	<u>Berlin</u>	<u>Saxony- Anhalt</u>	<u>Thuringia</u>	<u>Saxony</u>
1991	12.5	10.3	10.6	10.3	10.2	9.1
1992	16.8	14.8	12.4	15.3	15.4	13.6
1993	17.5	15.3	12.8	17.2	16.3	14.9
1994	17.0	15.3	13.2	17.6	16.5	15.7
1995	16.1	14.2	13.6	16.5	15.0	14.4
1996	18.0	16.2	15.2	18.8	16.7	15.9
1997	20.3	18.9	17.3	21.7	19.1	18.4
1998	20.5	18.8	17.9	21.7	18.3	18.8
1999	19.4	18.7	17.7	21.7	16.5	18.6
2000	19.0	18.4	17.6	21.4	16.5	18.5
2001	19.6	18.8	17.9	20.9	16.5	19.0
2002	20.0	19.1	18.9	20.9	17.2	19.3
2003	21.7	20.4	20.2	21.8	18.1	19.4
2004	22.1	20.3	19.9	21.7	18.1	19.4
2005	22.1	19.9	21.5	21.7	18.6	20.0
2006	20.8	18.7	20.1	19.9	17.0	18.8
2007	18.1	16.4	17.9	17.4	14.4	16.3
2008	15.5	14.4	16.1	15.2	12.3	14.3
2009	14.9	13.6	16.4	14.8	12.6	14.3
2010	14.0	12.4	15.8	13.5	10.9	13.1
2011	13.8	11.9	15.5	12.5	9.8	11.8
2012	13.2	11.3	14.5	12.4	9.4	10.9
2013	12.9	11.0	13.9	12.1	9.1	10.5

Figure 6: Comparison of Net Migration Development in East Germany 1990/2008

<u>Federal State</u>	<u>1990 (in millions)</u>	<u>2008 (in millions)</u>	<u>Difference (in percentages)</u>
Berlin	3.43	3.43	-0.1
Brandenburg	2.58	2.52	-2.2
Saxony	4.76	4.19	-12.0
Thuringia	2.61	2.27	-13.2
Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania	1.92	1.66	-13.5
Saxony-Anhalt	2.87	2.38	-17.1
West Germany (without East Berlin)	61.57	65.54	+6.5
East Germany (without West Berlin)	14.75	13.03	-11.7

Figure 7: Development of Gross Domestic Product compared to the previous year in West Germany (excluding Berlin), East Germany (including Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-2013 (in real terms and concatenated) in percentages

<u>Year</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Germany</u>
1992	1.1	8.1	1.9
1993	-2.5	9.2	-1.0
1994	1.5	8.6	2.5
1995	1.1	4.8	1.7
1996	0.6	1.6	0.8
1997	1.9	0.7	1.7
1998	2.1	0.5	1.9
1999	2.0	1.5	1.9
2000	3.4	1.0	3.1
2001	1.8	0.2	1.5
2002	0.0	0.0	0.0
2003	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4
2004	1.2	0.9	1.2
2005	0.7	0.7	0.7
2006	3.8	3.4	3.7
2007	3.4	2.8	3.3
2008	1.1	1.3	1.1
2009	-5.5	-3.3	-5.2
2010	4.2	3.0	4.0
2011	3.6	1.9	3.3
2012	0.8	0.2	0.7
2013	0.5	0.3	0.4

Figure 8: Development of Gross Domestic Product (in real terms and concatenated) compared to the previous year in the new federal states of East Germany (excluding Berlin) in percentages

<u>Year</u>	<u>Brandenburg</u>	<u>Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania</u>	<u>Saxony</u>	<u>Saxony-Anhalt</u>	<u>Thuringia</u>
1992	9.1	8.7	9.6	9.8	18.0
1993	12.7	10.5	13.0	13.1	13.3
1994	11.3	11.4	13.0	10.6	12.4
1995	7.4	7.3	7.8	3.9	3.4
1996	3.5	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8
1997	2.5	1.8	-0.1	2.9	3.3
1998	1.0	-0.5	0.8	0.3	1.5
1999	4.1	2.4	1.5	1.5	2.5
2000	2.7	-0.2	0.1	1.0	1.3
2001	0.4	-0.6	1.6	-0.6	0.9
2002	-0.5	-0.3	1.6	1.9	-0.5
2003	-0.3	-0.7	0.9	-0.5	1.1
2004	1.7	1.4	2.0	1.2	1.9
2005	1.3	0.6	-0.1	0.1	0.3
2006	2.6	1.7	4.1	3.2	3.2
2007	1.5	4.3	2.7	2.3	2.8
2008	1.6	1.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3
2009	-2.7	-1.6	-4.2	-5.1	-5.3
2010	3.4	0.7	2.9	3.9	4.9
2011	0.4	1.5	2.5	-1.5	3.6
2012	0.7	0.7	-0.6	0.7	-0.6
2013	0.7	-1.1	0.3	-1.2	0.5

Figure 9: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in West Germany (including West Berlin), East Germany (including East Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-1999 in percentages

<u>Year</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Germany</u>
1992	3.9	13.4	5.1
1993	3.6	10.6	4.5
1994	2.7	3.6	2.6
1995	1.6	1.9	1.8
1996	1.3	1.9	1.4
1997	1.9	2.3	2.0
1998	0.9	1.1	1.0
1999	0.7	0.4	0.6

Figure 10: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in Germany as a whole 2000-2013 in percentages

<u>Year</u>	<u>Germany</u>
2000	1.4
2001	2.0
2002	1.4
2003	1.1
2004	1.6
2005	1.6
2006	1.5
2007	2.3
2008	2.6
2009	0.3
2010	1.1
2011	2.1
2012	2.0
2013	1.5

Figure 11: Membership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic of the most important International Organisations

<u>Date</u>	<u>Federal Republic of Germany</u>	<u>German Democratic Republic</u>
1950		COMECON
1951	ESCS	
1955	NATO	Warsaw Pact
1957	EURATOM EEC	
1961	OECD	
1973	UN CSCE	UN CSCE
1975	OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) G7	OSCE* (Helsinki Accords)
1995	WTO	

* The OSCE was not formally established until 1975

Figure 12: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic 1989-2013 in percentages

	<u>Inflation</u>	<u>General Unemployment Rate</u>	<u>Gross Domestic Product</u>
1989	1.4	-	-
1990	9.7	-	-
1991	56.6	2.3	-10.0
1992	11.1	3.3	-2.0
1993	20.8	4.3	1.2
1994	10.0	4.3	2.9
1995	9.1	4.0	6.2
1996	8.8	3.9	4.5
1997	8.5	4.8	-0.9
1998	10.7	6.5	-0.2
1999	2.1	8.7	1.7
2000	3.9	8.8	4.2
2001	4.7	8.1	3.1
2002	1.8	7.3	2.1
2003	0.1	7.8	3.8
2004	2.8	8.3	4.7
2005	1.9	7.9	6.8
2006	2.5	7.1	7.0
2007	2.8	5.3	5.7
2008	6.3	4.4	3.1
2009	1.0	6.7	-4.5
2010	1.5	7.3	2.5
2011	1.9	6.7	1.8
2012	3.3	7.0	-1.0
2013	1.4	-	-

Figure 13: Graphs showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech territory of Czechoslovakia, and then the Czech Republic, between 1989-2013 in percentages according to the figures in 'Figure 12'




Figure 14: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia and then the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages

<u>Year</u>	<u>Inflation</u>	<u>General Unemployment Rate</u>	<u>Gross Domestic Product</u>
1989	-	-	1.2
1990	-	-	-2.7
1991	-	11.1	-14.6
1992	-	10.9	-6.7
1993	-	12.2	-3.7
1994	13.4	13.7	6.2
1995	9.9	13.1	5.8
1996	5.8	11.3	6.9
1997	6.1	11.9	4.4
1998	6.7	12.6	4.4
1999	10.6	16.4	0.0
2000	12.0	18.8	1.4
2001	7.3	19.3	3.5
2002	3.3	18.6	4.6
2003	8.6	17.5	4.8
2004	7.5	18.1	5.1
2005	2.7	16.2	6.7
2006	4.5	13.3	8.3
2007	2.8	11.0	10.5
2008	4.6	9.6	5.8
2009	1.6	12.1	-4.9
2010	1.0	14.4	4.2
2011	3.9	13.5	3.0
2012	3.6	13.9	1.8
2013	-	-	-

Figure 15: Graph showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia, and the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages according to the figures in 'Figure 14'




Figure 16: Membership of Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak Republics of the most important International Organisations

Date	Czech Republic	Slovak Republic
1945	United Nations (as Czechoslovakia)	
1949	COMECON (as Czechoslovakia)	
1955	Warsaw Pact (as Czechoslovakia)	
1973	CSCE (as Czechoslovakia)	
1975	OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) (as Czechoslovakia)	
1990	CEI (as Czechoslovakia)	
1991	Visegrád Group (as Czechoslovakia)	
1993	United Nations Visegrád Group CEFTA (until 2004) CEI OSCE	United Nations Visegrád Group CEFTA (until 2004) CEI OSCE
1995	OECD WTO	WTO
1999	NATO	
2000		OECD
2004	EU	EU NATO
2009		Eurozone

* The OSCE was not formally established until 1975